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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ENGINEERING COLONIALISM: RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF
FLOOD CONTROL IN GUYANA
by
Joshua M. Mullenite
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Gail Hollander, Major Professor
Overabundance and scarcity of water are global concerns. Across the world’s
low-lying coastal plains, flooding brought on by sea level rise acts as an existential threat
for a multitude of people and cultures while in desert (and increasingly non-desert)
regions intensifying drought cycles do the same. In the decades to come, how people
manage these threats will have important implications not only for individual and cultural
survival, but also for questions of justice. Recent research on flooding and flood
management probes the histories of survival, and adaptation in flood threatened regions
for insights into emergent flood-related crises. However, scholars have thus far
overemphasized the technical aspects of how engineered flood control systems
functioned, overlooking both the specific social, political, and economic contexts within
which past practices emerged and the social worlds that they helped create. This
dissertation examines the social, economic, and political histories of flood control
projects in the South American country of Guyana in order to understand the long lasting
social, political, and environmental impacts of colonial-era projects.

v

To do this, I utilized archival data collected from the National Archives in
London, UK, historical newspaper articles collected through online newspaper databases,
press release statements from Guyana’s major political parties, and unstructured and
semi-structured interviews with residents from coastal Guyana. These data were imported
and analyzed using qualitative data analysis software in order to make connections across
spatial and temporal scales.
The key finding of the dissertation is that, in Guyana, flood control engineering
has historically played multiple social, political, and economic roles beyond the
functional explanations assumed in many present environmental management discourses.
Colonial engineering projects served as a way to protect colonizers from economic crises
and social upheaval and were not just a means for protecting the coast from flooding.
Additionally, the dissertation found that these projects were key to creating the racial
geographies that helped to protect colonialism in its final years and which continue to
shape coastal life today. Finally, the dissertation found that, after the end of colonialism,
flood engineering projects were incorporated into larger projects of racialized regime
survival.
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INTRODUCTION - ENGINEERING COLONIALISM

"Possibly the little already known may enable us to see farther into the darkness of the
future, and to assist at events which are not yet. Possibly we may succeed in
contemplating in thought the spectacle of human history beyond the evil days of strife and
ignorance, and there again behold the picture of grandeur and beauty already unfolded
by the earth." - Elisée Reclus, The Universal Geography, Vol. XIX (1876, vi)

Overabundance and scarcity of water are global concerns. Across the world’s
low-lying coastal plains, flooding brought on by sea level rise acts as an existential threat
for a multitude of people and cultures while in desert (and increasingly non-desert)
regions intensifying drought cycles do the same. In the decades to come, how people
manage these threats will have important implications not only for individual and cultural
survival, but also for questions of justice. Social, political, and economic conditions will
play a vital role in the creation and continued engineering of water management schemes.
As these schemes modify landscapes seeking to perfect them for particularly human ends,
they will themselves become both reflective of and embedded in the social worlds that
surround them (Geertz 1972). This is certainly the case in Guyana1, where long histories

1

Throughout this dissertation, I use several names to refer to the same geographical
region: the present-day country of Guyana. It was first established as four separate
colonies by the Dutch. Essequibo and Pomeroon on the west, Demerara (or Demerary) in
the center, and Berbice in the east. Pomeroon was never successfully colonized on its
own and would later become a part of the colony of Essequibo. When the British took
official control over the Dutch holdings in 1814, they combined Essequibo and Demerara
1

of environmental engineering in the name of water management have thoroughly shaped
and have been shaped by social relations in the country. This dissertation seeks to
understand this relationship between infrastructure and the shaping of social conditions,
looking in particular at the ways in which flood control infrastructure has been used as a
form of governance in the South American country’s low-lying coastal zone and the
long-lasting impacts this has had on coastal socioecological resilience. In understanding
governance, I draw on the late work of Michel Foucault. For Foucault (1982, 790), “[t]o
govern […] is to structure the possible actions of others.” Beyond the function of
government, which includes the official and institutionalized systems which define and
enforce laws, taxes, etc. governance serves as a somewhat unofficial extension of this
power into the practice of everyday life. Governance structures, rather than officially
being officially codified or easily visible may serve as unseen extensions of broader
systems of power. Generally speaking, this dissertation seeks to answer the question of
how flood control infrastructure development, construction, and maintenance interact
with the social formations of a given place, and in particular with the socio-geographical
formations. How does this infrastructure work to shape the actions of free individuals
through the delimitation of new social, political, and economic boundaries?

into a single colony which were united with Berbice in 1831 to become British Guiana.
Throughout the text, I use each of these names when I am speaking specifically about the
historical place. In 1966, British Guiana became the Commonwealth Realm of Guyana
and in 1970 the Co-operative Republic of Guyana. I simply use Guyana to refer both the
postcolonial configuration of the state (with no differentiation between Commonwealth
Realm and Co-operative Republic) and to refer to the geographical area in a trans- or ahistorical manner. In cases where I am referring to the geographical area during the broad
British colonial period, I use British Guiana.
2

An Introduction to Coastal Guyana
Walking across the airport tarmac when I first arrived in Guyana I was greeted by
the distinctive feeling of being in an amphibious landscape, one in which “across distinct
geographical, social, political, and economic contexts, water and land enter in relational
processes that have implications for the production of place” (Gagné and Rasmussen
2016, 135). Having grown up near the swamps, canals, and oceans that shape life in
South Florida, it was a familiar sensation. The Cheddi Jagan International Airport, some
40 kilometers (around 25 miles) from Georgetown on the eastern bank of the Demerara
River, is far removed both geographically and socially from the busy streets of Guyana’s
coastal capital, but the sense of the water from the unseen Demerara River nearby was
still present. As we drove north along the river, down the poorly lit highway to our
coastal destination of Ogle, in what are now the eastern suburbs of the capital city but
which was at one time a thriving sugar plantation, my companion pointed out the sugar
fields that lined the road to the east, and the kokers2 that helped drain and irrigate them to
the west, both important parts of life in the country’s coastal plain and highly visible
indicators of the country’s long colonial history. Regardless of the day of week, the

2

Koker is an old Dutch term that has survived in Guyana from the Dutch colonial period
but has little use anywhere else in the world. It refers to a type of flood gate which can be
opened to flood a canal for irrigation purposes or to drain the canal when water levels are
dangerously high. Sluice, a term for similar gates that came from the British and has
wider international use is also sometimes used in Guyana. I generally use the term koker
throughout this dissertation as this is the term most commonly used in my conversations
in the country.
3

sounds of music fill the air from the small rum shops and bars lining the East Bank Public
Road as the taxis and minibuses dodge people and animals walking along the street.
When we approached Georgetown and the public road veered inland from the
river, the fields gave way to factories, shops, and housing and the kokers became more
frequent as we entered the highly-engineered landscape of the coast. Driving from the
airport to the East Coast Demerara region – our final destination on that trip – requires
traveling through Georgetown and, in particular, through the narrow streets sitting on
either side of small canals that quickly fill with even the lightest rains. Knowing it was
my first time in the country and owing to road work in preparation for the upcoming
postcolonial jubilee celebrations, the taxi driver took us down South Road, where one of
the few Dutch colonial-era drainage canals splits the east- and westbound corridors and
down Camp Street in the Cummingsburg neighborhood, where a similar French-built
canal had been filled in and replaced by a tree-lined avenue after the area’s conversion
from a sugar plantation to a colonial residential district.
As my taxi exited central Georgetown along the sea wall road that divides the city
from the Atlantic Ocean, the unmistakable sensation of the ocean air and the sharp sound
of crashing waves struck me. The road is nearly adjacent to the sea, but at high tide sits a
few feet below it. In some places, people had parked their cars along the road to celebrate
the weekend in the public spaces provided by the sea wall. In this Caribbean cultural
tradition, called liming, the rum and beer flow freely as the sounds of Soca – a variation
of calypso originating in Trinidad and Tobago that draws on musical styles from the
many ethnic groups that occupy the Anglophone Caribbean – compete with the explosive
sounds of ocean swells as they crashed against the rip-rap breakers a few feet away. Even
4

prior to the end of colonialism, the sea wall served as a place of relaxation, where live
music could be heard and the ocean breeze enjoyed (see Plate 1).
To the east, the roads cleared and the only thing visible along the sea wall was the
spray of the ocean as waves collided with the modern concrete barrier built to prevent
overtopping. The original sea wall, built between 1855 and 1874 after the devastating
Great Kingston Flood of 1855 (see Chapter 2 - “A Mild Despotism of Sugar”: Race,
Labor, and Water Management), is a sloping concrete structure built atop an earthen dam.
The stepped façade on the oceanside combines with riprap to act as breakers, meant to
keep the waves and their erosive actions at bay. Though once a dynamic site of coastal
formation and erosion (see Chapter 1 - The Precolonial and Early Colonial History of
Coastal Settlement), the sea wall ensures some measure of human control. As silting and
accretion occurred, the waves began to break higher, forcing the postcolonial
governments to erect an adjunct sea wall consisting primarily of precast concrete
barricades atop the colonial structure (affectionately called “the toenails” by some of my
Guyanese colleagues.) Despite these attempts to adapt infrastructure to new coastal
realities, breaches and overtopping are still common, though now repaired much more
quickly. During my time in the country, a sea wall breech that was inundating the East
Coast Public Road was repaired within hours, a feat that would have been unheard of
even a decade ago.

5

Plate 1 - The Sea Wall, ca. 1885. The portion in the photograph, about 150 yards from
the “round house” remains a popular space for social activity. (The National Archives,
UK CO 1069/355/6)

Beyond the apparently idyllic nature of this coastal scenery, Guyana’s politics are
deeply embedded within the fabric of these human-environment interactions. While I will
provide details of the country’s history and the development of at least some aspects of
the political life of the coast in the chapters that follow, it is worth highlighting the
modern racial-cultural geography as a means of situating and providing broader context
for the region. Even during the short trip from the airport to Ogle, never leaving the
greater Georgetown area, we passed through communities that were primarily Indo-
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Guyanese or Afro-Guyanese in both majority populations and culture. Within central
Georgetown, the spatial segregation is less immediately obvious but can fall along class
lines, with Indo-Guyanese, Portuguese-Guyanese, and Chinese-Guyanese populations
owning a comparatively larger number of local businesses and Afro-Guyanese holding a
larger number of laboring positions3. In the country more broadly, the segregation is even
more pronounced with different ethnic groups populating different Neighborhood
Democratic Councils (NDCs, the basic political body of local government.) With few
exceptions, NDCs are run by representatives from one of the major political parties
which, in the country’s racially-bifurcated political landscape (see discussion in Chapter
4) align with the major racial-ethnic group represented in that NDC. In other words, most
African-majority NDCs have local political representation from the African-majority
political party while Indian-majority NDCs are represented by the Indian-majority party.
Through the history outlined in this dissertation, the borders of the NDCs tend to fall
along the boundaries of old plantations and thus along the lines created by water control
infrastructure. Canals designed to prevent flooding or irrigate fields serve as effective
racial-ethnic boundaries. While the boundaries are soft (i.e. people of all ethnic
backgrounds can and do move freely between them) they provide discrete lines upon
which locals understand the coast and to whom the government is expected to serve.

3

In addition to the politically dominant Afro- and Indo-Guyanese populations,
Georgetown also has a small Portuguese population and a growing Chinese population.
These groups have historically served as population buffers between the majority
populations of Afro and Indo-Guyanese and the white settler population, but more
recently have come to dominate certain sectors of the economy, particularly grocery
stores.
7

Colonial-era stereotypes of African villages as being violent, fecund, or otherwise “wild”
persist in the postcolonial imagination and I was often warned not the enter them alone,
although I never felt less safe than anywhere else in the country and at times, especially
in the East Coast Demerara region the borders between African and Indian-majority areas
are fuzzy at best. One goal of this dissertation is to better understand the origins of this
geography as well as the ways in which flood control infrastructure projects have been
used to create and reinforce it.

Water and Water Management in Coastal Guyana and Beyond
In concert with this racial cultural geography, water is an everyday part of the
experience of coastal Guyana. As much as 90 percent of the country’s population lives
along the coast, the majority of which sits below sea level. In the environs of the capital
city and its surrounding suburbs, a network of canals, ditches, and open pits work in
conjunction with earthen dams, concrete sea walls, engineered groins, riprap, modern
mechanical pumps, 18th and 19th century floodgates, and more recently dense mangrove
forests in an attempt to delineate the boundaries between the wet and the dry. In the
villages that extend outward along the sea or down the banks and across the deltas of one
of the country’s many rivers, the struggle with water is no less quotidian. As agricultural
spaces, they have unique water needs in addition to protection from the encroaching tide
or the river flood. In these spaces, the needs for drainage and irrigation infrastructure to
support the agrarian coastal economy interact and conflict with the massive inequalities
of postcolonial life through processes that Sara Pritchard (2012) refers to as
“hydroimperialism” and “hydrocapitalism.” These describe “the ways that water,
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hydraulic knowledge, and water management practices both revealed and reproduced
unequal power relations predicated upon an expansionist mentalité, whether political or
economic in orientation” as well as “how particular hydraulic knowledge systems and
management regimes reflected and realized capitalist relations,” deepening the already
uneven political economies in place as a result of colonialism and extending them into the
present (Pritchard 2012, 592).
This political economy of water management has played out in a variety of highly
visible ways in the postcolonial history of Guyana. A widespread lack of affordable
housing and a coastal economy tied to a dying agricultural industry have given rise to a
large population of homeless and squatters, often living on marginal and flood prone
lands (see Pelling 1999, Chapter 4 - Colonial Persistence: Race, Class, and Flood Control
Since 1966). Recent cases of squatting in the southern edges of Georgetown have directly
interacted with flood management practices as squatters in South Ruimveldt build their
houses along the banks of drainage canals, making it difficult (if not impossible) for
dredges to pass through them and clear them of debris. This exacerbates already severe
local flooding with squatters feeling to worst impacts of it both in terms of their
proximity to flood waters and the disruptions they experience in their everyday lives.
Besides squatting, throughout the country, the inflated costs of garbage disposal in certain
areas and the impassibility of certain village roads after heavy rains in others means that
drainage and irrigation canals, water conservancies, and mangrove forests become
dumping grounds for everyday refuse, clogging drainage outflows and increasing the
impacts of floods (see Thom 2011; Plate 2; Chapter 4 - Colonial Persistence: Race, Class,
and Flood Control Since 1966). If there is an inequality of experiences of flooding along
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political economic lines, what about racial or ethnic lines? How do race and class unite
and collide with the engineered coastal landscape? Besides generalized notions of
neocolonialism or late capitalism, what are the political economies at work in such a
complex socioecological system? What social desires and imaginaries clash within it?
Perhaps most importantly, how did this system come to exist as it does?

Plate 2 - Trash thrown between the seawall and mangroves at Beterverwagting (Personal
photo, 1 July 2016)

Beyond Guyana, coastal flooding represents one of the most significant
challenges facing the world today. Coastal zones are currently more populated, are
experiencing higher rates of population growth, and are urbanizing more rapidly than

10

their hinterland counterparts and show no signs of slowing (Neumann et al. 2015). The
high population density and rapid population growth in coastal areas indicates that sea
level rise will combine with other sources of coastal flooding in ways that have the
potential to displace hundreds of millions of people and have significant impacts in the
global economy over the next century, with the effects being unevenly experienced in the
developing world (see Dasgupta et al. 2009). To address this threat, a renewed critical
and historical interest in flood management practices and flood control infrastructure
systems that are meant to mitigate the impacts of sea level rise has emerged in order to
provide the tools necessary for facing these uncertain environmental futures (Gersonius et
al. 2013; Hill 2015). This recent research on flooding and flood management probes the
histories of resilience, survival, and adaptation in flood threatened regions for insights
into emergent flood-related crises (e.g. Castonguay 2007; Hill 2015; Shrubsole 2007;
Wesselink 2007). However, scholars looking at the past to find solutions for
contemporary environmental concerns have tended to overemphasize the technical
aspects of how engineered flood management systems functioned, overlooking both the
specific social, political, and economic contexts within which past practices emerged and
the social worlds that they helped create. These oversights create the potential for
environmental futures that perpetuate the unjust social conditions of the past and present,
leaving marginalized people vulnerable (Ranganathan 2015).
One crucial concern missing from these analyses is that infrastructural works such
as roads, bridges, power grids, communications networks, and the dykes, dams, levees,
and sea walls that make up flood management systems can have both intentional and
unintended political effects resulting from the way they are designed and built, prior to

11

any of their stated or implied technical goals (Winner 1986; Mitchell 2002). Political
ecologists have begun to argue that infrastructure networks extend beyond just the items
built by humans to make trade, transportation, and communication easier but also to the
natural systems which those social tools rely on (Carse 2014). These broad networks of
human, natural, and hybrid systems broker state power, defining the ways in which the
state can enter everyday life and in turn shape the possibilities of life around the goals of
the state (Meehan 2014). Thus, in the Foucauldian sense outlined above, the networks of
infrastructure that make up everyday life are in themselves modes of government. Rather
than being subscribed to and tools for some external governmentality, these systems are
extensions of governmental power.
Recognizing that flood management projects rely on networks of infrastructure
that are imbued with political, economic, and social objectives, this dissertation uses a
case study of the ways in which Guyana’s colonial politics are both expressed in and
(re)produced by flood management projects in order to understand the sociality of
infrastructure and the resilient political and economic commitments of colonialism which
are implicated within it. Through an examination of the environmental history and
political ecology of flooding and flood management in coastal Guyana, I focus on the
ways in which colonial processes of racialization shaped the design and implementation
of flood control infrastructure, how racial categories were shaped and reshaped by this
infrastructure, and how flood infrastructure provides a space for the persistence of
colonial racialized social and environmental practices into the present through the
postcolonial persistence of colonial formations. In this way, I argue that Guyana’s flood
management infrastructure served as both an active form of governance in the present as
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well as way means for ensuring the and governing the future by forever limiting the
possibilities of coastal life.
Utilizing a combination of archival research and in depth, semi-structured
interviews (see on page 34), this dissertation also seeks to understand the ways in which,
beyond protecting the coast from flooding, infrastructure acts as a way of reinforcing the
power of the white supremacist colonial state and to understand how, like colonial laws,
customs, and economies, environmental engineering continues to shape the boundaries of
possibility for postcolonial life. I draw on theoretical interventions from human
geography, anthropology, science technology studies, environmental history, and other
disciplines to understand Guyana’s flood management system, and the broader water
management system it is intimately a part of, as a form of colonial governance, what has
been called ‘colonial hydrology’ (D’Souza 2006; see also Pritchard 2011). My primary
argument is that, in their attempts to engineer the environment in such a way as to reduce
the risk of catastrophic flooding of agricultural lands, colonial administrators were
simultaneously and actively engineering the social life of the colony. In this postcolonial
period, these water management projects became tied to other colonial legacies including
the racial politics of the postcolonial state and the new-found desires for regime survival
embedded within it (see Hintzen 1989). In this way, water management projects are not
just ways of protecting people or land from the threat of flooding or to provide insurance
to agricultural sectors, but instead act as an extension of the colonial government itself,
acting as a silent and omnipresent enforcer of colonial politics, including those which
limit the ability of individuals to prepare for and respond to environmental harms in the
present (cf. Pritchard 2011). I trace this governance through colonial processes of
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racialization, class formation, and the agrarian economies that bolstered the colonial
endeavor in the Caribbean.

The Political Ecology and Critical Physical Geography of Flooding
On May 16, 1895, a letter in the Daily Chronicle titled “Is the Long Sleep Over?”
called British Guiana “a tropical Holland.” The comparison – relating to the sub-sea level
nature of the colony’s most densely populated region as well as the systems of
infrastructure which protect and drain it – is in some ways an apt one, though perhaps
incomplete. It need not be said, either now or in 1895, that Georgetown is not
Amsterdam, and that the flood control infrastructure existing between the two may be the
extent of their similarities. However, with sea level rise providing a simultaneous rise of
the Dutch as the global experts in coastal water engineering, the comparison serves as a
useful tool for understanding the ways in which different political and economic
conditions shape experiences with flooding. It is also a useful comparison because much
of the groundwork for Guyana’s flood infrastructure was laid during the Dutch colonial
period, even if not actually built by the Dutch themselves (as detailed in Chapter 1 - The
Precolonial and Early Colonial History of Coastal Settlement.) In a recent New York
Times article, Arnoud Molenaar, then the chief resilience officer for the Dutch city of
Rotterdam, stated that “Water managers were the first rulers of the land. Designing the
city [of Rotterdam] to deal with water was the first task of survival” and was a task that is
always in process (Kimmelman 2017). But we might ask in response, “the survival of
what?” What sorts of politics are at stake within a rule of water management? What kinds
of political, economic, and social motivations underlie these politics? What forms of
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injustice are created or perpetuated through such a regime? Such questions can be
answered through an engagement with the fields of political ecology and critical physical
geography.
Emerging from critical examinations of disasters in both geography and
development studies, political ecological analysis has suggested that there are political,
economic, and social factors that must be considered in attempts to understand the drivers
behind changing environments, upsetting the distinction between “natural” and
“artificial” ecological phenomena. The ways in which people responded to
environmental change, whether through the long-term effects of a process like
desertification or in the recovery period after a particularly bad flood, earthquake, or
some other natural event was becoming an important part of development planning
(Wisner et al 2004). From its inception as a discrete body of literature, political ecology
has been concerned with, among other things, the ways in which apolitical ecological
discourses of adaptation and maladaptation to environmental change were deployed in
policy as a means of reducing vulnerability to environmental hazards and change
(Neumann 2005; Watts 2015). Rather than address these issues at their root, however,
mainstream socioecological analysis and environmental policy focused instead of the
actions of individuals, ignoring the context within which these actions occurred (Blaikie
1985; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). Thus, actions that appeared irrational or downright
harmful were instead responses to a broad set of conditions which limited individual
possibilities.
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Critical physical geography takes this analysis a step further. It argues that,
beyond political and economic inequalities operating at the interface of people and the
environments in which they live, it extends to the very geophysical nature of the land
(Lave et al. 2014). In this way, it is not just floods, droughts, or famines that are caused at
the root level by inequality, but the very geophysical processes which occur in place. As
demonstrated throughout this dissertation, in Guyana this means not only do the floods
experienced along the coast have political and economic origins, but so do the very
meandering of the country’s river and the processes of sedimentation, accretion, and
erosion that occur along the sea.

Historical Analysis and Socioecological Resilience
Over the past three decades, there has been something of a paradigm shift in the
field of ecology as well as in environmental studies more broadly that has impacted the
way flood vulnerability is conceptualized. While political ecology critiqued the apolitical
nature of ecological analysis applied to social systems, a new form of ecology was
emerging which saw adaptation as taking place within a larger field of instability, where
different threats were managed and negotiated in a broader plane and in such a way that,
without the influence of powerful external factors, emergent forms of coping develop and
create resilient systems capable of withstanding a variety of everyday threats. If plants,
non-human animals, and entire ecosystems can be resilient, then why not people? Over
the past decade, a new form of mainstream socioecological scholarship has developed
which seeks to understand the ways in which humans work collectively to account for a
variety of social, political, economic, and environmental information in order to better
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withstand potential threats to their environments. Vulnerability, in this new sense, occurs
when some people are unable to account for some threatening force and thus fail to be
resilient. However, it is only recently that the topic has been approached within the
geography literature. A Web of Science citation report of geography journals shows less
than 50 references to the concept in 2005 and nearly 500 in 2015. The rapid growth of
resilience as a model for understanding a variety of social and environmental problems
has become a cause for concern for many geographers and those in allied fields, with
many uneasy with the ease with which resilience is tied to neoliberal development
practices (e.g. Evans and Reid 2013; Chandler 2014; Welsh 2014). This is particularly
true in the interdisciplinary subfield of political ecology, where anxieties over resilience
are tied to a broader concern with approaches to development and risk reduction that fail
to address the causes of poverty and vulnerability (Bryant 1997; Taylor 2015; Watts
2015). Disaster scholars more broadly see promise offered by resilience, but only if
inequalities are addressed in its formulation (e.g. Canon and Müller-Mahn 2010; Tierney
2014). This latter work is in line with resilience scholarship that looks to political ecology
as a means of better understanding the operation of power in socioecological systems
(Fabinyi, Evans, and Foale 2014; Ingalls and Stedman 2016).
In the time since the ecological concept of resilience developed in the early 1970s,
it has become a normative model for environmental and economic policy and a key tool
for governance in a complex world with an uncertain future (Aradau 2014; Welsh 2014).
If humans are part of complex socioecological systems, catastrophes that disrupt human
life carry the potential to cause a disruption that cannot be recovered from. Since
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catastrophe can occur anywhere at any time, risk reduction has been incorporated into
people’s most banal practices (Aradau and Van Munster 2011). Resilience offers
policymakers the opportunity to promise a new vision of security in an unknown, at risk
future (Aradau 2014). The result of this understanding of resilience as part of everyday
life always already at risk has resulted in new theorizing about how to build or promote
resilient communities that must deal with environmental change and disasters (e.g.
Aldrich 2012; Walker and Salt 2012; Washburn 2013; Rodin 2014; Tierney 2014; Biggs,
Schüller, and Schoon 2015). Resilience has likewise been used to inform new approaches
to sustainable development in order to address the general vulnerability experienced in
less developed countries (Handmer and Dovers 1996; Folke et al. 2002; Brand 2009).
The quick adaptation of resilience by geographers and those working in related
disciplines is not entirely surprising. Kevin Grove (2018, 15) argues that “the roots of
resilience can, to a surprising and largely under-acknowledged extent, be traced back to
earlier scholarly efforts to grapple with humans’ fundamental creativity and
unpredictability in a complex and indeterminate world lacking transcendental
guarantees.” However, the recent upsurge of resilience as a foundational concept in
multiple policy realms has drawn the attention of a number of critics who point to the
discursive strategies of resilience planning to promote certain political economic goals
that they see as detrimental to the continuation of life on earth (Welsh 2014). Drawing
largely on the theoretical insights of the later work of Michel Foucault, these scholars
argue that resilience discourses produce a new regime of truth in which the antithesis to
vulnerability is the ability of the individual to remain useful participants in a capitalist
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system with the least amount of reliance and input from the state. In this manifestation,
resilience becomes a way of refusing the protections that the liberal state has long
promised and instead shifted the burden on the private industries which require resilience
projects be profitable. For these critics, resilience represents acquiescence to neoliberal
capitalism, acceptance of a maintenance role in a system supported by mass inequality
rather than resistance, and a need only to adapt to the vulnerability experienced in
everyday life rather than attempting to eliminate it altogether (Walker and Cooper 2011;
Evans and Reid 2013; Aradau 2014; Chandler 2014; Welsh 2014). Jeremy Cooper and
Melinda Walker (2011) find this aspect of resilience to be a part of its origin story. They
link the development of resilience in ecology with the rise in popularity of the economic
work of Friedrich Hayek, arguing that a focus on the resilience of a system to absorb
disturbance fits neatly within economic concepts that are similarly subject to shifts,
disturbances, and potentially disastrous scenarios but which, over a long enough period,
maintain their desired function. David Chandler (2014) takes a slightly different
approach, arguing that as the idea of resilience developed it began to incorporate and
respond to a number of political economic criticisms that were being leveled against the
authoritarian tendencies of both capitalism and the state. Socioecological systems thus
incorporate a political economy based on the ability of the system to organize itself in
complex ways. By guiding this self-organization toward systematic resilience it can now
be seen as a way of preventing the existing system from changing, thus maintaining the
political economic status quo (Evans and Reid 2013).
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Embedded within this concept of socioecological resilience is a reliance on
environmental history that has gone largely unexamined. While this new focus on
inherently unstable and emergent systems reflects social scientific understandings of
complex socioecological relationships, work that looks at resilience has largely failed to
address the ways in which past shifts continue to shape the possibilities for future
outcomes. One of the sites in which this is most visible is in projects of environmental
restoration meant to increase resilience, where it might be worthwhile to ask to what state
exactly is the environment being restored and for what ends?4 The authors in a fairly
recent volume, edited by Allen Thompson and Jeremy Bendik-Keymer (2012), take up
the argument that not only should adaptation be the norm, but that it ought to be done in
ways that are ethical to human and natural worlds. The authors take adaptation to be a
type of mitigation for future catastrophic events. Adaptation, for them, is then a way not
only to adjust individual practices in everyday life to the reality of a volatile environment,
but a way of changing human-environment relations to reduce future impacts. However,
past decisions are not equally seen as structuring. Instead, the past is treated as a given
point with only a few possible options which are treated as being inevitable outcomes
broader conditions rather than contingent outcomes of larger social processes. The extent
of history thus exists only in as far as scholars consider the historical fidelity of the land
to be restored (even if climate change means we can never truly restore it to how it once
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There are several chapters on environmental restoration, its ethical considerations, and
the politics embedded within restoration projects in Thompson and Bendik-Keymer 2012.
I have situated this work within a broader context of climate adaptation and resilience in
Mullenite 2017.
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was). Once “restored,” human-environment relations must take a new form that does not
continue the violent exploitation of resources that caused the present problems. This is
because, while positive, restoration is ultimately a type of reparation or restitution that
require existing negative practices to exist. Restoration, then, is a one-time goal that must
coincide with new ways of interacting with the environment. In these new interactions,
we use the past not as a reference point for restoration goals or a source of environmental
harms but as a way of finding what it is we desire about past environments. I address this
to some degree in Chapter 4 - Colonial Persistence: Race, Class, and Flood Control Since
1966 but the entirety of this dissertation might be seen as a response to these somewhat
ahistorical or partially-historical approaches to environmental change. I argue throughout
this dissertation that human action on or toward the environment creates a variety of
social, economic, political, and even geophysical options while simultaneously
foreclosing on other possibilities and thus shaping the grounds on which resilience is both
understood and through which it might be realized. By treating resilience as ahistorical or
only quasi-historical, the broader conditions of life through which individual decisions
are made and their lasting impacts are ignored. Instead, socioecological resilience (in
some form or another, see Grove 2018 for discussion of the multiplicity of forms) is an
emergent character of social life which can flourish in some conditions and falter in
others, with the latter case creating a multitude of potential issues for (re)building
resilience later. A defeatist response might say that those possibilities for resilience are
long gone, but as ecologists and engineers work to manage and restore coastal
environments it is worth asking, what kinds of pasts and futures are they creating?
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The ahistoric nature of resilience is not its only fault. As it has become more
popular as a paradigm within environmental management and ecology more broadly,
resilience has also developed a growing number of critics. Michael Watts, for example,
has called resilience “old wine in new bottles,” arguing that resilience is not so much a
paradigm shift in ecological thinking as it is a way of repackaging old ideas of adaptation
and maladaptation into a new form (Watts 2015). Drawing on Pelling (2011) and Cote
and Nightingale (2012), he notes how the malleability of resilience makes the principle of
adaptation difficult to get a firm grasp on in this context (see also Anderson 2015).
However, he does see similarity between works on resilience and the normative character
of cultural ecology that political ecology sought from the outset to address (Watts 2015).
Thus, while not identical, earlier appeals adaptation and recent calls for increased
resilience serve similar functions in policy discourses. For Watts (2015), an important
difference arises in the way that resilience and its correlated principles function as a form
of biopolitics expressed in the administration and regulation of life processes. Here,
Watts agrees with a number of critics who focus on the ways resilience is used to govern
and secure everyday life (Walker and Cooper 2011; Evans and Reid 2014; Grove 2014a;
2014b). Because resilience focuses on the capacity of individuals to absorb shocks
without changing form or to recover from them and return to their previous state,
potentially stronger, disasters and vulnerability remain inevitable characteristics of the
resilience literature (see also Evans and Reid 2014). If resilience represents a way of
living with rather than reducing the risk of disasters, then the normative differences that
make resilience thinking incompatible with political ecology become clearer.
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Matt Turner (2014) links the rise of political ecology as a field of inquiry and
resilience-thinking in ecology to a mutual aversion to equilibrium approaches that could
not stand up to empirical, field-based evidence (see also Holling 1973; Neumann 2005;
Watts 2015). For Turner, one of the major differences between political ecology and
resilience approaches is in the normative commitments of each, with resilience scholars
largely missing broader systems of injustice by focusing primarily on the actions of
individuals. This leaves the potential for violent, vulnerability-producing institutions to
remain intact. An example of this can be seen in earlier work done by Garry Peterson
(2000) who argues that resilience offers a way of including more ecological analysis in
political ecology while political ecology can bring a stronger focus on political economy
in work on resilience. In his case of the political ecology of salmon in the Columbia
River Basin, however, he shows why the marriage of the two fields is difficult despite
their overlap. Peterson is concerned with a variety of multi-scalar human actions that
shape the ecology of the basin, potentially reducing the resilience of both human and
non-human life in the area. In doing this he overlooks the political economic causes of
changes in land use that decrease resilience (cf. Taylor 2015). This is in part because the
normative goals of resilience approaches, even when they attempt to make explicit the
role of political economy in environmental change like Peterson’s, are different than
those of vulnerability and political ecology-based approaches. In the case of the
Columbia River Basin, Peterson (2000) suggests changes in the form of governance of
water rights so that it includes a larger number of voices combined with legal structures
that prevent the wielding the political and economic power of one group over another.
While such changes are certainly agreeable to a political ecology approach, they do not
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go far enough as they leave in place the political and economic systems that lead to a lack
of resilience in the first place (cf. Turner 2014; Taylor 2015).
The differences between Peterson’s (2000) and political ecological readings of
environmental problems, social change, and the potential for meaningful change highlight
the apparent incommensurability of the approaches. This is due in part to the fact that
Peterson’s attempt to reconcile the fields does not account for what Antonio Ioris (2014)
calls the “political ecology of the state.” Ioris argues that the “historical role and class
commitments” of the state are fundamentally at odds with genuine desires for ecosystem
protection (Ioris 2014, viii). This is because the state exists as a way of ordering the
world for the expansion of capitalist accumulation processes at the expense of the
environment even when policies are enacted that are ostensibly meant to protect the
environment (Ioris 2014). The role of the state as an ordering force for the expansion and
continuation of capital accumulation, even if such an approach contradicts other proposed
goals of the state such as environmental and livelihood protections, must be accounted
for. This is particularly true when such ordering has the direct effect of reducing
resilience (Taylor 2015). Who is able to make environmental decisions, based on what
knowledge, and to what ends are key questions asked by political ecologists in order to
recognize the operation of power within socioecological systems (Bryant 1997). Such an
approach is not yet matched in the resilience literature which has thus far had only
limited engagement with the operations of power behind the way decisions are made
(Ingalls and Stedman 2016).
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One of the key points of contention between political ecology and resilience
approaches to environmental problems lie in the way each recognize questions of power
(Ingalls and Stedman 2016). Understanding how relations of power operate and the ways
in which this operation impacts socioecological systems is a defining characteristic of
political ecology (Bryant 1997). From its inception, political ecology has set itself apart
from other approaches to social and the environmental issues through a focus on the root
rather than proximate causes of these issues. Raymond Bryant (1997) has traced this
through the introduction of the sustainable development paradigm and its inability to
adequately address either social or environmental concerns. Because it is poverty, and not
the causes of poverty (i.e., unequal relations of power in a capitalist political economy)
that are tied to environmental degradation, superficial efforts at poverty alleviation that
leave in place the conditioning factors that produce poverty in the first place cannot
adequately speak to environmental issues (Bryant 1997; Neumann 2005; Watts 2015; see
also Watts 1983; Blaikie 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). Political ecology addresses
this shortcoming by recognizing that “the relationship between actors […] and the links
between actors and the physical environment, are conditioned by power relations”
(Bryant 1997, 10). It is the inequality of actors in these power relations that must be
understood and addressed if environmental problems are to be addressed effectively
(Bryant 1997).
Recent scholarship in resilience has attempted to overcome resilience’s lack of an
analysis of power (Fabinyi, Evans, and Foale 2014; Boonstra 2016; Ingalls and Stedman
2016). Thus far, these approaches have taken political ecology’s critique seriously.
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Michael Fabinyi and colleagues (2014) seek to understand power in resilience
scholarship through an expansion of the “social” character of social-ecological systems.
In particular, they focus on the ways in which differentiated social desires and relations
of power are conceptualized in anthropology and political ecology, respectively. They
argue that while resilience is itself inherently value neutral, it is treated primarily as a
positive condition of socioecological systems with little focus on the resilience of
pathological social relationships (such as poverty and general social inequality.) They
argue that, while resilience approaches have attempted to account for material operations
of power, they fail to account for the discursive potential for power that arose in later,
explicitly poststructuralist approaches to political ecology (e.g. Tsing 2005; Li 2007;
Escobar 2008). Because resilience does not account for the ability of power to circulate
through particular discourses, even when it looks at the role of knowledge in producing
resilient socioecological systems, it fails to understand much of the context that shapes
and reshapes environmental models, assuming them to be relatively static and power
neutral (Fabinyi, Evans, and Foale 2014; see also Cote and Nightingale 2012).
Wiebren Boonstra (2016) has noted that other social scientists, including political
ecologists, have reasons for understanding power that move beyond clarification and
better measurement of an ecosystems potential for resilience, including understanding
“the extent to which systems and institutions help people in societies to meet their needs
and wants, free from the power of others” (Boonstra 2016, 2). However, this is often
antithetical to the ways in which resilience is enacted in policy. David Chandler (2014)
has argued that the approach taken in resilience scholarship to understand the relationship
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between actors forecloses on the possibility of problems being assigned to any particular
cause due to vulnerability’s nonpoint origin, a fact conceded to some degree by Boonstra
(2016). However, while direct causal relationships cannot be traced due to the
epistemology on which resilience is founded, there is a need to recognize the indirect
responsibility for actions that cause negative socioecological impacts (Chandler 2014;
Boonstra 2016). To assign some level of responsibility, Boonstra (2016) argues for a
focus on power that looks not for particular individuals but instead at the ability of
individuals and groups to shape social relationships in ways that cause resilience to be
reduced. This analysis of power thus doesn’t require individuals be blamed or held liable
but does recognize that the actions of individuals are not equally powerful in a
socioecological system. While a useful addition to the resilience literature, this
conceptualization of power offers little in the way of a possibility for resistance or
structural change to take place that does not require the benevolence of those who wield
power in a particular set of social relationships. It likewise leaves in place the potential
for the conditions that produced vulnerability and reduced resilience to persist in the first
place, thus failing to overcome political ecology’s initial critique.

Postanarchist resilience

We see no special problem in the possibility of a coexistence of revolutionary, reformist,
and reactionary elements at the heart of the same theoretical or practical doctrine. We
refuse to play “take it or leave it,” under the pretext that theory justifies practice, being
born from it, or that one cannot challenge the process of “cure” except by starting from
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elements drawn from this very cure. As if every great doctrine were not a combined
formation, constructed from bits and pieces, various intermingled codes and flux, partial
elements and derivatives, that constitute its very life or becoming.
-

Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (1977, 117)

Despite criticisms of resilience as being intimately bound to a broader neoliberal
project meant to inoculate atomized individuals from the environmental and psychosocial
traumas wrought by an unjust political economy, there is the potential for the term to be
recaptured and used to represent the ability of people to survive and innovate in spite of
oppressive systems. In line with the work of Deleuze and Guattari in their critique of
Freudian psychoanalysis, there is no issue with resilience having a multitude of
incoherent or even contradictory elements at its core (Deleuze and Guattari 1977). As a
concept, the meaning of resilience and its role in both theory and practice are, in part,
derived from its use. This creates the potential for resilience to become something
radically different from what its intellectual progenitors ever intended (cf. Bogost 2015).
Thus, rather than reject resilience as a concept tied specifically to the rise of neoliberal
capitalism (see Walker and Cooper 2011), in this dissertation, I read resilience through
the lens of postanarchism and political ecology to both develop a critique of the political
economic systems which have dominated flood management strategies since the colonial
era as well as a way of seeing the creative potential of colonized people in adapting to,
reconfiguring, and resisting these practices (see Mullenite 2016).
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This postanarchist approach views the concept of resilience as always in the
process of being defined in relation to the broader context of its use, where it is
constantly being co-opted to meet the needs and ends of those who are wielding it,
incorporating and superficially addressing critiques waged against it (cf. Chandler 2014).
In the process, resilience and related concepts become a part of the discursive foundations
of any given political economic system and can be used to understand and develop a
critique of that system.
In recent years, geography and its related disciplines have seen a resurgence of
anarchist and what could broadly be called postanarchist approaches (e.g., White and
Kossoff 2007; Cudworth and Hobden 2010; Springer et al. 2012; Springer 2013a;
Springer 2013b; Springer 2014; Wald 2014; Hammond 2015) As a discipline,
geography’s history is deeply entwined with anarchism thanks in part to the works of
Élisée Reclus and Petr Kropotkin who are heralded as foundational thinkers in both
circles, even if their anarchist contributions have been historically disregarded within
geographic thought (MacLaughlin 1986; Springer 2012). Anarchist approaches to
geography see the earth as an integrated whole that requires recognition of all of the
relationships that make up that whole (Springer 2013a). These relationships are seen as
naturally non-hierarchical but subject to domination and control at any point
(MacLaughlin 1986; Springer 2012; 2014). The normative commitments of anarchism lie
in the development of an understanding of how this domination occurs and in finding
ways to overcome it, an idea that extends back to Kropotkin himself and has continued
for more than a century since (1978; Springer 2014).
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Despite the extant historical connections between geographical and anarchist
thought, recent poststructuralist approaches to anarchism are perhaps the most useful for
understanding how power operates in complex socioecological systems. Postanarchism
attempts the expand on the anarchist tradition by freeing it from its modernist trappings.
While Kropotkin and Reclus offer significant insight into human-environment
relationships, they understand these relationships as being an innate part of humanity
corrupted by powerful outside forces. Postanarchism draws on postructuralist analyses to
suggest that there is no outside corrupting power on its own but that competing
discourses are combined to create topologies of power through which life continually
molded (May 1994; Newman 2001; Collier 2009; Springer 2013b). However, resilience’s
implementation of the vocabulary of poststructuralism creates the risk of co-optation of
critical responses based in poststructuralist analysis, including postanarchism (Chandler
2014). Among the earliest writings in this broad tradition is Hakim Bey’s (2003)
manifesto on the Temporary Autonomous Zone, which called for a radical reorganization
of daily life around ideas individual autonomy that can only be occupied temporarily
before being co-opted by the spectacle of late capitalism requiring a continuing reevaluation and reconfiguring of social and political life (see also Sellars 2010). Saul
Newman (2011) extends this argument to suggest that anarchism has its own spatial
imagination that seeks an ordered and planned society but where the planning is not
imposed from above but rather develops from the social relationships that exist within
that space. For Newman, this ordered but emergent space constitutes what might be
called a postanarchist geographical imagination. It is a space where the organization of
life and resources “emerges spontaneously, and which people determine freely for
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themselves” along horizontal means (Newman 2011, 347). While their nascent character
makes the mechanisms that operate within these spaces indeterminable in themselves,
postanarchism serves as a body of critiques meant to expose those discourses which
privilege particular forms of authority (Springer 2013b). When resilience discourses coopt the language of poststructuralism, they do so in order to obscure the power
relationships they produce (cf. Koch 1991). By tying poststructuralism to anarchism and
thus challenging those linguistic deployments on the basis of their power to maintain the
status quo, there exists the potential to destabilize the normative politics of resilience
scholarship and expose its liberatory potential (Koch 1991; Springer 2013b). In this case,
why certain discursive moves are made is as important as the content of the moves
themselves (Foucault 2003). Because co-optation is used to obscure particular
arrangements of power (Koch 1991; Springer 2013; see also Foucault 2003), an evolving
and open-ended critique of these discursive movements can be used to undercut the
foundation of this co-optation and continuously re-align the concept along a variety of
potential forms, including liberatory ones (Mullenite 2016).
One clear example of liberatory resilience comes from the Spanish Civil War. In
an interview with Pierre van Passen of the Toronto Daily Star in 1936, Buenaventura
Durruti suggested a sort of resilience for working people around the world but a
resilience the stems from their precarity in a capitalist system:

We have always lived in slums and holes in the wall. We will know how to accommodate
ourselves for a while. For you must not forget that we can also build. It is we who built
these palaces and cities, here in Spain and America and everywhere. We, the workers.
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We can build others to take their place. And better ones. We are not in the least afraid of
ruins. We are going to inherit the earth; there is not the slightest doubt about that. The
bourgeoisie might blast and ruin its own world before it leaves the stage of history. We
carry a new world here, in our hearts. That world is growing in this minute.5

While Durruti was talking in very specific terms about the bombing of Spanish
cities, we might see a similar process of ruination in the impacts of climate change that
coastal communities, especially postcolonial ones, are feeling today. The workers of the
world have the capability to build a new world based on their individual and collective
ingenuity and a lifetime of experiences living in the margins of society, but are
continuously disempowered in doing so either by their position in capitalist society, by
the actions of the state, by social marginalization based on processes of identification (i.e.
race, gender, sexuality), or most typically by an ad hoc combination of these. A key point
of differentiation between postanarchist and other antiauthoritarian theoretical strains is
understanding the movement and formulation of power and domination across a broad
field of power relations that are always in flux and contested, never held in place by any
individual or institution making it a useful tool for understanding these combinations
(Newman 2001). Postanarchism provides a comprehensive system of theoretical
movements stemming from the work of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix
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Additional text from the interview can be found at
https://libcom.org/history/buenaventura-durruti-interview-pierre-van-paasen
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Guattari that allow for an in-depth understanding of the intra- and extra-personal
relationships which structure and are structured by each other.

Flood Control Infrastructure as Imperial Ruins
I am not the first to use the imagery of ruination to understand capitalist legacies.
In her introduction to a 2008 special issue of Cultural Anthropology, Ann Stoler suggests
that imperial formations, including colonialism, leave ruins in their paths that must be
understood in order to “reposition the present in the wider structures of vulnerability and
refusal that imperial formations sustain” (Stoler 2008, 194). For Stoler, these ruins are not
just inert remnants of history which sit idly in a landscape to be contemplated or
remembered but rather contain a “material and social afterlife […] in the gutted
infrastructures of segregated cityscapes and in the microecologies of matter and mind”
(Stoler 2008, 194). Rather than serving needs and interests of the present in a way that is
cleanly ruptured from their colonial pasts, flood control infrastructure and the broader
flood management regimes in which they are embedded act as a durable and active form
of colonial governance that imparts the disjointed logics of colonialism into current
political, economic, and environmental decision making (see also Stoler 2016). In other
words, rather than colonial and postcolonial forms of flood management, there are instead
disjointed and tenuous – but never the less present – direct connections between what
might be considered a part of Guyana’s colonial history and that which exists today, what
Stoler (2016) calls colonial presence. Here, colonial inferences “wrap around
contemporary problems; adhere in the logics of governance; are plaited through
racialized distinctions; and hold tight to the less tangible emotional economies of
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humiliations, indignities, and resentments that may manifest in bold acts of refusal to
abide by territorial restrictions imposed or in the flare of burning tires in “sensitive”
urban quarter” (Stoler 2016, 4). In other words, the processes of decolonization which
promised the freedom of the colonized more than fifty years ago were only ever meant to
be partial, never complete.
Scholars of this neocolonial order, such as the Guyanese historian Walter Rodney,
noted as much in their analysis of the processes of decolonization that began to occur en
masse after the Second World War. For example, in his analysis of Tanzanian socialism,
Rodney (1972) argued that the Arusha Declaration6 blindly accepted colonial ideas of
governance and self-reliance at the expense of (and while co-opting the language of)
indigenous alternatives. For Rodney, decolonization occurred as a constitutional practice
that never questioned the legitimacy or the necessity of constitutional governance itself,
leaving in place a key political factor introduced by colonizers and through which
introduced features of colonial rule were guaranteed to be maintained. In this way,
Rodney viewed any form of governance which was enacted through the constitutional
state apparatus as part of a neocolonial endeavor which sought to make colonized people
a respectable and legible part of the metropolitan world.

6

Officially, “The Arusha Declaration and TANU’s Policy on Socialism and SelfReliance.” The document set out to outline the state socialist goals of the Tanganyika
African National Union. The full text is available at
https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nyerere/1967/arusha-declaration.htm
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Genealogies of Race and Infrastructure in Guyana
One of the primary ways this colonial engineering project has played out is
through the explicitly racial politics of the broader colonial project. Race is only a single
node through which colonial identities are constructed, interpreted, articulated, and
perpetuated, but it is both significant and highly visible in the colonial and postcolonial
world. As part of a complex set of ascribed identities, race has never been stable, clearly
defined in biological terms or linked to a set of inherent characteristics. Instead, notions
of race were produced within a logic of white supremacy in the colonial world which was
itself intimately bound to and constructed with classed and gendered practices (Stoler
2008a). In turn, these determined what kinds of social intermingling were acceptable and
those which were not while also determining who could reap the benefits of properly
functioning flood management systems. Despite their unstable nature and their
concatenation within a broader set of prescribed identities, the various and often ad hoc
racializations that are used to define colonial subjects are among the most visible social
dividers in colonial society.
By recognizing the contingent and constructed nature of race in Guyana, I seek to
produce a genealogy of racial formation through the lens of water control infrastructure.
Genealogies differ from other historical analysis by rejecting progressive or linear
narratives in favors of those which examine the nominal, contingent, and contestable
nature of historical enquiry itself (see Bevir 2008). While Mark Bevir (2008, 264), argues
that the origins of genealogy lie in the method’s ability to disrupt existing historical
narratives – “exposing the contingent and ‘shameful’ origins of cherished ideas and
entrenched practices” – I seek to use it as a way to understand the relationship between
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the materiality of nature and its domination on the one hand and the construction and
naturalization of racial social and geographical practices on the other. While Antonio
Ioris (2014) argues that the state serves its primary role as a political economic organizer
(see above), I want to extend this to suggest that it is impossible to remove the political
and economic dimensions of statecraft from the broader social dynamics occurring within
the state. Thus, while state actions may have political economic impacts they are not
reducible to these impacts but must be understood in a broader context of structural
conservation wherein the main goal of state action and intervention is to maintain racial
the status quo. In this way, rather than assuming that flood control measures were strictly
functional, served only political economic purposes, or were largely racial in character
(each commonly accepted in Guyanese and other coastal scholarship in various ways), I
show how all these factors came together in various and emergent ways in order to
respond to specific social conditions and, ultimately, the desires of the state.
In as far as it represents a coherent methodology for historical enquiry, genealogy
is tricky. It differs from other historical methodologies through a focus not on what is, but
how current aspects of everyday life have come to be (Bevir 2008). It requires not just an
analysis of what is, but of what might have been and what could have been (Stoler 2016).
It is analysis not just of the facts of history, but also of the politics and power relations
which have made that history possible and legible. It is thus a history not just of what is
said to be, but also of the various imperial refusals hidden within the disorganization of
the colonial archives (Stoler 2008). It calls into question the ontological and
epistemological grounds upon which things (material, conceptual, and those which exist
firmly at the confluence of the two) exist and how this existence might preclude other
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possibilities for being in a given time and at a given place. Thus, it requires some degree
of speculation and interpretation about the social and political imaginaries left out of the
colonial record (Stoler 2016). It provides a history of the present (but not necessarily a
presentist history) and examines the multiple temporalities (e.g. colonial and “post-”
colonial) in which people live.
This dissertation takes as its aim a genealogy tied to British Empire, but it does so
in a particularly colonial space in which imperial materiality is mediated by processes of
flood management and the intense racializations and racisms applied to colonized
populations. I draw implicitly on the work of Michelle Kooy and Karen Bakker (2008)
who argue that infrastructure acts as a “technology of government” through which spaces
and subjectivities are constituted, ordered, and integrated into broader governmental
agendas where they can be marked or otherwise made legible and thus subject to control
(see also Scott 1999). I likewise draw inspiration from the work of Sarah Pritchard (2011)
who argues that environmental management projects produced a wide variety of political
affects which shaped the everyday lives of citizens under these environmental regimes.
As I have argued elsewhere, infrastructure can have important political effects resulting
from the way it is designed, built, and managed that pre-exist its stated or implied
technical goals. It acts as a mediator and enforcer of state interests, defining the ways the
state can enter everyday life and, in turn, it shapes the possibilities of life around the
goals of the state (Mullenite forthcoming; see also Meehan 2014). Environmental
management in the form of flood control and the infrastructure necessary to support it
serve as an important site for authoritarian governance that is often overlooked, echoing
recent arguments from Jessica Barnes (2017, 149) that “the bureaucracy and technologies
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of water management can be seen as one of the conduits through which [state] authority
may be both forged and contested.” These everyday practices render the authoritarian
governance practices of both the colonial and postcolonial periods a banal part of daily
life, allowing for new authoritarianisms to creep in largely unnoticed.
However, I do not want to suggest that colonialism was in itself only an
authoritarian practice to which there was no possibility for resistance. I focus on the
discontinuities of colonialism in Guyana, the efforts to build alternatives to colonial
experiences by Guyana’s working populations, and the ways in which the colonial state
apparatus refused to legitimize these alternatives. As Ann Stoler (2016, 72) has argued,
“already knowing a colony precludes asking whether ambiguous nomenclatures,
competing visions, repeated failures, and reversals of course (and the violence and
fortressed settledness they engender) prefigure “the colony” as something else-rather than
a site of settlement, an always unstable and precarious project, plagued by the expectant
promise (and fear) of its becoming something other than which its visionaries
prescribed.” This view of the colony itself as unstable begs the question of the
differentiation between the colonizers and the colonized. How are these categories
performed in colonial spaces? How does the built environment act as a boundary in
which this dichotomy is produced, enforced, and reproduced? Rather than simply
providing protection for coastal populations and economies, the main argument of this
dissertation is that flood control infrastructure itself played a key role in the fields of
power which not only structure contemporary coastal life, but which also are a product of
a long history in which colonial Guyana was defined along infrastructural lines,
differentiated from the metropolitan other by a relationship of security from flood waters.
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To put it explicitly, I understand the ways in which problems of flooding and flood
control were used to “solve” a number of crises of legitimacy, first the political-economic
legitimacy of colonial regimes and later the governmental legitimacy of postcolonial
governments. In other words – and speaking more directly to the work of Michel
Foucault who popularized genealogy as a method for historical enquiry – flood control
projects act in a broader imperial genealogy of racism in which “disciplinary projects that
target the body and biopolitical technologies that target the population” converge and
become part of a larger project of governmentality (Rasmussen 2011, 37). It is through a
genealogical method that I show that flood control was one of the means by which
colonized bodies were raced and thus differentiated and able to be targeted explicitly by
the colonial state.
In this way, this dissertation also offers genealogies of environmental racism in
Guyana. Plural because the environmental racisms felt by different racialized ethnic
groups in the country do not necessarily share origins, even if, broadly speaking, the
operations of power at work in their histories can be located in the same political and
economic conditions. Environmental racism emerged as a framework for understanding
the disparate, and disproportionately negative experiences, of working class communities
of color to environmental hazards, particularly as they related to exposure to pollutants
(Pulido 1996). This analysis has strong resonances with approaches that seek to
understand what Bobby Wilson (2002) has called “race-connected practices.” For Wilson
(2002, 31), “race-connected practices” refer to “practices resulting from racism–negative
attitudes groups of people or individuals belonging to one race hold about individuals or
groups of people belonging to a different race.” To understand these race-connected
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practices, their origins, and their affects, one must also understand the historical and
geographical contexts from which they are born and within which they operate (Wilson
2002). In the context of Guyana, this means better understanding the sometimes intimate
and sometimes disparate connections between racism (colonial and contemporary) and
the variety of practices and environments in which they developed. Thus, while outlining
a particular environmental history of racism, it is one that is contingent on the details
contained within and does not simultaneously exclude other possible origin stories.
Importantly, this means that the inclusion of Guyana’s other ethno-racial groupings
beyond the Amerindian, African, and Indian communities is largely missing from this
dissertation. In focusing on flood control infrastructure in particular, I am choosing to
privilege the stories of those colonized people who would themselves come to settle and
take power in formerly colonial lands. The stories of Chinese and Portuguese indentured
laborers have been told elsewhere, for example in the excellent works of Walton Look
Lai (2004) and Sister Mary Noel Menezes (2010), respectively.

Methods
This project draws on mixed, interdisciplinary methods to answer the various
research questions posed both here in the introduction and in each of the following
chapters. These include historical methods, rooted in archival research conducted in
London in the summers of 2015 and 2017, and ethnographic research conducted in
Georgetown and its surrounding suburban and exurban areas in the fall of 2017, and
textual analyses of a variety of governmental and non-governmental publications. I
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supplement the archival research with newspaper accounts available through common
library databases such as the Center for Research Libraries.
First, using the online database provided by the National Archives in London, UK
I searched for all documents potentially related to flooding, sea defenses, drainage and
irrigation, the rice industry, and the sugar industry as well as key locations located along
the coastal plain (see Appendix A). These items were categorized using an excel
spreadsheet where they were assigned different priorities based on their potential
relevance to the research project assumed from brief descriptions provided on the
website. I ordered a sampling of these documents digitally in 2014 to confirm the validity
of the priority assignment. In the summer of 2015, I spent three days in the archives
digitizing high priority files. I skimmed these documents and, based on key names and
dates, I preformed additional searches and additional potential research items were added
to the file index. In the summer of 2017, I returned to London where I continued
digitization. Once all files were digitized, they were converted to PDF files and imported
into Atlas.ti qualitative data analysis software. Here, I read and coded based on keywords
relevant to the dissertation using a process of open coding (e.g. “sugar,” “rice,”
“flooding,” “race,” “labor,” etc.) I linked the codes to specific quotes in the documents
which could be examined both in relationship to each other and in the historical context
in which they were stated. These methods are used primarily in chapters 2 and 3. Similar
method of coding was used for newspaper accounts and supplementary documents cited
in chapters 2, 3, and 4.
By disassociating the various archival documents from their colonial orderings
and placing them in the broader context of the colonial project I was able to reassemble
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the stories that had been unceremoniously scattered into hundreds of small boxes in
London. In the production and location of specific documents within the archive, colonial
administrators produced contexts from which they wanted their thoughts and ideas to be
understood (cf. Stoler 2015). The arrangement of pages, the notes and corrections made
long after the fact, and the inclusion and exclusion of related materials were a way
ordering knowledge and producing specific Truths about the colonial project ex post
facto. While this ordering can in itself provide important insights into the larger colonial
project, it is most successful in its obscurantist goals. Beyond official memoranda, the
archives contained the conversations between administrators and minutes from their
meetings that, detached and spread across dozens of individual boxes show cool
discussions but which show larger colonial anxieties when reassembled. The large
quantities of archival materials gathered, even if not quoted or cited in this dissertation,
helped to form the broader social topographies in which colonial ideas, practices, and the
decisions made by individuals within and outside the Colonial Office are understood in
this dissertation (Stoler 2015, 153).
I spent the fall of 2017 living in Georgetown where I conducted 52 interviews
with coastal residents (see Appendix B). Interview participants represent a range of
ethnic groups, age groups, economic classes, and educational backgrounds but lived
within 10 miles of Georgetown. Sampling was done via “snowballing,” whereby
participants would introduce to me to other potential participants. Though typically used
to identify and recruit research participants among marginalized populations, snowball
sampling has also been shown to be a useful method for generating emergent, political,
and relational social knowledge (Noy 2008). While all consented to be part of this
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research, only 10 agreed to be recorded. For the 10 recorded interviews, I transcribed
them using F4 transcription software before importing the transcriptions into Atlas.ti and
coding them utilizing the same methods as above. The remaining interviews were noted
in my field journal and have been used to reflect on my own experiences and
conversations in the area but are not quoted directly and are not used as a means for
discussing the ways in which people understand questions of government action but do
provide some background on how floods might be experienced. Because my goal with
this research is not to produce generalized statements about Guyanese experiences with
flooding but instead to explore the depth of individual experiences, there was no need to
reach theoretical saturation and thus the relatively small number of recorded interviews
does not affect the significance of their content. Instead, participant experiences are used
to outline varied experiences of flooding in the country’s urban coastal landscape. I draw
on these interviews and my own experiences to inform research in chapter 4.

Organization of the Dissertation
The storytelling in this dissertation is non-linear. I do not move neatly from yearto-year for the sake of historical consistency, but instead focus on the interactions
between laboring populations, the economy, the environment, and the state. This does not
mean that what is discussed in one chapter is not affecting the conditions being addressed
in the others. The creation of the Political Action Committee and eventually the People’s
Progressive Party (discussed in Chapter 4) certainly had an impact on discussions of
unemployment in the sugar industry (Chapter 2) and in the creation of the rice industry
(Chapter 3), but, based on the sources drawn upon, those connections have only been
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made when they could be affirmatively connected to the broader projects being
discussed.
One of the key arguments made at the end of the dissertation is the need for
decolonization of coastal processes. During my time in Guyana I spoke with several
stakeholders in this process to better understand what it might mean to make that a
reality. I have personally little to offer Guyanese other than a critical analysis of the
situation at hand and so understanding what of this analysis would be useful for
Guyanese people forms a key part of what may be called the praxis of the dissertation.
While not an activist-research project, the dissertation is written and organized in such a
way that it is not a purely extractive exercise through which the historical suffering of
people is used to further my own career. In line with Todd May’s arguments for a
postanarchist ethics, this project seeks, as far as possible, to avoid “representing others to
themselves – in either who they are or what they want –” while allowing other ways of
knowing and doing to flourish (May 1994: 130). This has ethic has been extended
historically as well. In this way, the dissertation itself serves in some ways as an attempt,
however minor, at working toward the process of decolonizing geographical scholarship
in general (see Radcliffe 2017; de Leeuw and Hunt 2018) and posthumanist geographies
specifically (see Sundburg 2014).
Based on these reflections, I begin this dissertation with an overview of the
precolonial and early colonial social and environmental history of the area that is now
within Guyanese borders. In chapter 1, I examine the role of Dutch-Amerindian Trade in
the modification of present-day Guyana’s coastal plain between 1590 and 1790. I argue
that processes of indigenous erasure related to a colonial and postcolonial politics of
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belonging on the coast have shaped the narrative of coastal settlement in Guyana.
Drawing on a variety of colonial-era sources and more recent ethnohistorical accounts, I
argue that, rather than a coastal plain void of human life, ready to be canalized and
dammed for colonial exploitation, coastal Amerindian groups played a significant role in
setting the conditions for colonial settlement on the coast only to later be displaced and
erased from the country’s history by British historians. I show that geopolitical
arrangements among South American and Caribbean colonies were shaped by DutchAmerindian trade agreements. As the Dutch lost power in the region through colonial
warfare, these agreements became less valuable to Amerindian groups allowing for their
displacement to areas further inland. This is key because understanding both the social
and natural processes that existed prior to colonization are important steps in
understanding decolonization. While there can be no return to that past, it does offer
insights for potential futures.
In Chapter 2, I trace the development of coastal flood infrastructure through the
sugar industry beginning with emancipation in 1834 and ending with independence in
1966. Drawing on archival research conducted at the National Archives in London, UK,
the Walter Rodney Archives in Georgetown, GY, and accounts from local newspapers
such as the Daily Chronicle, I examine two case studies: coastal flooding in African
Villages in 1886 and 1887 and infrastructure development during sugar relief works in
the late 1920s and early 1930s. I argue that, rather than a backdrop upon which colonial
processes occurred or simply another way of seeing and understanding the exploitation of
colonized people, flood management acted as a form of colonial governance in itself,
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serving as one of the principle means of colonial political and economic exploitation in
the post-emancipation period.
Beginning in the late 19th century and extending through the post-World War II
period, British colonizers began expanding their presence in coastal lands through the
development of a rice industry while also managing the relationship between South
Asian- and African-descended people in the colony. In chapter 3, I analyze the
development of this system of rice production, tracing its origins both to economic
instability in the sugar industry and to the need to provide land for indentured laborers
whom the British could not afford to send home after their indentureship had ended. I
argue that, in addition to these functional purposes, new forms of land tenure provided
under these colonization schemes required new legislation regarding flood control
infrastructure construction and maintenance. These differences, coupled with distinct
positions within the colonial political economy, were used to drive ethnic divisions
between Afro- and Indo-Guyanese people as means to preserve colonial power in the face
of growing anti-colonial sentiment.
Finally, in chapter 4, I examine the ways in which postcolonial governments have
managed flood control systems since 1966, focusing in particular on the racial conflicts
between Guyanese people and how these have been mediated by and through their
experiences with flooding. Based on semi-structured interviews conducted along
Guyana’s coast in the fall of 2017, I analyze the relationship between race, flooding, and
political and economic development in the postcolonial era. I place current drainage,
irrigation, and flood control problems in the context of a shifting postcolonial political
economy, moving from the mixed economy offered by the first coalition government,
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through to the rise of Forbes Burnham’s Jucheist-inspired socialism in the 1970s, and the
period of privatization experienced from the 1980s to the present. Drawing on
government documents, interviews with coastal residents, and my own experiences living
in Guyana’s capital city of Georgetown, I also examine the changing epistemologies of
river and sea defense during an era of sea level rise and the role of mangrove restoration
in undoing some of the threats created by the country’s colonial past.
I conclude by thinking about the role of colonial ruins in shaping contemporary
sociospatial patterns of coastal life broadly and consider some potential lessons offered
by Guyana’s history. I contend that processes of imperial ruination and the role of
infrastructure in acting as a form of governance offer innovative ways of thinking about
socioecological concepts such as resilience. If resilience refers to the ways in which
socioecological systems adapt and change based on their conditions as a means of
survival, then in what ways might colonial aspects of these systems, whether embedded
in the material culture of a region or in the various institutions held over from the colonial
period, persist and thus be resilient? How does this resilience impact people’s
experiences of vulnerability today, tomorrow, and in the decades to come? I show both
how resilience is a useful analytic for understanding the ability of people and institutions
to survive while also exploring its current epistemological limits and its role in
perpetuating colorblind environmental racism. Finally, I draw out a few ways that we
might be able to dismantle colonialisms’ infrastructural legacies and avoid engineering a
new colonialism.
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CHAPTER 1 - THE PRECOLONIAL AND EARLY COLONIAL HISTORY OF
COASTAL SETTLEMENT

Guyana’s coastal plain stretches approximately 250 miles from its eastern border
at the Corentyne River to its terminus just west of the border of Venezuela. Rarely
extending more than 6 miles inland, this narrow and shallow coastal system is part of a
larger 750-mile long system of low-salinity mudbanks called the Amapá-Guianas coast,
which extends northwest from the delta of the Amazon River in the Amapá State of
Brazil to the Orinoco River in the Delta Amacuro State of Venezuela, making it the
longest mud coast in the world (Allison et al. 2000). Like other mud coasts, the
mudbanks lining South America’s northern edges drift in regular intervals as a result of
broader climatic variations. In this case, they move to the northwest through a process
that varies in both speed and intensity with the trade winds that helped make the
Caribbean attractive for early colonial settlement (Allison et al. 2000; Vaughn 2017).
While the elevation of the coast itself varies across Guyana’s stretch, it is
relatively low-lying, with large sections below mean sea level and otherwise featuring
very little geographical prominence (see Figure 1). Punctuated by four rivers originating
in the Guiana Shield along the Guyana-Brazil border (from east to west, the Corentyne,
Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo), regular flooding of freshwater from the hinterlands
also shapes coastal processes. River floods deposit silts and other debris which in turn
produce natural embankments along the coast. These same swells also silt the outfalls of
the various canals which drain the coastal landscape, contributing to broader coastal
flooding when flood gates cannot be opened. The large watersheds of these major rivers
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flood regularly flood pockets of land inland from the coast and provide a valuable source
for fresh water for human settlement. This combination of coastal and riverine systems
produces what would be highly dynamic coastal geomorphology, exhibiting regular and
rapid patterns of accretion and erosion, if not for the efforts of 18th century colonials
seeking the geomorphological stability necessary for the establishment of an agrarian
political economy.

Figure 1 - 3D model showing the coastal plain from the Corentyne River (left) to the
Essequibo River (right). The Berbice and Demerara rivers are also shown. Data based
on ASTER DEM. Elevation exaggerated 50x. The peaks on the right are the result of data
anomalies. Rendered by author.

Today, people inhabit only about two-thirds of Guyana’s section of the coast. The
towns of Corriverton in the east and Anna Regina in the west mark the extent of
concentrated coastal settlement resulting from the two centuries of intensive agricultural
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development first introduced by British, French, Dutch, and German colonial settlers in
the 18th and 19th centuries. The patchwork of rice and sugar fields, pocked by numerous
towns and villages named after the plantations that once stood in their locations, are
drained by more than 4000 miles of canals and protected from the sea by a combination
of concrete sea walls, rip rap, and dense mangrove forests (Thomas 1984; Vaughn 2017).
Like the villages bearing the names of plantations long gone, this water infrastructure is
part of Guyana’s imperial ruins, serving as an active part of the country’s political and
economic landscape while also maintaining the geophysical alterations which allowed
that landscape to come into being (cf. Stoler 2008; 2016). They thus serve as a valuable
representation of the dialectical relationship between human desires (for economic
prosperity, security, and freedom) and geophysical forces which are a part of coastal
landscapes around the world. In this chapter, I draw on insights from critical physical
geography to understand how early colonial politics and settlement patterns marked the
path for later agrarian development and set the stage for the frequent flooding along the
coast. I draw on the explorer narratives and “natural histories” written during the early
colonial period along with more recent ethnohistorical analysis to understand what
attracted people to the region as well as how broader colonial patterns of life shaped the
geophysical environment of the coast. Natural histories produced during the colonial
period are, in themselves, extremely problematic for their selective representations of
events but serve as fruitful insights into the colonial/settler perspective on history.
Though relatively new as a subfield of geography, critical physical geography has
its roots in earlier attempts at understanding the ways in which social factors (including
political formations, economic systems, and social norms and mores) impact and are
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impacted by geophysical factors (see Tadaki et al. 2012). Critical physical geography
differs from these earlier attempts at bridging the gap between the field’s two largest
realms by focusing explicitly on the role of power relations in geophysical processes
(Lave et al. 2014). As Rebecca Lave and colleagues put it, “socio-biophysical landscapes
are as much the product of unequal power relations, histories of colonialism, and racial
and gender disparities as they are of hydrology, ecology, and climate change” (Lave et al.
2014: 3). Employing this framework, I show how the socio-geophysical characteristics of
the land (i.e. a landscape heavily modified for economic purposes through extensive
drainage and irrigation infrastructure) are produced alongside a politics of belonging on
the coast. Thus, rather than simply providing early historical context for the following
chapters, this chapter specifically examines the socio-biophysical production of Guyana’s
coast up to the beginning of the British colonial period in the late 18th century.
While later chapters investigate the wide-ranging political, economic, and social
causes and consequences of flooding along the coast, this chapter analyzes its origins in
the political and economic processes brought by Dutch colonialism. I begin by providing
some background on the geomorphology of the coast. I draw on literature from geology
and physical geography to understand the geophysical processes by which Guyana’s
coastal plain developed as a site suitable for colonization. Next, I draw on ethnohistorical
and archaeological research to consider indigenous land use practices along the coast
prior to colonization. I challenge existing arguments that the coast was uninhabited prior
to colonial settlement and contend instead that these arguments exist in the colonial and
postcolonial literature as part of a larger politics of indigenous erasure. Finally, through
an examination of the early colonial history of Guyana, I seek to understand the political
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and economic processes that made the discursive erasure of Guyana’s coastal indigenous
populations possible, linking it to land settlement practices that were patterned in the
process of colonial warfare.
This early history provides important foregrounding for understanding the
operations of colonial political economies and anti-/postcolonial desires for a “Guyanese”
state in as far as colonial and postcolonial governance has focused primarily on the coast
and not the vast and sparsely populated hinterlands. It helps provide insights for both the
reasons and the means by which colonialism and the requisite flood control infrastructure
that supports it developed and thus helps shape a further, more historical understanding of
problems relating to socioecological resilience on the coast. In turn, it also provides some
insight into state formation in the region, providing further understanding the processes
that shape coastal vulnerability today.

The Geophysical History of the Guiana Coast
The 750 mile Amapá -Guiana coast is one of the muddiest in the world (Anthony
et al. 2010). When the earliest potential colonizers arrived in the area they found dense
mangrove forests, impenetrable pegasse swamps, shifting sand bars and difficult to
navigate currents. By the early 17th century, English colonials had already taken to
referring to this challenging and inhospitable land, sandwiched between Spanish and
Portuguese claims, as the “Wild Coast.” (Edmundson 1901; Mathews 1966).
The land itself contains a few different geomorphologies, each contributing
different features that would eventually make the area an attractive place to settle. Prior
to colonial settlement, sea water covered much of the shallow coastal plain at high tide,
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giving way to coastal saltmarshes and dense mangrove forests sitting on top of shallow
beach ridges and chenier (semi-circular shell and sediment) formations (Brinkman and
Pons 1968; Daniel 1989). The cheniers are formed, in part, by mud flowing northwest
from the Amazon delta by an equatorial current (Richardson 1987). Bonham Richardson
(1987) has suggested that chenier formation is Guyana, and mud accretion more
generally, may be due to the shape of the coast. However, these cheniers make up only a
small portion of Guyana’s coastal plain and are relatively young, dating back to a little
more than 2500 years ago, at their oldest (Daniel 1989). Despite this, they have served an
important role in creating natural breaks, protecting the land behind it from wave erosion,
giving way to the brackish and freshwater tidal clay flats and marshes that support
mangrove ecosystems (Brinkman and Pons 1968; Daniel 1989).
Black (Avicennia nitida, historically referred to as courida) and red (Rhizophora
mangle, pictured in Plate 3) mangroves covered these flats when brackish and, once
desalinized, develop a thin layer of pegasse which, when reintroduced to salt water form
deeper peat swamps (Brinkman and Pons 1968). The mangroves have historically acted
as a natural protective barrier from wave action on the coast, slowing erosion. As waves
approach, they break on mangrove hammocks rather than the sea shore itself. The
dampening effect of the mangroves can also help accretion processes by trapping the
muddy soils suspended in the coastal sea water. Conversely, and much less commonly,
wave action can break down sections of mangroves turning them into a corrosive element
that hastens shoreline erosion (Rodway 1912).
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Plate 3 – Red Mangroves and Seawall in Beterverwagting, East Coast Demerara, June
2016. Part of the Guyana Mangrove Restoration Project. Photo by author.

Like the mud that travels up the coast from the Amazon, the inland soils along the
coast tend to be clayey, with some silt carried down by the various rivers. As these silts
deposit along the banks of the rivers, they form natural levees which kept clayey soil of
the swamps from washing out to sea except at the highest flood of the river. As accretion
occurs and formerly waterfront lands “move” further inland, the salt desiring plants die

54

off, turning the soil into pegasse — a mixture of clay, silt, and decaying vegetation.
Pegasse soils are waterlogged in the wet season and arid in the dry season, making them
difficult to manage. In the most densely populated areas of the coastal plain, the pegasse
regions are used as part of the water conservancy system before giving way to “palm
march forest” made up primarily of chewstick (Symphnoia globulifera), pracaxi
(Pentaclethra macroloba), and partridge wood (Vatairea guianensis) trees.
Sandy formations, locally known as “reefs,” exist (particularly around Berbice)
but they are the exception to a coast that is primarily clay mixed with other dense and
nutrient rich soil types (Brinkman and Pons 1968). These reefs are typically utilized for
the production of tropical fruits, such as pineapple, mango, guinep, and coconut, that
either do not grow well in the frontland clays that make up much of the rest of the coast
or have been relegated to these secondary soil types as frontland soils are typically used
for the more economically productive sugar and rice along with, in the villages,
subsistence crops such as cassava and yams (see Chapter 2 - “A Mild Despotism of
Sugar”: Race, Labor, and Water Management).
Like similar coasts around the world, Guyana’s coast consists of stepped
planation surfaces, with each major step tied to specific erosive events (e.g. nonanthropogenic sea level rise; McConnell 1968). It is unclear how permanent settlement
on the coast and how sea and river defense structures, drainage and irrigation
infrastructure, and soil modification for agriculture might affect large-scale coastal
erosion and accretion in the future in Guyana. However, the colonial record is filled with
plans for engineering works that aimed to help to slow down accretion due to silting and
there are several examples of plantations abandoned to the sea after erosion caused their
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sea walls to collapse and their lands to flood. As a more general move to prevent
flooding, but which may help with accretion, there has been a movement to restore the
mangrove forests that line the coast which has experienced mixed results (see Vaughn
2017; Chapter 4 - Colonial Persistence: Race, Class, and Flood Control Since 1966).
What is clear that these types of events have created a clearly defined coastal plane with
rich, dark soils, geologically distinct from the larger grassland savannahs and forest lands
(and the sandier soils associated with them) behind it and that this geographical diversity
created the conditions for both the current population geography of the country and the
ways the people living there experience flooding.

Indigenous Land Settlement and Use
While much of the geophysical history of the coast can be inferred through
geological and soil surveys, the historical use of the coast by indigenous peoples in
Guyana prior to colonization is, thus far, poorly understood. Recent archaeological
surveys have largely excluded coastal areas, focusing instead on the savannah and forest
regions as well as a few midden sites near, but not entirely on, the coast (see, e.g. the
work of Denis Williams, Betty Meggars, Clifford Evans, and articles in the journal
Archaeology and Anthropology). This may be in part due to the dense development of
many coastal regions, either as cities, towns, and villages, or as spaces for agricultural
production. Thus, some of the best accounts of pre- and early-colonial coastal life,
including with regards to indigenous use comes from colonial-era accounts themselves.
From the early 19th to the early 20th centuries, scientists, missionaries, and colonial
officers wrote a number of “Physical and Natural Histories” and memoirs of life in
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British Guiana, often including significant analysis of the time before their arrival. While
the violence of colonialism tinges these writings and while they are also littered with
inaccuracies, through comparative analysis, they can also act as an important repository
of information from which new analyses can proceed. They likewise provide valuable
insights into the settler perspective on history, highlighting what was important to record
and, in various absences, what could be discarded.
For example, in his history of Guyana, James Rodway (1912) notes that human
remains and artifacts were found during the initial digging on plantations in the East
Coast Demerara region, but that they were not preserved nor properly investigated,
making it difficult to know if these were graves tied to a settlement, ritualistic burials, or
people from other areas buried during trips to the coast. Regardless, it does indicate that
there was some indigenous use of coastal lands and that this may have been significant.
Adjacent to the coast between the Orinoco and Essequibo rivers, early colonial settlers
found large midden (refuse) piles that indicate a fairly dense population at some point in
history. The content of the midden piles also points to the existence of a pre-colonial,
indigenous coastal lifestyle, with subsistence based primarily on fish and mollusks
(Rodway 1912). In 1665, shortly after attacking the colony of Essequibo, English Major
John Scott estimated that there were more than 42,000 Carib (today Kalina/Karinya)
families living in the broader Guiana coastal region, with Arawak (Lokono) and Warow
(Warao) tribes living further inland along the rivers and savannahs (cited in Rodway
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1912). Rodway does not include a source for Scott’s figure7 and is skeptical of the
number as he counts each “Indian family” as being about a dozen people, placing precolonial population estimates in the same range as the population at the height of
colonialism and about 60 percent of the current estimated population. He suggests instead
that the word family should be substituted with people, making the population
significantly smaller. However, it is not clear to what extent Scott was referring to in his
discussion of the coast and Rodway does not attempt to clarify. Thus, Scott could have
easily been referring to the entire coastal plain (from the Amazon to the Orinoco) or only
to the coast and adjacent areas that make up present-day Guyana. Likewise, precolonial
populations significantly larger than colonial estimates have been found throughout the
Americas, indicating that Scott’s assessment may have been accurate even if restricted
only to the modern Guyanese coast (cf. Mann 2005). Regardless of the actual numbers,
Rodway, via Scott, provides evidence that, at least up the mid-17th century, the coast had
a relatively large number of indigenous inhabitants linguistically distinct from groups
living in the savannahs and forests of the interior.
In other ethnohistorical studies of Guyana’s Amerindian population, the simple
argument put forward by Rodway is challenged somewhat by a more complex system
where Carib groups shared portions of the coast with Arawak and Warao. According to
Edwards and Gibson (1979), at the time of their writing Arawaks constituted the bulk of

7

It likely comes from memoirs, letters, or notes related to Scott’s 1665 attack on Fort
Kyk-over-Al. Scott successfully took over the fort for a brief period of time before being
ousted by Dutch soldiers from Berbice.
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Guyana’s Amerindian population and lived primarily on the coast, replacing the Warao
who may be descendants of the earliest settlers in the Guyana region, especially around
the Orinoco River. To support this claim, they argue that Warao have particular cultural
adaptations that suggest they have lived in the coastal area for a long time, such as expert
boat building. This same evidence was used, however, by Rodway (1912) to suggest that
Warao people historically lived up stream along the rivers where they would have access
to both tropical hardwoods and water, while Caribs and Arawaks dominated the coastal
zone, a point supported in the ethnohistorical record (see Whitehead 1990).
Despite this evidence of coastal indigenous land use, there is relatively little
Amerindian presence in Guyana’s coast today. With the exception of the Umana Yana (a
cultural center built in the 1970s in the center of Georgetown), the Walter Roth Museum
of Anthropology, and small villages inland from the coastal towns of Anna Regina and
Charity, there is little reference to indigenous life at all in the cities, towns, and villages
that line the modern coast. Historians such as Walter Rodney have to some degree
explained this away. Rodney (1981) suggests that, by the time of colonization,
indigenous life had mostly moved inland where they had a somewhat neutral relationship
with colonizers who were not interested in the country’s hinterland after initial searches
for the famed El Dorado were unsuccessful. Drawing on accounts produced by Rodway
and other early historians of the region, Rodney argues that the indigenous population of
the country in the early colonial period acted as accomplices to the colonizers, catching
Africans seeking to escape their bondage in the country’s dense forest lands. Early
archaeological investigations which focused primarily on the hinterland support this
argument to some degree and ethnohistorical accounts do show that Carib groups were
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used for slave patrol work (see e.g. Evans and Meggars 1960; Whitehead 1990). Shona
Jackson (2012) argues, however, that this is part of a long-standing politics of belonging
which centers on the experiences of Afro- and Indo-Caribbean peoples at the expense of
indigenous experiences.
For Jackson, Afro- and Indo-Guyanese peoples sought to construct a creole
identity in which they tied their belonging in the country to a coastal existence, with some
portions of Guyanese society going as far as to claim that the country’s Amerindian
populations are not Guyanese at all (see also Sanders 1972, 1976). By considering
indigenous populations as only a product of and thus belonging to the country’s underdeveloped hinterlands, they were able to produce a type of “creole indigeneity” which
granted them rights to Guyanese territory and acted as fuel for the anti-colonial
movements which sprang up in the post-emancipation and post-indenture periods
(Jackson 2012). In this way, colonized people brought to Guyana were staking out their
claim on what they considered to be a no-man’s land prior to colonization and which
would ostensibly be a no-man’s land once colonialism ended. The nutrient rich clays of
the coast were available to the colonizers and thus were available to develop a new,
postcolonial political economy in which the riches of the English could become the riches
for all. These accounts were verified during my fieldwork on the coast and in
conversations I had with numerous coastal residents and teachers who told me that the
idea that the coast was terra nullius prior to colonization is part of the state-sanctioned
curriculum for primary school history.
While Jackson covers this politics of belonging in great detail during the colonial
and postcolonial periods, she does not address (at least not in a satisfactory manner) how
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this came to be. Through her focus on myth, Jackson usefully highlights various narrative
forms of Amerindian cultural erasure, but the actual displacement of Amerindian people
is assumed from the beginning to be similar to that of the rest of the America’s, where
histories of slavery and ecological imperialism ravished native communities. While she
challenges the idea that the coast has never been Amerindian, she implicitly accepts the
argument that, even during the early colonial period, Amerindian life had been relegated
primarily to the hinterland. Rather than beg the question, as Jackson does, it is worth
asking: If there is first hand and archaeological evidence of widespread coastal
settlement, and there is evidence of collaboration between Amerindian groups and early
colonizers, what happened in the years between that coastal life and the development of
the coastal agrarian system? How did Amerindian coastal life influence the later political
economies and social experiences of the coast? How did these politics work to shape the
geophysical processes at play in the Guyana’s coastal zone?

Amerindian Trade and the Beginnings of Guyanese Colonialism
There is little relatively little written on the early Guyanese colonial period, owing
in part to an often confusing and scattered archival record, a relative lack of Dutchspeaking historians interested in the topic, and a general lack of interest in the Dutch
Guianas prior to the 1763 Berbice Slave Revolt (Oostindie 2012). There are likewise only
limited accounts of Dutch colonial history in the West Indies prior to 1688 when the
colonies became a more important part of the Dutch colonial project and thus became
something worth writing about in the colonial eye (Oostindie 2012; van den Bel,
Hulsman, and Wagenaar 2014). I draw largely on the work of James Rodway who, for all
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his faults, was a serious historian of the region who drew together a number of disparate
accounts in an attempt to make sense of the colony’s history, providing a uniquely British
colonial perspective to other, Dutch-oriented sources. According to Rodway (1893;
1912), despite earlier “discoveries” by the British and Spanish, the first European traders
to successfully settle in the Guyanese coast were the Dutch who, prior to their revolt in
the Eighty Years War, had grown accustomed to tobacco products grown in Spanish
colonies and sought their own plantation and trading lands for it. This is likely not a fully
accurate representation of Dutch desires for colonial land of their own, but regardless,
beginning in the late 16th-century, the Dutch established a number of forts between the
Amazon and Orinoco, usually surrounded by small plantations of tobacco, coffee, and
cotton. Early Dutch forts were typically not immediately adjacent to the ocean, but
several miles upstream on many of the rivers in the area where they could more easily be
defended from Spanish and English attacks8. Through a series of attacks, many of these
forts would fall into British, French, and Spanish hands, but were usually brought back
under Dutch control fairly quickly.
In 1613, Spanish colonials from the Caribbean isles attacked a group of Dutch
settlers along with their Carib trading partners in a small fort on the Corentyne River.
Despite their trade relationship, the two groups engaged in and experienced the battle in
very different ways. The Dutch settlers died with their fort, while their Carib companions

8

An earlier work by Halliday (1837) suggests that Zeelanders had established a coastal
fort in the mid-17th century, but this is likely either a typographical error in the text or a
misunderstanding of the transfer of land from the Dutch West India Company to
Zeelanders in the 18th century.
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escaped (Rodway 1912). Around the same time, the Dutch settlement at Fort Kyk-over-al
was established in what would become the Essequibo colony. Fort Kyk-over-al’s longterm success (i.e. being lost briefly to the English and being repeatedly attacked by
French privateers not withstanding) was, according to Rodway, due in part to a lack of
coordinated response from Spanish colonials in Trinidad and Margarita (perhaps out of
fear of Carib groups in the area, see Rodway 1893) and in part because it was an early
outpost of the Dutch West India Company and thus a useful trading post between South
America and the Antilles, including as a site for illicit trade with the Spanish. This is only
a partial story of Dutch-Carib relationships, however. While it is true that the Spanish did
not coordinate an attack on newly established settlements in Essequibo, perhaps equally
important in Dutch success was the unique relationship Dutch settlers in that area had
established with Carib groups, a point hinted at but never expounded upon in Rodway’s
historiography of the region.
According to Neil Whitehead (1990), the Dutch established a variety of important
trade relationships with different Carib groups, usually trading access to European goods
in exchange for military assistance (including the capture of enslaved people attempting
to escape) through a process known as ethnic soldiering. James Whitaker (2016) expands
upon this history, noting the multiple configurations of Dutch-Amerindian relationships
which included ethnic soldiering but also less hostile trade relationships. These
relationships were important to maintaining life in Dutch colonial Guyana. As with other
Dutch colonies the actual number of Dutch settlers was small and made up only a
minority of the European settler population (Oostindie 2012). Those interested in coming
to the region to establish plantations were largely from other European countries and
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were willing to work the land and trade with the Dutch in exchange for the security of
both their land and their human property.
In the early years of Dutch colonization these trade relationships centered around
the movement of native materials — such as annatto — as they sought to establish a trade
network in South America and the Caribbean. During this period, Dutch-Amerindian
relationships were useful for the Dutch in that they provided them not only with a trading
base but also a source for the goods desired in Europe, particularly annatto (Whitaker
2016). As these trade relationships developed so did Amerindian enslavement in Dutch
colonies. Though officially prohibited, Amerindian enslavement appears to have occurred
as early as the 1640s and intensified to the extent that, by the 1680s it needed to be
regulated as prohibition was no longer working (Whitaker 2016; Whitehead 1988). With
regulation came codification of the rules of enslavement and in particular the fact that
Dutch could only enslave Amerindians who had already been enslaved by other
Amerindian groups (Whitaker 2016). Intensification of annatto production combined
occurred simultaneously with intensification of Amerindian enslavement and the
Amerindian slave trade (Whitaker 2016; Whitehead 1988).
While the Dutch may not have been interested in establishing themselves as
settler colonials in the Caribbean-Atlantic region like the neighboring Spanish and
Portuguese, they did find it necessary to become a political power in the region. Unlike
the Spanish, who treated all Carib people as a homogenous group, the Dutch recognized
divisions within Carib society that they could exploit for their own benefit. Dutch
colonizers forged relationships with individual Carib leaders and acted as arbitrators in
local inter- and intragroup Amerindian conflicts, securing the loyalty of some groups and
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a source of enslaved Amerindians from others through the exploitation of intra-ethnic
conflict. As a result, Dutch trade agreements fractured the unified Carib ethnicity that had
been established and enforced by the Spanish and, in the process, produced several
distinct ethnic groups with a new set of politics and a new hierarchy based primarily on
access to the Dutch themselves. These were thus not organic or ad-hoc trade relationships
that existed for the sole purpose of slave capture and marginal trade, as Rodway and
Rodney seem to suggest, but deliberate political maneuvers meant to insert Dutch
influence into local Amerindian politics. As such, the relationship between Dutch and
Amerindian populations were not static either but rather changed as part of the dynamics
of a broader system of colonization in the region.
Within 50 years, these new ethnic divisions had overridden wider ethnic loyalties,
with different Carib groups fighting each other, allying with Arawak groups, and
acquiescing to Dutch interventions into Amerindian politics to build and maintain
European trade alliances (Whitehead 1990). The Dutch had effectively created a new
geopolitics for the region based not on a typical settler colonial arrangement which
murdered, enslaved, or displaced Amerindian groups in an effort to settle large tracts of
land, but through incorporating them into the very system of trade that they were most
concerned with. Conversely, the burgeoning colonial sugar industry in Essequibo (which
was not just Dutch but also British, French, and to a lesser degree German), important to
both Rodway’s and Rodney’s historiographies, was less important to the profitability of
the colony than Amerindian trade agreements until at least the mid-eighteenth century. In
one example, the Dutch commander Amos van Groenewege would have likely lost
control of the colony if not for his marriage to a Carib woman, which settled a dispute
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between Carib and Arawak groups living in the region by equalizing the access each had
to colonials (Whitehead 1990).
However, by the mid-18th century with the growth of other industries beyond
indigenous trade and the true start of widespread colonization, these relationships took on
a new character where Amerindian enforcement became a key factor in the success of the
coastal colonies. The Amerindian slave trade became more profitable than the annatto
trade and co-existed alongside the African slave trade. Since the only source for enslaved
Amerindians were other Amerindian groups, inter-ethnic fighting intensified and certain
Carib groups took on a position as enforcers of colonial laws and boundaries, highlighted
by their role in the 1763 Berbice Slave Revolt which, had it been successful, would likely
have collapsed the nascent coastal plantation economy.
The growth of the plantation economy in the Dutch colonies corresponded with an
increase in the enslaved population working in it and — unsurprisingly — attempts to
escape it. Having a stake in this system, those at the top of the Dutch-Amerindian
hierarchy began capturing or killing people escaping enslavement, destroying maroon
camps, and generally acting as a colonial police force. By 1763, they had become nearly
fully integrated into this role, receiving firearms, collars, and badges for taking part in the
suppression of the rebellion (Whitaker 2016; Whitehead 1988; 1990) and by the 1770s
this relationship became a formal means by which the Dutch sought to protect their South
American colonies from the internal threats posed by revolting enslaved people as well as
the external threats posed by invading colonial forces during the Napoleonic wars
(Whitehead 1988; 1990). In this way, Dutch-Amerindian relationships — both as slaves
and as enforcers of the system of slavery — were a keystone in success of plantation
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colonial settlement on the coast, paving the way to the establishment of the modern
system of plantation agriculture and the political, economic, and social precarity that
would come with it.

Power, Politics, and the Taming of the Wild Coast
The Dutch were not alone in their attempts to colonize the West Indies. Prior to
the start of the War of American Independence, British trade in the Caribbean relied
heavily on trade with the American colonies, where sugar, molasses, and rum produced in
the island colonies could be traded for lumber, cotton, and foodstuffs produced in the
American colonies (Carrington 2002). With land as a precious resource and with Dutch
and Amerindian enforcement of slavery, island planters began establishing sugar and
coffee plantations in the burgeoning South American colonies of Essequibo, Demerara,
Berbice, and to a lesser extent Suriname and Cayenne (modern French Guiana). As this
occurred, British (along with Dutch, French, and German) planters began building their
settlements downstream before eventually settling the coastal area in the mid-18th
century9. To support this new growth, colonizers began establishing cities to facilitate
trade closer to the mouths of the rivers, including Stabroek (now part of central
Georgetown), established by the French at the mouth of the Demerara River in 1782 and
New Amsterdam, established by the Dutch at the confluence of the Berbice and Canje

9

One example that illustrates this movement north to the coast is Cummingsburg. Now a
part of central Georgetown and home to many of the country’s government offices, it was
established as a coffee plantation in the 1760s by a French planter named Jaques
Salignac.
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Rivers in the 1790s. To protect these lands from flooding, planters developed a system of
dykes, dams, and earthen sea walls that channeled water into a series of canals, the
outflows of which were managed by the Dutch and are today called Canals No. 1, No. 2,
and No. 3.
This new system of drainage doubled as a means for irrigating sugar cane fields as
well, with canals able to drain into the fields and exit through sluice gates (locally called
kokers) into nearby rivers or the ocean. With each plantation being roughly rectangular in
arrangement, the setup was fairly simple (see Figure 2). Along the banks of the river or
the coast was the front dam, usually an earthen levee built behind the mangroves that
could double as the high road connecting plantations to the cities. The plantation village
was behind this, sometimes separated from the fields by a road (or, later, railway
embankment) also used to transport goods between plantations and to the ports and
markets. At the rear of the property was another earthen levee called the back dam. Along
either side of the plantation, demarcating the property lines, were canals which drained
either to the front dam, the back dam, a larger canal that drained several plantations, or a
combination thereof. The middle of the plantation included a road that allowed access
from front to rear, with canal trenches on either side. These canals were also used to
move cut cane from the fields in the rear to be processed at the front of the plantation
near the village. In some cases, in order to provide direct access to the sea, mangroves
were removed resulting in the collapse of the sea wall and a flooding of the field (more
details on this in later chapters.)
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Figure 2 – A typical plantation layout (from Jenkins 1871)

Besides occasional feelings of resentment by planters resulting either from
perceived slights by Dutch colonial administrators or issues with neighboring plantations,
this system developed fruitfully until the outbreak of the War of American Independence.
Shortly after the war began, the Dutch West India Company supplied arms and munitions
to American revolutionaries in exchange for tobacco and other American colonial goods,
which were laundered to Europe through Dutch trading posts in violation of the
Navigation Acts. With the outbreak of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in 1780, the British
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used their superior naval fleet and the movement of the Dutch centers of commerce to the
coast to seize control of the Dutch mainland colonies of Essequibo, Demerara, and
Berbice in 1781, though they would lose control of Demerara to the French the next year
and not take final control of them until the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1813.
Under British rule, coastal drainage and irrigation saw its first regulation. The
system of individual planters working without coordination to drain, irrigate, and protect
their lands from flooding was only marginally successful and made coastal floods
difficult to manage. Likewise, with the administrative center of Essequibo and Demerara
moved to Stabroek, the area saw large population growth in the form of colonial
administrators and traders who would not need (nor likely desire) to live on plantations,
bringing about the development of specifically urban neighborhoods, such as Kingston
(the site of former British and French forts at the mouth of the Demerara river), and the
transformation of some plantations into residential and administrative blocks, such as
Cummingsburg in central Georgetown. These new residential districts needed to be
drained and protected from flooding as well and could be negatively impacted by the
actions of planters on nearby lands. In the 1780s, under French control, enslaved Africans
requisitioned from nearby plantations were forced to dig two large, east-west canals to
ease flooding in these emergent residential areas.

Conclusion
It is clear that Dutch settlement of the coast in the 17th and 18th centuries, and as a
result the canalization and damming of the region for the creation of a colonial agrarian
system, would have been much more difficult without coastal Amerindian’s provisioning
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of material support for Dutch colonial efforts. Rather than settlement on a virgin coast
ready to be modified by European achievement, as has been suggested by other histories
of the region, colonial success rested on alliances with a variety of existing coastal Carib
(and to a lesser extent Arawak) groups which not only helped to enforce slavery in a land
rich part of the world, but which also helped to establish a much larger military presence
which aided in their defense against threats from both foreign militaries and privateers.
Early Dutch-Carib trade relationships established the political and economic
conditions for coastal settlement in what is today Guyana. Through the founding of the
colonies of Essequibo, Demerara, and Berbice – made possible in part due to the use of
Carib ethnic soldiering – the insular system of Caribbean sugar and coffee plantations
was able to spread to the mainland bringing with it the social, political, and economic
components of the broader colonial project. This includes both the racial politics of
slavery and indenture and the authoritarian systems of governance which these
necessitated. As more planters moved to the region, they modified the physical
environment to better suit the production of sugar, taking advantage of the nutrient rich
coastal soils. Despite setbacks, including the loss of a number of sugar plantations, this
system flourished with the establishment of hundreds of new plantations dedicated solely
to the production sugar. This growth required the development of a system of flood
protection, drainage, and irrigation that transformed a highly dynamic coastal mangrove
forest and swampland into a highly-managed human-environment, modified to suit the
needs of a colonial agrarian economy and providing the groundwork for the continued
production of precarity that governed colonial and postcolonial life for the vast majority
of coastal residents. When a series of wars broke out between the French, Dutch, and
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English, the shifting power dynamics required a change in tactics. Under English rule,
ethnic soldiering was no longer a requirement for the defense of the region and coastal
indigenous populations were displaced to make way for the growing agrarian system.
While the Dutch utilized slavery for their plantation system, the magnitude of the sugar
trade under British control brought about a massive shift in the population dynamics in
the colonies. Rapid population growth in the coast required changes to the existing
system of drainage and irrigation, requiring a more complex arrangement, often, as
argued in the following chapters, to the detriment of the country’s laboring populations.
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CHAPTER 2 - “A MILD DESPOTISM OF SUGAR”: RACE, LABOR, AND WATER
MANAGEMENT

Mr. Trollope’s10 description of the government of British Guiana as a mild despotism
tempered by sugar, would be more correct if altered to “a mild despotism of sugar.”
Sugar is the ambition, means, and end of nearly everything done in the colony. It gives
aim to the energy of the trader, animates the talent of the lawyer, prompts the research
and skill of the doctor, and sweetens the tongues as well as the palates of the clergy.
-

Edward Jenkins, The Coolie, His Rights and Wrongs (1871, 58)

Introduction
Since its establishment as a British colony in 1814, sugar production has been the
primary economic motivator in Guyana (Thompson 2006). As with other colonial
locations, this economic position gave rise to social and political order and disorder
centered on the continued successful production of the commodity. While working as the
postal inspector in the colony, the Victorian novelist Anthony Trollope described the

10

Anthony Trollope, a Victorian-era novelist who toured the colony as postal inspector in
1859. The original quote can be found in his recounting of the trip in The West Indies and
the Spanish Main. “The form of government is a mild despotism, tempered by sugar. The
Governor is the father of his people, and the Governor’s wife the mother. The colony
forms itself into a large family, which gathers itself together peaceably under parental
wings” (Trollope 1859, 170).
73

political situation in the colony as a “mild despotism tamed by sugar,” in which it only
the needs of the sugar industry could temper the authoritarian goals of the planters and
sugar industry (Trollope 1859, 170). A few years later, during a study of the conditions in
which indentured laborers were being forced to live and work, Edward Jenkins offered a
corrective, stating instead that it was more accurately a “mild despotism of sugar,” in
which sugar and its continued success was the driver of life on the coast at the expense of
all other options (Jenkins 1871, 58). Beyond the role of the plantocracy in guiding
colonial policy, the development and protection of the sugar industry was the principal
concern of the government. In this chapter, I draw on archival research conducted
between 2015 and 2017 at the National Archives in London, UK to examine the broader
social politics of this “despotism of sugar.” I utilize a variety of letters, memoranda, and
minutes between colonial administrators and sugar estate representatives as well as
newspaper commentaries related to sugar and flooding in order to understand the ways in
which sugar production and the water management infrastructure that made it possible
affected labor and race relations in the colony, acting as both a means through which
colonial politics were enacted and as a form of colonial governance in itself. This is done
through an examination of the legislation surrounding the construction and especially the
maintenance of infrastructural systems. I analyze the discourses surrounding why
maintenance schemes were enacted as they were in order to understand maintenance not
as a means to correct an objective failure, but instead to maintain “the social and political
relationships in which that object is embedded” (Barnes 2017: 3).
While much can be said on race, labor, and water management during colonial
slavery, the focus of my analysis is on Guyana’s post-emancipation period. The reason
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for this is two-fold. First, there exists a significant body of literature on sugar and slavery
with much less emphasis on sugar in the post-slavery period. Centuries of writing on the
subject have produced detailed accounts on the conditions and resistance of enslaved
Africans (Viotti da Costa 1997), the role of sugar and slavery in the development of
capitalism (Mintz 1985; Williams 1944), and the role of the sugar industry in the
abolition of the slave trade (Carrington 2002), to name only a few, while considerably
less has been written about the ways in which the commodity continued to be a driving
force in the Caribbean long after both the end of slavery and perhaps after the crop’s
economic viability had come to an end. Second, while writings on labor relations and the
sugar industry in the post-slavery era exist, including some with a focus on Guyana (e.g.
Rodney 1981a; Thomas 1984), the role of water management infrastructure as a
technology of government (see Kooy and Bakker 2008) and an active producer of
socioecological precarity within this system has not yet been included in these analyses.
This is a significant omission from the literature. In their respective examinations of
sugar and labor in Guyana, Adamson (1972), Rodney (1981a), Thomas (1984), and
others treat infrastructure as a background upon which colonial relations were structured
rather than as a structuring object within the colonial system itself. In this way, the
drainage and irrigation and sea defense systems have been treated as simply another
means by which the exploitation of the working people of the country could be seen and
quantified. While this is certainly true, I argue that water management as a whole was
one of the principle means through which colonial governance occurred, directly shaping
experiences of colonialism and legislating life in the colony in order to produce a very
specific colonial subjectivity rooted in black (and later Indian) laborers’ role in a white
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plantation economy. It served as an avenue not only for providing general economic
stability but also for population control. Importantly, I argue in this chapter that water
management and flood control infrastructure projects were used as a means by which
colonial actants produced and reproduced the economic precarity of African village
laborers and to suppress the wages of those who remained in the broader sugar economy.
In this way, control over the floods and thus also their impacts served a means of
reducing the potential resilience of Guyana’s black working classes in a way that – as I
show through the following chapters – had long-term impacts on coastal resilience more
generally while simultaneously producing a resilient sugar industry on the backs of the
working classes answering an important questions in resilience narratives: resilience of
what and for whom (Cretney 2014). This can be applied more broadly to understand the
ways in which control over infrastructure acts as a means by which governments can
produce precarious subjects.
I begin with a brief theoretical overview of the “politics of things.” Here, I review
the existing literature on the many ways that artefacts are used to affirm and reproduce
existing systems of power in capitalist political economies as well as the ways in which
these systems draw on racialized bodies to act as vehicles for this reproduction. Drawing
theoretically from political ecology, environmental history, and science and technology
studies, I use two case studies to show how infrastructure construction and maintenance
carries with it a particular set of politics related to prevailing socioeconomic (rather than
strictly geophysical or ecological) characteristics. First, I argue that flood events are not
necessarily the result of colonial negligence but were actively used to reincorporate
emancipated Africans back into the plantation economy after the urbanization and
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proletarianization of black labor on the one hand and the village movement on the other
significantly reduced the number of workers willing to work in the sugar industry,
threatening its ability to survive various economic recessions and depressions. Next, with
the sugar industry undergoing financial struggles in the early-to-mid-20th century, I show
how relief projects, including the construction of drainage and irrigation and sea defense
works, was used as a means of economic support for the large and growing number of
unemployed in the country during economically down years without fundamentally
changing their position in society and denying them the possibility of leading what might
have been resilient lives.
Through a series of policy changes and direct acts of legislature, the crown was
able to sustain the sugar industry through the promotion of these works without ever
providing direct financial support to planters. In fact, in at least one case, planters
profited off of these policy changes and the dire financial situation of the colony. I
connect these temporally disparate events in order to argue that planters, with the implicit
support of the colonial government, used flooding to mobilize a reserve army of labor
economically located outside the sugar industry and spatially located in African villages.
Moreover, as I will make clear, there was a racialized component of this governance.
While there were many Indo-Guyanese workers on sugar plantations beginning in 1838,
the number was often not sufficient for cane harvesting season and workers could not
work simultaneously in the fields and on infrastructure projects, especially as indenture
contracts ended and a portion of Indo-Guyanese workers began moving away from the
plantation system themselves. Thus, Afro-Guyanese, whether seeking new forms of
economic autonomy or working as an urban proletariat in Georgetown, were the target of
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many of these plans to increase labor productivity without increasing costs. I draw
specifically from Marx’s (1887) idea of a “reserve army of labor” to explain this
situation, but I also expand upon it by making it clear the ways in which this “reserve
army” had a racial character affected by the broader colonial system in which it was
operating.

Infrastructure, Governance, and the Politics of Things
In one of the seminal essays of science and technology studies, Langdon Winner (1986)
asked a simple question: “do artefacts have politics?” Winner argues not only that they
do, but that “The kinds of things we are apt to see as ‘mere’ technological entities
become much more interesting and problematic if we begin to observe how broadly they
are involved in conditions of social and moral life” (Winner 1986: 6). Technology, in the
broadest sense of the term, serves a mediating role in everyday life not only through the
ways we interact with it, but also by establishing clear boundaries of who belongs in
particular spaces at a given time. This techno-material culture, including in this case the
dykes, dams, kokers, and pumps meant to keep coastal Guyana dry (which, drawing on
Prichard 2011, I refer to collectively as enviro-technical systems) and inline with
postanarchist conceptualizations of diffuse power, “embody specific forms of power and
authority” (Winner 1986: 19). This power and authority comes from larger systems and
structures of power, they are reflections not only of the society in which they exist but
also that which built it. This confluence of power and material culture may be seen as
accidental or exploitative (i.e. they create a condition which can be taken advantage of
but were not designed to meet any particular goals), but it is worth asking whether these
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creations were designed to serve any purpose prior to those professed in their design and
to what extent their designs continue to shape coastal lives.
In the decades since Winner posed his question, a large body of scholarly
literature has developed around questions of the power of artefacts, particularly around
water infrastructure. Timothy Mitchell (2002) argues that enviro-technical systems were
another site in which colonial and postcolonial governments demonstrated not only their
technological, but also their economic power. The ability to “tame” nature in the name of
capitalist production was the sign of a modern and efficient state, in which technology
was the means by which the economy could survive and thrive. Katie Meehan (2014:
216) has shown how water infrastructure acts as sites for building and resisting state
power, in turn becoming spaces “reflective of deep sociospatial inequalities.” Envirotechnical systems were likewise created for a world that will cease to exist long before
that technology is no longer useful for its stated purpose, but those systems maintain the
unequal spaces which they initially produced (Winner 1986; Stoler 2016). Political
conditions change, economic systems rise and fall but the material culture embedded in
enviro-technical systems persist.
The persistence of political and economic conditions embedded within water
management is also in line with Sara Pritchard’s (2012: 592) argument for what she terms
“hydroimperialism,” in which “water management practices both revealed and
reproduced unequal power relationships based upon an expansionist mentalité.” In the
cases below, the expansionist ideology that supports unequal power relationships is tied
directly to the establishment of a colonial agrarian economy that required copious
amounts of inexpensive labor not only to work in the cane fields and factories during
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planting and harvesting season, but also to construct the system itself. While Guyana’s
coastal plain contains nutrient rich soils ideal for cane production, it features very little
geographical prominence and poor natural drainage resulting in heavy flooding unless
altered by the drainage and irrigation system. The construction and maintenance of this
system required thousands of enslaved and later poorly paid African laborers to move
thousands of tons of earth (Rodney 1981a). Even as the political and economic system
changed from one based on slavery to one based on “free” labor, the material conditions
set in place by the construction of Guyana’s coastal water management system were
reproduced even (and especially) when a portion of those lands no longer served the
purposes of a colonial, agrarian political economy. This is reflected in another term
developed by Pritchard (2012), “hydrocapitalism.” Through hydrocapitalism, water
management practices helped realize and reproduce capitalist arrangements, deepening
the already uneven terrain of political and economic power in colonial spaces and
working to produce a form of socioecological precarity that could only be reduced
through continued engagement with the system that produced it, in some ways echoing
Evans and Reid’s (2014) criticisms of many of the current calls for increased resilience.
As I will demonstrate in the two case studies below, water management infrastructure
played a significant role in maintaining British Guiana’s sugar industry, and thus the very
lifeblood of the colony, both when it was flourishing and when it was floundering not by
protecting it from encroaching water, but by providing spaces for additional low-paid
black labor.
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Flooding, Labor, and the Sugar Industry in East Coast Demerara
By the 1880s, when the story of flood control as governance begins in earnest, British
Guiana had already undergone considerable political and economic shifts since its
establishment as a British colony, related in part to the end of global colonial warfare, the
abolition of slavery, and the rise of the industrial revolution but also due to changing
political, economic, and geophysical conditions along the coast. Although having
occupied the territories that make up present-day Guyana since the late 18th century,
official British reign would not begin until 1814 when the Dutch ceded the colonies as
part of the Treaty of Paris at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. As shown in Chapter 1,
under the Dutch, administration of the colonies was somewhat laissez faire, with planters
enjoying considerable freedom and limited controls on trade but also bearing much of the
burden of protecting and maintaining drainage, irrigation, and flood defense works. The
Dutch oversaw the construction of only three of the colony’s canals, all along the
Demerara River, with the rest having been built by enslaved laborers at the behest of
planters from a variety of European colonial origins.
Under the British, however, there was a distinct change not only in the form of
governance but also in the logic applied to it. While the Dutch saw their role as trade
facilitators for an ad hoc collection of tenants – many of whom were not Royal Dutch
subjects – the British saw themselves as colonizers proper, who ruled over both people
and the land. In order to enact these changes, they sought to centralize the system of
governance along the coast and bring into being what they considered a more ordered
state of affairs, one in which British colonial law could be implemented and enforced. A
major part of this was the centralization of flood control efforts, most especially sea
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defense works. A history of sea defense in the country produced for the Colonial Office
in the 1920s shows that early as 1794, while still technically occupying Dutch territories,
the British became concerned about coastal erosion at Fort William Frederick in what is
now Block Alpha of the Kingston Neighborhood of Georgetown11. The Fort, lying along
the eastern bank and coast of the estuary of the Demerara River, was a key strategic site
for the defense of the emerging coastal city and its protection was vital to British success
in the region. Dutch settlement of the Guyana territories occurred upstream, where people
and property could be easily protected with assistance from the river. As the population
moved north to the coast, many of the valuable agricultural assets would be left
unprotected without some kind of defense structure in the region. The Fort provided not
only a battery which could protect both the river inlet and the sea face, but also supported
a much larger military presence on the coast more generally. The battery was built on and
protected by a short sea wall itself built atop the muddy coastal land. However, between
the outflow of the Demerara River and movement of the Guiana Current, processes of
accretion and erosion in the area were so severe and happening so rapidly, that beaches
would form in front of the fort as the result of mud and silt deposits only to be completely
washed away within a year, taking the soil supporting the wall with it.
By 1810, there was a serious need for construction and maintenance of the
defenses but there was significant colonial confusion with regards to who should pay for
them12. Severe flooding in 1804 devastated parts of the coast and it appeared that it would
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happen again. British Guiana did not yet exist and Demerara-Essequibo technically
remained a Dutch territory being occupied by British forces. The Kingston area was
under the control of the Colonial Office, but the Fort and its northern face were under the
purview of the War Office. Nearby plantation lands were held privately by individuals
who were responsible for their own drainage, irrigation, and sea defense systems.
Because funds for major colonial works projects were often limited during war time,
especially for areas that were not yet colonies, the Colonial Office and the occupying
government “refused to contribute to the protection of these lands.”13 While minor efforts
were made to protect the land, including the building of breakers in an attempt to slow
erosion of current earthen defenses and doing maintenance on the existing, but failing sea
defense works, there was no systematic construction or maintenance of sea defenses and
it was only a matter of time before this piecemeal system collapsed.
With the end of slavery in 1834, planters were granted four years to hire the
formerly enslaved people on their plantations as “apprentices.” Under apprenticeship,
emancipated Africans experienced a kind of indentured servitude where they worked in
the fields in exchange for food, shelter, and a small wage. When apprenticeship ended,
many, though certainly not all, left the plantation system and sought a life outside of it, in
part through the creation of what would later be called the African Village Movement
(Moore 1987; Young 1958). This period saw formerly enslaved Africans pool their
economic resources and purchase abandoned plantation lands on which they could settle
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and grow their own food and crops, relying significantly less on the plantation system
and colonial government in order to survive in the colony (Haynes 2016; Young 1958).
According to sociologist Brian Moore (1987, 93), “it was the newly established village
communities along the coast which provided the institutional framework for organizing
the black and coloured section into a coherent corporate group. They were the vehicle by
which the disenfranchised majority could develop the organizational structure and
leadership with which to challenge the political and social dominance of the white
minority.”
The development of villages thus served as a significant threat to white social
domination through the threat they posed to the survival of the coast’s agricultural
economy. However, removal from plantation life did not, however, mean removal from
the sugar industry and a number of Afro-Guyanese sought work in industries ancillary to
the plantation economy (e.g. shipping; Rodney 1981a; 1981b; Thompson 1987). To offset
this loss of labor, the government established an official system of indentureship which,
between 1851 and 1917, saw 226,723 South and Southeast Asians brought into the
colony and provided with food and shelter in exchange for their labor on the sugar
plantations (Follett-Smith 1954). However, as indentureship ended, many of these
workers also left the plantation system, moving to villages alongside Afro-Guyanese or to
ones specifically established for the expansion of the sugar and rice industries along the
coast as part of a new land settlement scheme (see Greenidge 2001).
In the interceding years there would be a number of small breaches of coastal sea
defenses, including floods in the African village of Plaisance in 1847 that inundated the
front properties as far as a mile back from the sea wall and in 1849 that saw villagers
84

petition Governor Barclay to not levy assessments against their property for damages to
nearby lands as a result of the breach of the Plaisance front dam (Haynes 2016). It was
not until 1855, when flooding directly threatened colonial lands and the sugar plantations
that supported the colonial economy, that things came to a head. The Great Kingston
Flood, as it is now known, caused breaches of coastal defenses that affected not only the
emerging capital city of Georgetown, but also many of the plantations that would
eventually become integrated into the city as they failed and closed, including what
would eventually become the squatter settlement of Sophia, the University of Guyana,
and Ogle Airport some 10km away from the center of the capital. With such a large
portion of the coast inundated, including both private and colonial lands, the question of
how to manage floods become one of critical importance for the continued governance of
the colony.
When the flood waters receded, new construction on sea defense works began on
all of the colonial coastal lands. In 1855, construction of a new permanent sea wall began
at the battery of Fort William Fredrick and continued to the neighborhood (then village)
of Kitty by the end of 1874. Meanwhile, planters and nascent villages were still largely
left to construct and maintain their defenses or to pay the government for the works at a
later date via loans, costs which planters argued they could not afford to bear after
emancipation and which villages that were largely self-sufficient were in no economic
condition to pay. In 1856, the Village Management Bill was passed, providing the first
legal definition of a village and outlining their responsibility in relation to the colonial
government and the estates. It also created the legal infrastructure for the requirement of
all independent villages to maintain their drainage and irrigation systems as well as their
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sea and river defenses (and other infrastructure) or risk losing their land entirely. While
Kingston and the colonial parts of Georgetown were now well protected, nearby areas
were still exposed to severe threats of coastal flooding. Environmental engineers working
on the system of sea defense warned that these weaker areas could cause significant
distress to other parts of the colony. The situation became so dire that, in 1883, the
government was forced to enact further legislation placing the legal onus of construction
and maintenance of all sea and river defenses as well as all estate back dams on the
proprietors and villagers while shifting the responsibility for kokers, pumps, and other
large drainage infrastructure to the government, paid for via taxes. Failure to maintain
defense works could result in legal action including the loss of the plantations and for the
villagers the loss of the entire village, which would usually then be sold and incorporated
into an adjacent plantation (Adamson 1972; Young 1958).
The severity of this law was justified by the fact that the failure of one estate to
maintain the works also threatened the entire coast with inundation. If that was the case,
however, sea defenses should be considered a colonial matter and handled by the colonial
state, at least according to some of the smaller estates remaining on the coast. In April
1886, estates from the West Coast Demerara region argued exactly this, stating that sea
defense should be a colonial matter and arguing for it in the Court of Policy. At least one
member of the court agreed with the estates and stated that “small capitalists, individual
proprietors, were not able to struggle with the sea defenses of the colony. No individual
owner of a small property could run out a strong and expensive sea wall, where there was
much granite work” (Daily Chronicle 1886). However, change would come slowly.
Meanwhile, a system was established where estates and villages would be able to draw
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on loans-in-aid from the colonial office and government to either pay for construction
themselves or to pay the Public Works Department to cover the costs if they could not do
manage it themselves.
So dramatic was the flooding during this period that, in 1929 a member of the
Colonial Office described the history of Sea Defense in British Guiana prior to 1883 as “a
continuous fight between the landed proprietor and the sea, in which the proprietor was
usually defeated.”14 Now codified into law with punitive measures, proprietors –
including villagers – were forced to take pre-emptive action. The new costs imposed by
this legislation found smaller planters seeking to extend the cane season by modifying the
amount of water in the drainage system to allow for a prolonged cultivation and to find
ways in which they could lower labor costs during cultivation and processing while the
larger estates and sugar firms lobbied for continued preferential treatment to insure the
economic viability of the British Guiana sugar market.
It is within this context that Plaisance and the nearby village of Beterverwagting
flooded in 1886 and 1887. The village of Plaisance was, in the late 1880s, sandwiched
between two sugar estates, Goedverwagting and Sparendaam, with which it shared side
dams and a back dam meant to protect all three from savannah floods. Utilizing the
existing network of drainage and irrigation established when the land was used as a
cotton plantation, villagers produced subsistence and market crops including plantains,
cassava, yams, and other tropical staples, allowing them to supplement wages earned on
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the sugar plantations and in the city, diversify their local economies, and live with at least
somewhat less reliance on the colonial agrarian economy established in the 17th century15.
In January 1886, heavy rainfall along the East Coast Demerara region caused the water in
the canals to rise, eventually inundating the village. While Plaisance had experienced
flooding before, the causes had appeared to either be anomalous (e.g. the failure of a
defense work due to erosion or wave action) or just part of coastal life, afflicting much of
the adjacent coast with the same struggles. In 1886, villagers began to see the floods in
terms of racial power. The large steam-powered mechanical pump, which was meant to
drain the village in the event that gravity drainage was unfeasible, was left inoperable due
to the poor condition of its boiler resulting from a lack of maintenance by the colonial
government. While plantations and villagers were required to maintain their own
drainage and irrigation and sea defenses, as outlined below, villagers in Plaisance opted
to pay a maintenance rate to the colonial government in exchange for assistance. In a
letter to the editor of the Daily Chronicle dated February 1st, an anonymous villager
asked in anger, “how must the people undertake again to put their labour in the ground
when the white man allows negroes’ plantains and cassava to be inundated and thus
suffer?” (Ratepayer 1886).
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The following year, flooding struck Plaisance again and villagers again used the
Daily Chronicle to voice their frustrations and, this time, to demand direct compensation
for the crops that were destroyed in the flood. Villagers blamed this second major flood
explicitly on the manager of the adjacent sugar estate of Goedverwagting. They
maintained that the estate manager modified a stop-off used to hold back conservancy
waters at the rear of the plantation in order to extend the cultivation of sugar in his fields
(Truth 1887). With the stop-off not functioning as intended, a period of heavy rainfall
caused additional pressure to be placed on the Plaisance village back dam which
eventually gave way; flooding their fields and destroying acres of crops used for
subsistence. Other villages in the East Coast Demerara region, including nearby
Beterverwagting were also deeply affected as the storms caused a breach in their sea
defense system which they could not sufficiently repair on their own. The result of this
was the temporary dislocation of villagers on the East Coast who did not have a dry place
to sleep as well as a steep decline in the availability of plantains, a staple food in the diet
of the country’s black laboring population (Pro Bono Publico 1887).
At least one villager demanded action, stating in an editorial letter to the Daily
Chronicle that “the condition of the people wandering about, some huddled under the
railway station, and in the open verandah, struggling to obtain a dry spot for human
existence, exhibits a deplorable scene. All that the friends of the manager may say either
by telegram to the governor or in the public prints in extenuation of his acts will not
compensate in any way for the sufferings of the villagers” (Truth 1887). The response by
white settlers was to say that the black villagers should give up their attempts at growing
their own crops and take jobs on the plantation system as a means for recovering from the
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effects of the flood. Harry Garnett, from the nearby Plantation Nonpareil, shared the
sentiment of many colonials, stating in his own editorial letter, “let another industry be
started by all means, at which the black man will work for love or that can afford to pay
him his own value, but in the mean time (sic) we are one and all dependent on sugar”
(Garnett 1887b). Like the villagers of Plaisance a year prior, Garnett framed the issue of
village flooding and the inundation of ground crops in racial terms. Elsewhere in his
letter, he noted the role of sugar in dominating the politics and legislature of the coast,
particularly around questions of flooding but dismissed village concerns because it was
sugar, and nothing else, that would make coastal life successful, effectively denying
Afro-Guyanese villagers the right not only to live outside of the plantation economy, but
to even imagine alternatives to it. After emancipation, the low wages offered by the
estates played a key role in the movement of Africans to other industries, including the
village movement. That this would now be turned on them in times of need is
unsurprising, but exemplary of the general abhorrence of the villagers by the plantation
owners. Garnett characterized villagers working their own fields instead of his as lazy16,
stating previously that “provisions during [the immediate post-emancipation period] were
cheap and we naturally expected cheaper labour; but no, Quashie17 preferred to eat his
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own provisions that he had planted rather than work at a rate which did not enable him to
sit down two and a half days out of the six” (Garnett 1887a)18.
The labor necessary for sugar production can take multiple forms. Workers are
needed not only for planting and cultivation, but for processing in the factories and for
general labor and maintenance of the plantations. Some of these jobs were necessary
year-round and others seasonal. Indentures and former indentures provided the bulk of
this labor force. Garnett (1887a) suggests that the ratio at Plantation Nonpariel was 2/3
Indo-Guyanese and 1/3 Afro-Guyanese at the best of times. Outside of the plantation
system, Afro-Guyanese worked as a combination of yeoman and subsistence farmers and
as an urban proletariat working in shipping and manufacturing in Georgetown and New
Amsterdam. This racial differentiation of the classes was common throughout the
Caribbean but was uniquely spatialized in Guyana where there was no white settler
population to speak of and where historical conditions and a relative abundance of land
led to the segregation of the racialized ethnic groups within the country (Hintzen 2004).
When floods occurred, this race-class dynamic combined with systems of infrastructure
to determine the lines along which people were affected. Already working in the sugar
industry and living in the housing schemes associated with the sugar estates, IndoGuyanese were in some ways shielded from the long-term impacts of these floods as
were Afro-Guyanese who had secure work in the cities. Those Africans who refused the
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industry and sought a new life altogether in the villages were often left homeless,
starving, and generally helpless in times of flood, with no choice but to work in the
industry for severely depressed wages. Even during the worst floods of this period, the
sugar industry was mostly unaffected, even if inconvenienced. Instead, as shown above,
free villages became sites in which severe floods had the greatest impacts to the general
population. Estate managers and other colonizers recommended little more than for the
country’s black population to give up their desires for total emancipation from the
plantation system and return to it in order to pay for the necessary repairs and for their
own survival, regardless of what caused the floods themselves. With this loss of
economic independence, colonial issues of race and flooding combined to govern the
livelihoods of villagers and, by denying alternatives to acting as proletarian labor in
planter capitalism, black life on the coast as a whole.

The Sugar Industry, Infrastructure, and Relief Works
Despite improvements in sea defense, coastal flooding in Guyana continued to be a
burden to both plantations and villages, with neither able to afford the excessive costs
associated with flood control works. A series of strikes in the sugar industry did not help
the situation for the plantations who continued to expect and rely on low wages and poor
conditions for workers and who refused to pay full prices for the needed works (see
Rodney 1981a). In partial response to the worsening economic situation, in 1913 new sea
defense legislation was passed that allowed the Government of British Guiana to provide
up to 25 percent of the costs of sea defense for a plantation or village. This was funded by
an acreage tax levied against all property owners outside of Georgetown, which was
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exempted from certain provisions of the ordinance due to its status as colonial land. This
shift in policy from one in which only the city of Georgetown was protected by the state
to one where the state played a role in all defense works was due in part to sea defense
becoming a “colonial question.” By the mid-1910s, the warnings from West Coast
Demerara in the 1880s became more obvious to the rest of the coast and it came to be
increasingly clear that flooding in the region could not be left up to the actions of
individuals, it required a more coordinated effort. In this regard, colonial officials drew
an arbitrary line 10 miles inland from the coast and declared all lands between the ocean
and that line as part of a number of sea defense districts. This new boundary, defined on
the principle that “it is indisputable that, if the defences fringing the seaboard, were
removed, the sea at high tides would inundate this area,” provided the basis for the
country’s first integrated system of flood control.19
The logic of undertaking such a massive change in policy was clear: colonial
records show that the government was already spending a considerable sum of money on
sea defense and emergency works due to the failure of the estates and villages to do so to
colonial standards. By taking it upon themselves, the colonial government could mandate
and implement necessary changes and develop a tax scheme to fund them.20. A failed
version of this policy, sent to the Court of Policy in 1921, stated this rather clearly when
it said that one of the purposes of such bills was “to obviate along the whole 270 miles of
the Colony’s seaboard the recurrence hereafter of disasters such as those which have
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involved an expenditure of more than five million dollars21 during the past five years to
protect permanently a seaboard of 52 1/2 miles only.”22 In this way, the burden of the
cost would no longer fall only on those adjacent to the sea, but to all who were protected
by the system of sea defense whether directly or indirectly (although, notably, none of the
proposed or passed bills dealt with the burden faced by past sea defense expenditures,
only future works.) One major issue arises from this new arrangement, however. It would
take decades for the taxes to raise the funds necessary for the construction and
maintenance of new flood control projects. However, the works cannot take decades to
build or the risk of catastrophic flooding remains. While fundraising through grants and
loans from the Colonial Office was possible, the colony needed to find a way to cut costs
in the short-term to reduce their loan burden.
Beginning in 1922, a series of coastal works projects took place and by 1923 the
British Guiana government took over all responsibility for sea defenses23. Funded in part
by the government and in part by proprietors (including both plantation land owners and
local authorities), these works were meant to overhaul and generally improve agricultural
productivity on the coast for both planters and small holder farmers (i.e. villagers and
former indentures.) Over the six-year period of the projects, 22 new drainage areas were
declared, 20 new drainage boards were established, and over 88,000 acres of newly
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cultivatable land were now under a drainage scheme24 Within a decade of their
completion, these projects were largely deemed failures due to a lack of maintenance and
poor planning prior to their implementation25 The situation was so dire that W. Jackson, a
member of the West India Committee, one of the main legislative bodies for all of the
British Caribbean territories, stated in a letter to then Secretary of State for the Colonies
Malcom MacDonald “that the financial position of local authorities and proprietors
concerned is at present so unsatisfactory and the present economic value of the lands
included in the drainage areas so low that comprehensive measures of relief are
necessary26.”
The villages were in particularly poor condition. In his witness testimony to the
West India Committee, Gerald Case, an environmental engineer then serving as Director
of Public Works and Sea Defences in British Guiana, suggested that the government take
over all of the main drainage works in these locations because the villages themselves
simply could not afford to maintain them, as shown in the extract of his expert testimony
transcribed below.

Q: Do you consider the village communities are incapable of looking after their own
drainage successfully?
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A: They can certainly look after their internal drainage if given the particulars as to
levels and size of drains required.
Q: Why is it then, that you find drains now generally neglected?
A: The villages cannot raise enough money.
Q: I see. The question is one primarily of money, not of efficiency of working or
supervision?
A: No. They could look after the internal drainage perfectly well if they had sufficient
funds. 27.

Case thus argued for state intervention into the village drainage system as a means of
easing the financial burden of the villagers, a burden born in part from decades of
economic precarity stemming from their decision to live outside of the plantation system
even in the face of colonial threats against their ability to do so.
Despite implementing changes meant to mitigate the impacts of falling sugar
prices, by 1930, British Guiana was facing a full-blown economic crisis, with colonial
officials seeking a series of grants and loans to cover current expenses. Part of these
expenses included funds needed for the construction and repair of sea defenses. Sir
Alfred Sherlock, chairman of Bookers Bros. McConnell & Co. Sugar, spoke candidly
about this situation by calling the British Guiana government takeover of sea defense
works in 1923 a “colossal blunder,” stating that “Our firm is very anxious indeed over sea
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defenses. Government made a colossal blunder when sea defenses were put under the
charge of the Public Works. I certainly do not wish to belittle in any way the Director of
Public Works or his assistants, but I think it is very unfair to ask a man to undertake a job
which he does not understand, and it is still more unfair to those who have to pay and
who are dependent on the maintenance of their sea defences for efficient work.” 28
Meanwhile, directors from the sugar firm Sandbach Park and Co. offered to either loan
the government money to repair a section of sea defenses on their land or to do the work
themselves under the supervision and direction of the Division of Public Works, under
the expectation that the capital invested in the project would be paid back at a later date
with interest, an offer which the government accepted.29 The conditions were so bad in
the country, the governor sent a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies warning
that inaction could lead the rise of anticolonial sentiment during the country’s local
elections30.
The laborers for this new era of sea defense construction and maintenance came
in the form of unemployment relief. The introduction of beet sugar in Europe and the
United States caused the prices of cane sugar to drop significantly as early as 1883
(Follett-Smith 1954; see also Mintz 1985). This caused a number of smaller estates and
factories to close as it was no longer profitable to grow sugar on a relatively small scale
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in the country31. Even then, the ones that survived did so primarily on the surge in sugar
prices during the First World War and through Colonial and Imperial preference (FollettSmith 1954). In order to reduce their production costs, other estates changed their
production schedules in such a way that allowed them to hire more workers while
reducing the total cost of labor. In the case of one large estate, between 1928 and 1930
the total number of laborers increased by 90 while the monthly wages paid decreased by
$34,000.32 The average wage on one estate went from $11.78 per month to $9.24 per
month over this period while on another it went from over $15 per month to $9 per
month.33 During this same period, producers increased production and expanded as they
had a guaranteed market, but the prices for which were still so low that they refused to
aid the producing populations. R.R. Follett-Smith, then-chairman of Bookers Sugar
Estates Limited, stated as much noting that the prices during these preferential periods
“did not permit improvement of living conditions or of factory equipment” but did allow
estates to continue in these socially detrimental production schemes while passing off
their increased infrastructural burdens onto the state (Follett-Smith 1954, 9).
Relief schemes allowed the government to kill two birds with one stone. The
elevated levels of unemployment suppressed wages to the extent that a large number of
workers could be hired on for relatively little money. These workers could then be
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contracted to build and maintain flood control infrastructure for much less than would
otherwise have been possible in normal economic conditions or if the workers were in a
position to demand higher wages, addressing the financial shortcomings of the new flood
defense policies. This combination of un- and underemployment as well as the state
intervention into flood control infrastructure effectively provided the estates with a new
source of free labor. In the case of the loan provided by Sandbach Parker, estates were
also able to directly profit off of the situation.
Despite these efforts, the East Coast Demerara region, home to many of the
African villages, saw severe flooding in January 1934, with several villages – including
Plaisance – and remote sugar and rice estates being inundated almost entirely while the
large estates that most benefitted from the free labor provided by the Department of
Public Works were left relatively unscathed. While this could be coincidental,
considering the geography of the flood (inundating the entirety of the east coast for a
variety of reasons, mostly infrastructural failure) it seems unlikely.

Conclusion: Sugar, Floods, and Reserve Armies of Labor
The clear result of these floods and the colonial responses to them is the reincorporation
of villagers and other colonized people into the plantation system in the wake of any
failure of the flood control system. Coastal flooding, rather than serving as a severe threat
to the colonial political economy, ultimately benefited the sugar industry by providing
them with a pool of cheap labor who lack other options for the very means of their
survival. Flood control technologies and the legal requirements surrounding them could
be manipulated in such a way as to turn flood control efforts into part of a larger racial
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politics of social control through the precarity – either threatened or experienced – of the
Afro-Guyanese population. In this way and despite their apparent autonomy from the
plantation system, villagers fill the role of what Karl Marx (1887) refers to as a “reserve
army of labor.” In times of economic crisis, villagers served as “a mass of human
material always ready for exploitation” and able to be mobilized for the accumulation of
capital in times of crisis, in particular times of flooding (Marx 1887: 784). While typical
Marxian analysis of surplus labor considers primarily the unemployed, which coastal
villagers were often not, the broader operations of power within the colonial environment
meant that, effectively, the population of surplus laborers in British Guiana were treated
as such and the economic precarity introduced by the threat or experience of coastal
flooding rendered this treatment visible. The portions of their lives outside of the
plantation system, rather than posing a threat to the plantocracy or even providing them
with other means by which they could survive the environmental and economic shocks of
colonialism served its purposes particularly well. As floods threatened the coast, either in
the imminent form of failed drainage and sea defenses or in the direct form of a flood
itself, the conditions were always in such a way that the threat was not only more
immediate to but also directed toward the villages, be they African or Indian in racial
composition. The breakdown of village life, including the economic autonomy that came
with it, provided the sugar industry with labor at rates well below those that which could
otherwise be paid. This arrangement was structured by the legal system and its imposition
of equal treatment of the villages and estates under the law, an arrangement lobbied for
by sugar interests. The end result is a sort of resilience for the sugar plantations (and thus
the economic system which propped up colonialism) at the expense of resilience for
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village populations. The potential of a life free from unstable and capitalistic plantation
economy was denied to those who sought it. Instead, the burdens of broader economy
were placed on their tables through their incorporation into the primary system they
shared: infrastructure. What was once the promise of freedom from the fluctuations of the
sugar market, the promise of a self-reliant economy that could handle the shocks of the
global economy through its distance, became a promise of continued precarity as water
infrastructure was used to reincorporate them back into plantation life.
This is in line with what Percy Hintzen (2017) has argued for occurring in
peripheral and semi-peripheral capitalist systems more broadly. Specifically, he argues
that “the social forces of the state and national authority were also deployed to control,
discipline, and regulate those located outside of the space of capitalist formation in order
to ensure they did not disrupt the process of capital accumulation. The latter also became
organized into ‘segments’ of ‘surplus labor’ to be made available for capitalist production
when needed and for conscription into the service of national authorities, even while
remaining outside of the space of capitalist accumulation” (Hintzen 2017: 4). In Guyana,
as well as in similar colonial economies, this process was racialized, with Afro-Guyanese
typically serving the role of surplus laborers due to contractual agreements between
estates and Indo-Guyanese laborers that were worked out in 1921 (Sugar Producers
Association 1954). Though not entirely outside of the plantation system (see Rodney
1981b; Sugar Producers Association 1954), African villages were ideal spaces to serve as
banks for surplus labor to be drawn upon when the financial situation of the sugar
industry was under threat. The threat of flooding and its ever-changing legal requirements
and repercussions ensured that this was the case, allowing floods and the flood
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management infrastructure meant to mitigate against them to become key tools in the
colonial governance of the colonies.
Importantly, this also demonstrates the ways in which the development of flood
control infrastructure was so heavily entwined with the broader racial politics of the
colony. When and to what extent flood control projects were legislated, funded, and to
whom they benefitted were structured both directly and indirectly by the relationship
between Afro-Guyanese laborers and the plantation economy in the post-slavery period.
While flood control projects certainly pre-date the end of slavery, the new constitution of
social life on the coast created new anxieties and possibilities for flood control
infrastructure and in turn extended the operations of power (both potential and realized)
through broader systems of infrastructure, both those built at the behest of colonizers and
those natural systems which are themselves part of that infrastructure (cf. Carse 2014).
Brian Moore (1987, 97) has argued that “colonial authoritarianism was not born in bad
drainage; rather the latter merely served as an excuse for resorting to the former.”
However, as I have shown in this chapter it was drainage itself that was a means by
which this colonial authoritarianism was produced and enacted. Rather than a simple
excuse, it was in itself a form of authoritarian governance. But this did not happen on its
own. At the same time that new legal and financial structures were affecting the ability of
Afro-Guyanese to prosper in their villages, workers on the sugar estates were facing
increasingly harsh conditions and suppressed wages resulting in strikes, riots, and other
forms of labor action. To mediate these emergent challenges to colonial authority, a rice
industry was developing meant to alleviate other financial burdens facing the colonial
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government and, in turn, establishing an entirely different form of flood control that also
fell along racial lines. This is the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3 - RICE, RACE, AND EMPOLDERMENT

“Guyana’s Rice Industry provides a livelihood for more people, directly and inirectly,
than any other industry in the country. In one way or another, almost one quarter of a
million of our people earn employment through the rice industry and forty-five thousand
families work in our rice farms.”
-

Ptolemy Reid, Minister of Finance, June 7, 1968 (Quoted in Richardson 1970)

Introduction
The turn of the twentieth century saw rapid population growth in Guyana. Improved
healthcare was extending life expectancies while the end of indentureship led to a rising
and newly independent East Indian populace. With a sugar industry at times incapable of
and at times averse to employing all the workers available in and around the capital city
and a growing population, unemployment was becoming a significant issue that was
increasingly complicated by the country’s historical ties to coastal agriculture and a
general unwillingness (and a historically constituted inability) to diversify (see Khemraj
2015; Ramraj 2001).
At the same time, the end of indenture contracts resulted in the growth of a second
emergent laboring population with historical ties to the sugar industry. Early indications
show that the inter-ethnic relationships between Afro-Guyanese and the formerly
indentured populations (including not only Indo-Guyanese but also Portuguese and
Chinese) were amicable at times but that conflict emerged as a result of the strike-
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breaking activities, producing ethnic boundaries based primarily on the social solidarity
found (and encouraged) within ethnic groups (Bartels 1977). These conflicts developed
(albeit unevenly) through a series of riots between these laboring groups beginning in the
1840s when Portuguese indentures were given preferential treatment over villages in
terms of access to small market spaces (Moore 1975; Wagner 1977). The conflict was,
however, relatively short-lived and the working classes would largely return to their
general apathy until re-united by a common anti-colonial sentiment (Moore 1987, 193).
In 1905 that unified sentiment began fomenting in earnest around what would come to be
known as the Ruimveldt Riots.
In December of 1905, stevedores, porters, and other Afro-Guyanese workers
remaining in the sugar industry went on strike demanding higher wages. Supported by the
largely-immigrant middle classes of the colony as well as the lumpen and village
populations, the workers demonstrated on the streets of Georgetown in increasingly
militant actions against the colonial government while, simultaneously, they agitated on
the plantations against East Indian scabbing which had been used to break previous
strikes (Rodney 1981). Though never involved directly in the strikes, Indian plantation
laborers (both indentured and “free”) refused to fill the positions of the striking workers
and helping to make the strike more effective. In return, the striking workers made
demands on behalf of all workers rates, arguing that wages were not meeting the rising
costs of living in the colony and that the current economic depression was resulting in
less hours paid pro rata. In Walter Rodney’s (1981) analysis, this multi-class, multiethnic solidarity was a turning point in the history of Guyana’s working people, one
which would bring about a new threat to colonialism, the only apparent and existing
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solution to which was the exploitation of racial and ethnic differences (Moore 1987).
According to Moore (1987), this exploitation was dangerous and new ways to “divide
and rule” the colonial populations were necessary.
In chapter 2, I discussed the ways in which infrastructure was used to quell
surging unemployment rates while reincorporating Afro-Guyanese back into the
plantation economy after the development of the village movement and the historical
strikes resulting from decreasing wages. This was a stop gap measure that could satisfy
the sugar industry, but which did not resolve the underlying socioeconomic issues that
were causing unemployment in the first place: a growing population and a dying market
for cane sugar in general and Demerara sugar in particular. Widespread political and
economic precarity resulting from this industrial failure combined with colonial racial
characterizations that preferred ‘industrious’ Indians to ‘lazy’ Africans is the often-cited
reason that the unity of working people could not last. Dennis Bartels (1977) argues in an
article representative of this Marxian analysis, for example, that the relatively positive
racial stereotypes attributed to Indo-Guyanese resulted in favorable policy-making thus
furthering the material divide between the two populations. Brian Moore (1987) has
argued that economic specialization created space between the major ethnic groups but
still provided lines along which they could built interdependence and thus cross-racial
solidarity. While I do not disagree with either Bartels’ or Moore’s analyses, I want to
argue that they account for only part of the story. To address larger problems within the
colony and the emergent threat to the colonial project itself being produced through the
alienation of the working populations, the Colonial Office, Colonial Development and
Welfare, and British Guiana government undertook large-scale drainage projects to bring
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tens of thousands of acres of regularly flooded lands under cultivation and to – through
the establishment of small villages adjacent to the land – encourage population growth
along the stretch of the coast. If appropriately racialized, this project would provide
geographic and economic independence among these communities, along the colonial
government to treat each group as distinct and thus limit the impacts of things like strikes
to the larger colonial project.
In this chapter, I examine the social history of this land development, looking in
particular at the ways in which it produced new racial geographies along the coast.
Drawing on archival research conducted at the National Archives in London, UK
between 2015 and 2017 and interviews and fieldwork conducted in Den Amstel, West
Coast Demerara (an African village adjacent to the Boeraserie Scheme), I argue that these
projects were in part an attempt to relieve racial tensions and anti-colonial sentiment in
the country’s post-union movement period and played a similar role through UK
intervention in the postcolonial period. The result has been the increased geographical,
social, and economic distance between large portions of the population resulting in an
overall in a lack of resilience due to social fragmentation. I also argue that, just as
previous attempts to reincorporate Afro-Guyanese into the sugar industry served not only
as a means of maintaining white supremacy but also (and more broadly speaking) to prop
up a dying colonialism, the development of a rice industry did the same. Not only did it
provide the ethnic difference necessary to end or avoid anticolonial revolts, it also
provided new sources of income to make up for the profits lost by the shrinking of the
sugar industry.

107

Many of the lands used for these new land settlement projects were once sugar
estates, abandoned either shortly after the abolition of slavery in 1834 or during later
depressions when the rising costs of upkeep and lower sugar prices reduced the
profitability of the smaller estates, particularly those that did not have any legislative
sway34. Changing land use from one commodity to another was not as simple as tilling
and replanting. In discussing the requirements to shift from fields designed and laid out
for sugar production to the production of rice, an Afro-Guyanese civil engineer who
worked on several drainage and irrigation projects from the 1970s to the 2000s explained
to me that it was not as simple as clearing the brush and changing the amount of water
flowing in. Rather, cane fields are built with each row of cane on a small hill to facilitate
rapid drainage during heavy storms while rice fields are ideally flat or gently sloping
toward a canal (see Plate 4 and Plate 5). In order for a successful conversion from one use
to the other, the fields themselves need to be levelled at significant expense. In the early
years of rice production, former estate lands were purchased and then sublet to a number
of tenants who were individually responsible for making the necessary modifications to
the land or were made up of small disused sections of larger sugar estates and managed
by the predominantly East Indian staff working in the area (Rice Farmers Committee
1953). The settlement schemes, requiring thousands and thousands of acres of land to be
brought into productions required significant expense. With the few remaining large
estates and apparently no colonial capitalists willing to undertake these expenses, the
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burden of large scale conversion was laid at feet of the Colonial Office and the British
Guiana Government.

Plate 4 - Former cane fields now used for grazing in Den Amstel, Guyana, adjacent to
the Boeraserie Scheme. Note the ridges used to wash water away from the cane and
toward canals. (Photo by Author November 2017).
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Plate 5 - Former cane fields flattened and converted for rice production in the Tapakuma
scheme, Pomeroon-Supenaam, Guyana. (Photo by author, June 2015).

The two-fold nature of this venture (repurpose sugar fields for rice production and
create a village system for the peasant farmers who would work them) resulted in a
number of civil and environmental engineering problems which needed to be resolved,
the most significant of which was the question of how to manage water. How could
engineers modify and expand the existing systems of canals and dams to ensure there was
enough water for agricultural production, particularly water-heavy crops such as rice for
which colonizers had identified a local (circum-Caribbean) market, while also ensuring
that the villages surrounding the fields would not become inundated should flooding
occur? From the beginning, these schemes were envisioned as small-holder projects that
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may or may not see mechanized production based on the needs, desires, and economic
ability of the farmers. Thus, they also needed to ensure that villages were close enough to
the fields that they would not be neglected in favor of the smaller family plots used
primarily for subsistence. How did engineers and colonial officers navigate this terrain?
How did the developing racial politics in the country and the growing anticolonial
movement affect the ways in which projects were planned? In what ways did this set the
stage for future infrastructure maintenance in the postcolonial period?
I answer these questions through an examination of three rice development
schemes: Boeraserie (40,403ha), Black Bush Polder (12,545ha), and Tapakuma
(10,926ha) (see Figure 3). These schemes span much of Guyana’s coast, covering
portions of the West Coast Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice regions respectively. They
also each presented their own challenges and produced their own racial spatializations of
labor. I begin this chapter with an overview of the empolderment process that made the
realization of these schemes possible, examining the ways in which empolderment has
been used to shape political and economic regimes beyond Guyana. Next, I use this
analysis to re-introduce the relationship between race, food, and agriculture developed in
the introduction as well as chapter 2, looking specifically at the processes by which food
production becomes a means for both repressing and mobilizing colonized people and
linking them to larger political and economic conditions not because they serve particular
colonial economic needs but also for the ways in which such linkages can be used to
solve a variety of issues which serve to threaten colonialism. Finally, I provide a general
overview of Guyana’s history of indentureship and the racial politics of land settlement
involved at the end of the indentureship period before looking specifically at the above
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named empolderment projects. I conclude with a brief reflection on the ways in which
these systems continue to shape life in Guyana, especially through new processes of
urban movement from the country’s village extremes and the continued minimization of
the sugar industry by the current government.

Figure 3 - Map showing the location of major drainage and irrigation projects in British
Guiana. Source: Daniel 1988.
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The Critical Physical Geographies of Empolderment
In the first chapter I outlined the broader physical geography and historical
geology of the coast. Chapter 2 I briefly reviewed the politics embedded within the
drainage, irrigation, and defense artefacts associated with coastal drainage, noting how
they stake long-term claims for particular capitalist formations and political desires. This
is true for polders as well, but to a different extent and inclusive of different reasons.
Empolderment is a sort of infrastructural master project, encompassing a wide variety of
other infrastructural commitments which must be maintained as a unit to ensure the
empoldered lands are not inundated. This differs from other drainage schemes primarily
in the scale in which it occurs. While it was not uncommon for local landholders to cut
canals, build dams, and drain lands for agricultural production (as in Chapter 2), these
projects were traditionally worked, maintained, and to some degree legislated at a much
more local scale than empolderment projects which have geographically larger (and in
the context of British Guiana, colonial) significance. To an extent, the centralization of
drainage authority in the mid-20th century means that all of Guyana’s coast has been
empoldered in one way or another, but this chapter examines specific empolderment
schemes, whereby an area of land is deemed unsuitable for cultivation, is (re-)empoldered
through extensive construction of dams and canals, and is turned into an economically
(and in this case at least, socially) productive space. In these projects, empolderment
served as a means of manipulating the physical environment in order to expand the
colonial capitalist economy into new geographies. They corresponded with land
settlement projects meant to redistribute the population along the coast and provide
workers, primarily of East Indian descent, for the new schemes (see Greenidge 2001). As
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mentioned in Chapter 1, the field of critical physical geography is particularly well suited
for understanding such processes.
Empolderment is perhaps one of the world’s oldest large-scale environmental
engineering processes. At least as far back as the middle ages, Dutch citizens were
building “encircling dams” and complex systems of canals, dykes, and other
infrastructural artefacts to secure, claim, and reclaim land from the sea (TeBrake 2002;
Hughes 2009). This was necessary because, like Guyana (see Chapter 1 - The Precolonial
and Early Colonial History of Coastal Settlement), The Netherlands had large areas of
peat soil. Seeking additional land for agricultural production and settlement, people
drained these peaty areas causing the density of the soil to increase, the volume to
decrease, and the land to subside and eventually flood, either through new spaces for
meandering for one of the country’s rivers or for flooding from the sea (Hughes 2009).
By enclosing the land prior to draining it, the Dutch were able to minimize the negative
environmental impacts of this subsidence. The large-scale engineering efforts of the
Dutch have given rise to a popular refrain in the literature on Dutch water management:
“God made the world, but the Dutch made Holland” (see Hughes 2009). But if the Dutch
“made Holland,” they also created the conditions which made these projects necessary as
they sought out new lands for capital accumulation. This was true also in Guyana, where
colonial records show that early empolderment projects (some of which were built with
advice from Dutch engineers but were not products of the Dutch colonial period35)
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resulted in increased flooding in surrounding areas, simultaneously creating new land for
cultivation while inundating previously cultivated land. In a letter to a member of
parliament, one colonial engineer described the extent of the problem, stating “small
portions of land on the flood plains have in fact been empoldered, but this while securing
the safety of those particularly areas, has only accentuated the problem [of flooding]
outside them. There is obviously a limit to the effectiveness of such piecemeal
empoldering since each new empolder simply diverts the flood water with increasing
force elsewhere and so results in a situation where protection of land becomes
progressively more expensive.”36
Because polders work by redirecting natural flows of waters around enclosed
areas they serve two key purposes besides land reclamation. First, empoldered land must
be continuously drained to ensure it does not simply become a large lake in the event of
pluvial flooding. This is done by pumping or otherwise draining water through canals
into nearby rivers or the ocean. In the Netherlands, windmill-driven pumps were used
while in Guyana a combination of gravity drainage and, later, mechanical pumps were
used to move this water. Second, during times of drought, the gates accompanying these
pumps can be used to flood the canals providing a source of fresh water for continued
cultivation (Schuetze and Chelleri 2011). Though useful for the development of
agriculture, this canalization changes watershed dynamics in a way that carries with it a
number of negative secondary effects which must be mitigated by future engineering
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works. In the case of the Netherlands, this has resulted in the threat of salinization of both
to the aquifers and to the canals, due in part to an increase in both the frequency and
intensity of droughts (Schuetze and Chelleri 2011; see also Bouwer, Bubeck, and Aerts
2010). As droughts occur and less freshwater runs through the river system, there is less
freshwater to recharge aquifers and less pressure holding back salt water at the estuaries.
This results in salt water intrusion, whereby salt water enters the freshwater aquifer
system (see Essink 2001) and allows salt water to enter canals when gates are opened to
flood them with irrigation water (Schuetze and Chelleri 2011).
The control of water, and especially seawater, also has cultural implications.
Stefan Helmreich (2011) calls water a “theory machine,” an object which, through its
widespread significance serves as a means of stimulating theoretical insights (see also
Galison 2003). This is reflected in the work of Timothy Mitchell, Sara Pritchard, Jessica
Barnes, and others that have been reviewed throughout this dissertation but Helmreich’s
understanding of water as a genesis for theoretical-cultural insights in itself is important
here because it also lets us think theoretically about attempts to control it and what this
means for those involved. From its origins, empolderment has been less a project of
protecting humans from natural hazards as a means of protecting people and property
from a combination of geophysical hazards created in the name the accumulation of
capital. As recently as the mid-20th century, the government of The Netherlands has
developed polders to reclaim land from the sea in order to expand areas for agricultural
production and population settlement (van Schoubroeck 2010). In this way, it makes
sense that British Guiana’s authorities sought to use empolderment as a means for solving
its land settlement problems. However, despite its political economic origins, widespread

116

adaptation in colonial and postcolonial countries, and unlike other infrastructural projects,
empolderment has been largely understudied. The lack of recent critical analysis on
large-scale infrastructure projects is somewhat surprising given a return to infrastructure
in water management after and in combination with the ecological turn (see Crow-Miller,
Webber, and Molle 2017). There have been a handful of critical studies of drainage and
irrigation in Guyana that have looked at empolderment schemes, but often indirectly (i.e.
as isolated analysis of village life) or ignoring the political, economic, and cultural
complexities shaped by and embedded within these systems, focusing instead on the
purely technical measures of their functioning (e.g. Daniel 1988; Danns 1997; Farley
1954; Greenidge 2001; Lakhan 1994; Nasseer 1978; Ramraj 2001; Richardson 1972;
Richardson 1973; Strachan 1980; Veramallay 1976; Vining 1977).
Expanding empolderment to include other practices of land reclamation can also
be fruitful for understanding the ways in which such projects can be used not only for the
purposes of capitalist accumulation but also a means of social control, extending state
power into a variety of areas often overlooked in more traditional political economic
analyses. Jessica Barnes (2017), for example, highlights the ways in which the
maintenance of irrigation infrastructure used to create arable land along the Nile has also
created sets of social relationships that in turn shape and maintain the regional material
and social order. Similarly, Rae Choi (2014) shows how land reclamation projects in
South Korea’s tidal flats – which were discursively defended as modernization projects –
actually contributed to regional underdevelopment by alienating rural workers from the
economic growth being experienced in more urbanized areas. These insights allow us to
consider the ways in which projects in Guyana may have impacted social organization,
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relationships between rural workers in reclaimed land and the larger economy, and,
because these projects were primarily land settlement for Indian-descended people, the
racial politics of these divisions.

Polders, Politics, and Agriculture
A common thread between empolderment projects in Guyana and other largescale infrastructure projects is their seemingly incessant focus on monocrop agricultural
production. As noted above, both empolderment and other processes of land reclamation
have historically been undertaken with the primary goal of increasing the availability of
foodstuffs in a given region, whether to feed local populations or for export. In Guyana,
this was largely the case for rice production. As mentioned previously, a wide variety of
crops were grown in the colonies that now make up Guyana up until British colonization,
but even then, these crops were grown as export commodities to be sold to metropolitan
consumers. Subsistence crop production was largely ancillary to growing crops for
foreign markets. Rice production, existing as early in 1753, was seen to be a potential
boon for planters starting to establish themselves under Dutch colonial rule (Richardson
1970). Early Dutch governor Storm Van’s Gravesande noted the potential for rice under
this movement, stating “It is a pleasure to see how cheerful, zealous and industrious the
new-comers are. In addition to sugar plantations, several will be laid out with coffee, and
the arrivals from Carolina will devote themselves to the cultivation of rice. On Mr. La
Villette’s plantation I have seen rice standing neglected and have no doubt that it will be
a great success and yield good profits to the planters” (Harris and de Villiers 1911, 293,
quoted in Richardson 1970, 56). Under British supervision, this production consolidated
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around the sugar industry owing at least in part to soil exhaustion and more generalized
land degradation in their other Caribbean colonies (Carrington 2002). Under this system,
drainage and irrigation infrastructure also united around sugar production and the estate
system at the expense of small holder production.
In the 1860s, two East Indian-descended people used oxen to cultivate rice on the
foreshore of the Edinburgh sugar estate, but as late as the 1890s rice was still only
produced at a relatively small scale, with only an average of 7,490 acres under cultivation
between 1894 and 1898 and the first rice for export not being produced until 1903 (Rice
Farmers Committee 1953; Richardson 1970). The sugar depression of the 1920s and 30s
saw a new colonial focus on rice production and with it the amount of land under rice
cultivation would increase dramatically and rapidly. By 1930 enough rice was being
produced that the Ministry of Agriculture established full-time rice grading offices and by
1952 production reached over 134,000 acres in active cultivation (Rice Farmers
Committee 1953; Richardson 1970; see Figure 4). This rapid increase in rice production
was due in part to the leasing of crown lands for rice production at relatively low rates
across the colony (previously, rice production was done on small parcels leased from
estates with most rice producers earning the bulk of their income in the sugar industry,
see Richardson 1970, 58.) Without any large-scale scheme, however, this production was
ad hoc and prone to rapid declines in production as a result of flooding (these declines are
clear in Figure 4). This production also fell outside of the larger system of drainage and
irrigation at times, owing to regulatory changes focused on the sugar industry discussed
in Chapter 2. Instead, outside of the larger land settlement schemes that are the primary
subject of this chapter, infrastructural responsibilities fell variously to tenant, landlord,
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local authority, and Drainage and Irrigation Board depending on both the location of the
field and extent (and expenses) of the work (Rice Farmers Committee 1953). For their
efforts, rice farmers had relatively secure land tenure rights and low rents under the
Defence (Restriction of Eviction of Rice Farmers) Regulations first released in 1942 and
the Rice Farmers (Security of Tenure) Ordinance of 1945.

Figure 4 -Rice Production by Acreage 1898-1968. Adapted from Richardson, 1970

Outside of the structures of colonialism, rice was produced by Africans who had
escaped the shackles of slavery and setup villages on the fringes of the colonies (Farley
1954). In the early years of British colonization, this was a major point of both interest
and derision for colonial administrators. Rawle Farley (1954) notes how then-Acting
Governor of Berbice Samuel Dalrymple timed expeditions against these villages to
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correspond with the rice production cycle to ensure maximum damage to African fields
and thus their ability to survive. When accounting for this destruction, Dalrymple
estimated that enough rice had been produced – excluding other ground provisions – to
feed as many as 700 people for a year37. That such widespread agricultural production
occurred under the autonomous self-management of escaped Africans is not surprising.
Judith Carney (2001) has shown how people from across the Upper Guinea Coast have a
long history of rice production, predating European colonization of the Americas (for a
contextualization of this production into the broader western African economy see
Rodney 1970). Her work demonstrates not only that African people had a large rice
producing culture in Africa, but that they brought this cultural knowledge with them
when they were forced to work in American fields. As shown in the above quote from
Storm Van’s Gravesande, rice may have first been introduced to the Guianas by way of
the Carolina rice industry that Carney (2001) so beautifully historicizes (Richardson
1970). An unfortunate consequence of the wanton colonial destruction of these African
fields is the lack of knowledge about the ways in which these “maroon” villages
organized their social and material worlds and with them alternatives to the colonial order
of things.
Unlike sugar, which was produced primarily as an export product for the
American and later European markets (for a detailed analysis of this see Carrington
2002), rice had a significant local and regional market which produced new challenges
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related to the organizational needs of the system, but it also solved two problems for the
colonial government. First, the large amount of land under cultivation for sugar meant
that most of the actual edible produce was produced on a small scale. Many plots were
subsistence-focused and, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, were often disrupted by flooding.
This meant that most of the food consumed in British Guiana and other British Caribbean
territories was imported from other colonial areas, making the country reliant on extant
British trade agreements and successful agricultural yields in other, more distant colonies
such as those in East and Southeast Asia. Producing rice in land rich British Guiana
allowed for a commodity that could be processed and distributed locally and regionally –
a point of importance when international transport was limited due to the First and
Second World Wars. Rice, still a cash crop, was seen as vital to the success of these
schemes. As an anonymous commentator noted in a comment on the Report of the Land
Settlement Committee in July of 1939, “the essential point of a land settlement scheme is
the cash crops to be grown, as settlers cannot succeed on a basis of subsistence farming
alone38.” The goal then was not to create a system in which settlers could work in their
own self-interest but instead to perpetuate what increasingly appeared to be a dying
colonial capitalism. By the time land settlement was in full effect, rice had become a
highly desirable crop in the Caribbean. With the outbreak of the First World War, rice
supplies from the colonial East Indies had been cut off, leaving stores of the staple crop
low throughout the western hemisphere (Naseer 1978). Seeing the opportunity for quick
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“British Guiana: Comments on the Report of the Land Settlement Committee,”
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cash on the export market, estate managers and peasant farmers, with the support of the
Colonial Office, began establishing rice fields. Though lulled to near extermination in the
interwar period, the Japanese occupation of rice producing territories across Asia gave
new life to Guyana’s industry.
Though spurred on first by planters and later by the economic politics of total
war, rice production was also important in the postwar political economy. It was,
significantly, a major concern for decolonization advocate and politician Cheddi Jagan.
In 1961, after a large rice order from Fidel Castro’s Cuba, Jagan – then acting as the
Minister of Trade and Industry in the semi-autonomous government – sought to reclaim
even more lands and expand the industry further, stating “We can all go forward
confidently in our drainage and irrigation schemes, land settlements, and in bringing
more and more land into [rice] cultivation” (quoted in Richardson 1970, 61). With
Burnham’s election in 1964, however, the Cuban market disappeared and with it a large
source of income. The loss of the Cuban market combined with the fact that Jagan had
been paying out greater prices to rice farmers than he was receiving from rice buyers in
order to advance his political career left the rice industry bankrupt, compounding the
existing environmental and political challenges facing East Indian communities
dependent on rice production (Richardson 1970).
Second, and perhaps more importantly for the colonial project as a whole, rice
production provided a means for offsetting the costs associated with the end of
indentureship. By 1939 the question of land settlement had become a contentious point in
British Guiana. Facing the imminent threat of a second world war and still recovering
from a decade long economic depression, the British sought to pre-emptively reduce
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costs throughout their empire. One way to do this was to offer land to recently released
indentures in exchange for the return passage they had been promised with the grants of
land being “a charge on the Immigration Fund to limit the liability of the Fund for the
repatriation of the expenses of immigrants.”39 Between 1838 and 1917 a nearly 239,000
indentured laborers entered the colony to work in the sugar fields in place of black
laborers who had since refused or had been denied the right (see Chapter 2 - “A Mild
Despotism of Sugar”: Race, Labor, and Water Management), the majority of whom were
from British colonies in South Asia (Naseer 1978; Lakhan 1994). From this group only
around 75,000 returned (Naseer 1978). The remaining population remained to work in the
sugar fields as free laborers or settled in a variety of small villages near the centers of
sugar production until economic crises in the sugar industry pushed them out, leaving
them with nowhere to go without the assistance of government settlement schemes.
These new settlers would be granted land on an 11-year lease with the maintenance costs
for the first year being spread over the remaining 10, in the case of those who exchanged
their return passage for land all costs would be waived for the lease period. Though
technically available to anyone in the colony, there existed within the Colonial Office and
in the Government of British Guiana a “relative preference of negro and East Indian
cultivators for cane and fruit farming and for rice cultivation respectively.40” In terms of
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By the late 1970s, Indo-Guyanese accounted for more than 90 percent of coastal rice
producers (see Naseer 1978).
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both the agreement for settlement (with lease costs being waived entirely for East Indian
settlers willing to exchange their return passage) and the fact that much of the settled land
was to be part of rice producing schemes rather than those focusing on sugar, East Indian
populations saw clear advantages over their African-descended neighbors. The focus on
sugar was also disregarded at one point because “sugar can stand the capital cost of
drainage and irrigation works in addition to the cost of upkeep, and it is assumed as
axiomatic that rice cannot.” 41 It should also be made clear that East Indians were not
universally treated better than Afro-Guyanese. At the same time that settlement schemes
were being discussed, East Indian villages were being regularly flooded by the drainage
of excess waters from the East Demerara Water Conservancy. One commentator even
suggested to the Governor of the colony that a solution to this problem could be to
relocate those affected to rice lands in one of the new settlement schemes rather than
actually finding an engineering solution. As he argued, “the taking of such measures
would be in accordance with the policy which has been adopted, as the result of outbreak
of war, of increasing the production of local food-stuffs and in this connection I note that
rice which it is especially desired to encourage in British Guiana to meet the needs of the
West Indian market, is one of the commodities grown in the areas concerned.”42
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Minute 1A of 29/8/1939, CO111/763/3, The National Archives, UK.
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Boeraserie and Black Bush Polder: Rice, Drainage, and Sea Defense
As shown above, experiences with rice production in the inter- and post-war
periods highlighted the general inefficiency of current drainage and irrigation schemes to
function within a rice-based economy as well as a general lack of coordinated planning
on the part of agricultural producers and the state more generally (see also Lakhan 1994).
The first attempts to create from scratch a new scheme of land settlement tied directly to
the development of rice production occurred with the Boeraserie and Black Bush Polder
Schemes. The previous schemes aimed at reducing the costs associated with repatriation
were smaller in scale, typically limited in size to the area covered by seized estates along
the coast. About 5,000 families (30,000 individuals) had been settled in these earlier
schemes, collectively representing 70,000 acres of arable land (under 4000 acres per
scheme on average, or about 14 acres per family – though the majority of individual
holdings were much smaller, [Naseer 1978]). By comparison, Boeraserie and Black Bush
Polder encompassed over 130,000 acres, making them the largest land settlement projects
in the Caribbean and perhaps the most ambitious projects of their kind throughout the
British Empire. The massive scale of these projects can be especially understood in the
Black Bush Polder scheme, where settlers were each given 17.5 acres of land for
cultivation, with 15 acres dedicated to rice production and the remaining 2.5 to be used
for subsistence production43 (Naseer 1978).
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Though ear-marked for subsistence production, experience in the country dictates that
the 2.5 acres available to settlers provides enough land for small-scale production of local
market crops.
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Though different in their extent, their goals, and the means and measures
necessary to create them, the Boeraserie and Black Bush Polder schemes faced common
challenges surrounding the production of arable rice lands, appropriate drainage for those
lands, and a means for defending both the land and the water network from the threat of
excessive or saline water, which had the power to make these efforts futile. In Boeraserie,
the concern centered around increasingly brackish canal waters, the potential collapse of
the earthen dams used to delineate the boundaries of the reservoirs, and the potential for
minor issues in one portion of the scheme to cause domino effects throughout the region.
In Black Bush Polder, there were concerns over the regular flooding of the Canje River
and its distributaries as well as the flushing of estate waters from the existing network of
canals. In solving both of these issues, colonial engineers established a system aimed at
social management as much as it was water meant to manage water.
Boeraserie
The estates and villages lining the coast of the West Coast Demerara region have
historically relied upon the 94 square mile Boeraserie Water Conservancy, situated in the
backlands between the Demerara and Essequibo rivers. However, inefficient design and
poor soil conditions made the conservancy inadequate for large scale agricultural
production. Though a complaint among the planters and villagers relying on it for
decades, this inadequacy became painfully clear in 1937, when according to the narrative

The Boeraserie scheme, though technically a larger area overall, involved the
rehabilitation and extensions of a large conservancy, making the amount of arable land –
and thus the amount available to individual settlers – much smaller.
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of the project application a drought left the conservancy dry for a period of 42 days44.
The lack of water caused the dam walls (mostly made out of local, peaty soil, see Chapter
1 - The Precolonial and Early Colonial History of Coastal Settlement) to shrink or
collapse, leaving the areas adjacent to the conversancy – by this time mostly African
villages or predominantly black towns having sprung up following the death of the local
sugar industry – vulnerable to flooding. Similarly, nearby Canals Polder Conservancy,
though much smaller in size and meant to provide water for a much smaller area caused
regular experiences of drought and flood in the area of Canals Polder on the west bank of
the Demerara River45. These problems with the Boeraserie Conservancy were first
addressed by the Bonasika scheme, which created a canal from the Bonasika river to the
conservancy to provide it with a regular infusion of fresh water. However, shortly after
the scheme was completed, heavy rainfalls threatened to undermine the headworks,
which resulted in the project’s abandonment46. So severe was the damage that, in his
notes of a tour of the decimated scheme, J.W. Vernon of the Colonial Office stated that
“the water rushing through these headworks had scoured back so fiercely under the
greenheart pile foundation that the diver who examined them was able to walk right
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underneath the whole structure.”47 These issues, including water problems in Canals
Polder, were to be addressed by the newly Boeraserie Scheme, which would, according to
colonial legislators, also bring about thousands of new acres of arable land which could
be worked by re-settled East Indian laborers, with the potential to grow a variety of
crops48.
Encompassing an area of 129,000 acres (201 square miles) with 97,000 acres
available for cultivation, the Boeraserie scheme was an absolutely massive undertaking.
While initially calculated to include not only support for rice and sugar but also for the
ground staples common to African villages (see Chapter 2 - “A Mild Despotism of
Sugar”: Race, Labor, and Water Management), early reports on the economic prospects
of the Boeraserie scheme quickly noted that the majority of the newly established arable
areas would be used to develop the rice industry, while sugar expansion would be
focused on the area of Wales Estate, West Bank Demerara49. This was due largely to
concerns that the growth of non-cash crops would not provide the economic returns that
cash crops (especially rice) could offer. One administrator made this point bluntly,
“Leaving aside engineering, the doubtful part of the scheme from the technical aspect is
the direction of agricultural developments. Unless the land is in fact developed with crops
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Enclosure C: Note on Agricultural and Economic Prospects of the Area Commanded
by the Boerasirie Scheme, CO1031/170, The National Archives, UK.
The Wales Estate is an interesting project which is, as of this writing, under threat of
closure and privatization by the Government of Guyana. It will be the site of future
analysis.
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that pay, it will not be possible to charge water and other rates50.” Falling sugar prices
and low local market prices for other crops limited this to rice and thus, based on colonial
agricultural racializations, to East Indian settlement.
This concern with the financing of the scheme through water rates (and thus
seeking production for only specific crops) combined with racialized policies related to
which racial groups would be targeted by and aligned for each agricultural project meant
that, despite the longstanding African population in the region serviced by the Boeraserie
scheme, the primary benefactors would be an East Indian populace who would receive
land, housing, and preferential land tenure arrangements as a result of its production51.
The positive effects for existing villages would be secondary – i.e. they would still
benefit from improved drainage and through maintenance to some of the existing
infrastructure, but there would be no major changes in economic or land tenure
arrangements. According to some village residents I spoke with during fieldwork in the
area in November 2017, this created some tension between newly settled groups and
longtime residents which often collided with other racial biases.
Black Bush Polder
In 1957, a large portion of British Guiana’s eastern region was uninhabited
marshlands. The coastline between the Berbice River in the west and the Corentyne in the
east were lined with relatively small sugar estates backed by an extensive and frequently
flooded marshland. Being disconnected geographically, politically, and economically
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130

from Georgetown, the depression of the sugar industry in the 1950s along with retaliation
against organized laborers52 caused increasing levels of unemployment in the region,
especially among the Indo-Guyanese population who could not readily find work in the
Afro-Guyanese stronghold of New Amsterdam. Prior to establishment of the settlement
scheme, much of this land was used for cattle grazing and the development of the scheme
had to take this into account, with planners for the scheme noting at one point that “the
invasion of cattle on to cultivated land discourages desirable agricultural practices such as
crop rotation, the cultivation of permanent crops, etc.53” Invasive cattle aside, the scheme
successfully established thousands of acres of land for settlement and rice cultivation and
soon saw settlers from around the region claim land to develop their rice farms. On April
7th, 1961, the scheme officially opened with great fanfare, including parades of settlers
and speeches from important public figures, including Dr. Cheddi Jagan, leader of the
Indo-Guyanese People’s Progressive Party (see Plate 6, Plate 7, and Plate 8).
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An important part of this history of labor retaliation actually relates to the digging of
new drainage ditches in what was then Plantation Skeldon. During a strike related to the
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Greener Guns at protesting workers. The details of this event can be found in “Report of
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1957.
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Plate 6 - "March past of settlers," Black Bush Polder Opening Ceremony, 7th April 1961,
CO1031/3468, The National Archives, UK

Plate 7 - "Platform Party. Dr. Jagan Speaking." Black Bush Polder Opening Ceremony,
7th April 1961, CO1031/3468, The National Archives, UK
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Plate 8 - "Mr. Benn, Minister, opening the Joppa sea sluice,” Black Bush Polder
Opening Ceremony, 7th April 1961, CO1031/3468, The National Archives, UK
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In what will be a recurrent theme, however, the excitement and success of the
project did not last long. While initially run largely by the villagers, postcolonial
development schemes established as part of the Burnham government’s commitment to
“cooperativism” saw the government take over capitalization projects and, in turn, saw
the continued failure of many of the machines that made large-scale rice production a
viable option, with cooperative rice mills incurring heavy debts that would need to be
regularly written off by the parliament (Richardson 1972). The threats posed by this
mechanical breakdown, along with those of drought, flood, blight, and pests meant that,
within a decade, many of the settlers were “not full time farmers as those found in more
developed nations where land, capital and labour are often devoted to the production of a
single crop,” creating a situation where both domestic and international intervention into
the industry failed on the grounds that they did not account for local conditions and
practices (Richardson 1972, 21; see also Lakhan 1994; Vining 1977).
As the first attempt in Guyana to establish new agricultural production in
previously un-/dis-used land (Vining 1977), hopes were high for the Black Bush Polder
scheme, but problems in the region persist. Black Bush Polder should have represented
the culmination of more than a century of knowledge and experience with planning and
development along the coast, from a fragmented, individualistic system which saw
estates looking out for their own interests at the expense of others to a centrally organized
system governed by groups who should have had significant knowledge of the conditions
across the coast and thus – drawing on accumulated environmental and engineering
expertise – develop meaningful and functional solutions. Instead, a postcolonial
government that failed to provide education to settlers and cared little for their success
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along with settlers’ understandable ambivalence toward monocropping combined to
create a generalized and systematic failure of the scheme from the standpoint of both
production and flood prevention (Lakhan 1994).
Chris Lakhan described the dire state of the scheme in the 1990s, stating that “it
would be worthwhile if further recognition is given to the fact that the cumulative
impacts of negative experiences, as for example water control problems, will act as a
forceful deterrent to the successful cultivation, settlement and development of the coastal
zone. As a matter of fact with its current water control and associated problems there is
considerable disenchantment by many people in the coastal zone” (1994, 183). The
situation has not significantly changed. In 2017, major flooding struck the area,
devastating the region, a problem exacerbated by the fact that the design of Black Bush
Polder meant that water flooding from the Canje River could not be adequately drained
away (Williams 2017).

Tapakuma: Race, Rice, and Foreign Aid in the Postcolonial Period
On June 16th, 1961, the Tapakuma Drainage and Irrigation Scheme was created
by an act of colonial legislation54. Combining two existing, smaller schemes, the goal of
the project was to improve drainage in the area of Tapakuma Lake which, along with
Lake Reliance and Lake Capoey, serves as one of the primary sources of fresh water for
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rice cultivation in the Pomeroon-Supenaam region55. However, with origins dating back
prior to the 1828 construction of Taksmu Lake (which was to be used as a conservancy),
archival records show that the desire to have large swathes of cultivatable land along the
northwestern coast was not new56. Prior to the completion of the Tapakuma scheme in the
1960s, planters settling the area had successfully strung together a series of canals that
could be used to water crops and operated somewhat successfully in that way for nearly a
century with little government assistance (Strachan 1980). By the 1930s the depression in
sugar caused many of the estates to either close or significantly reduce their
infrastructural expenditure, leaving the estate workers to deal with regular flooding and
inconsistent crops (Strachan 1980).
While government funding for schemes in the area was scarce for most of British
Guiana’s history, it became a major focus when F.H. Hutchinson suggested
redevelopment of the area as a means to promote the relative prosperity of its
inhabitants57. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (a constituent
member of the World Bank) disagreed with this assessment, stating that “absentee
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landlords have failed to improve, or even to maintain, their drainage channels. Until land
tenure here can be reviewed and thorough drainage of the farm lands guaranteed, the
mission considers it inadvisable to spend heavy sums on irrigation” (International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development 1953, 201). The colonial government acknowledged
this assessment in the grant for the project but it was summarily ignored by G. Lacey,
then the Secretary of State for the Colonies’ advisor on irrigation, who argued the
following year that “the fact, however, remains that the present unsatisfactory state of
land development of the Essequibo coast must remain unremedied until the Government,
by comprehensive scheme of irrigation and water control, secures effective control of the
land58” (emphasis added). Thus, the goal of the colonial government was to use their
ability to drain and irrigate the land as a means for taking control from absentee landlords
in order to address issues of rural poverty in what remains even today a remote part of the
coast. Once done, crown lands in the region would be given to settlers (drawn from those
already living and working in the region) who could then compete with the absentee
landlords and force an increase in the general maintenance and cultivation of the region59.
Earlier colonial plans sought settlement in the area of what is now the town of Anna
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Regina in the scheme but those were dismissed because the required outlay for the
settlement “was altogether out of proportion to the benefits to be obtained. […] [I]t has
been decided that it would be more advantageous that the estate should be operated as a
Government property on a small tenant farmer basis than as a land settlement.”60 Thus,
unlike the projects in Black Bush and Boeraserie, however, these settlers would not be
provided with village lands or lands for their own cultivation. Instead, the government
would provide space for rice cultivation and the settlers would need to work out other
arrangements to meet their needs from the freeholders who controlled land near public
road until a potential village site was found and built61.
The quasi-populist undertones found in the colonial office response to the
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)’s concerns were matched
in the undemocratic character of the bill that legislated Tapakuma’s official creation,
which proposed “to construct the works under the authority of an order of the Governor
in Council with a view to avoiding the necessity of compliance with the lengthy
procedure prescribed by the Drainage and Irrigation Ordinance whereby the proprietors
in a drainage and irrigation area are given the opportunity of protesting against the
construction of new works62.” This would have the effect of undermining the power of
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the landowners in the region to veto the spending in order to maintain their monopoly on
labor. It also ensured that the project was done according to the desires of the government
without input from either landowners or potential settlers. As permanent settlement of
East Indian populations became a reality, Indo-Guyanese formed an interest group called
the East Indian Association. The Association brought all manner of complaints to the
government and tried to force them to respond or devise some kind of solution, which,
perhaps more often than it should have, resulted in the government suggesting that
problems facing East Indian populations would be solved via relocation in land
settlement schemes63. Rising shipping costs and the increasing abandonment of sugar
plantations led to increasing levels of unemployment in Indian communities. This had
initially been addressed by “Grow More Food” campaigns beginning in the 1940s that
were designed not only to decrease the amount of agricultural imports but also to reduce
the duress experienced in Indian communities and feed “the progressive increase in
population,” but which were continuously disrupted by floods and droughts64 (see British
Guiana 1941; Mullenite 2015). The largely Indian population already living in the area of
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the scheme were facing a similar promise, with neither group able to have a say in the
planning process.
Financial records included in a grant application for the scheme show that with a
total estimated cost of £2,326,66665, the project intended to create a drainage and
irrigation system capable of supporting 36,000 acres of cultivation with 20,000 acres
being created immediately as part of the scheme66. This was to be done primarily by
damming of the Tapakuma River in order to increase the storage capacity of Lake
Tapakuma. The lake, along with Capoey and Reliance, would then be used to distribute
fresh water during relative dry periods, serving largely the same purpose as the
conservancies used in other parts of the colony67. Central to the creation of this project
was the rice mill at Anna Regina, at the time the most modern mill large mill in the
country68. The goal was to continue on with what was assumed would be the successful
launching of the Black Bush Polder Scheme in an effort to remove the country’s extreme
eastern and western peasant populations from an extended period of economic depression
while continuing to diversify its economy away from an increasingly volatile sugar
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industry, this time following along with the recommendations of the IBRD (1953)69.
Within a decade much of the hydraulic works for dedicated rice production had been
completed and by 1965 – one year before Guyanese independence – land settlement
projects began. The postcolonial government, forgiven of many of its colonial debts as a
gift during the decolonization process, needed to do little more than provide maintenance
funds to ensure the schemes success. However, cuts to Indian majority schemes spurned
on in part from the bankrupt rice industry and in part to focus funds on developing other
industries, including sugar and bauxite, all but ensured that this was not the case
(Richardson 1970; Vining 1977).
By the late 1970s the Tapakuma project was in a state of disrepair. Sea defenses
were crumbling, roads were impassible at times, and the rice industry was under constant
threat of catastrophic inundation70 (Vining 1977). In considering projects to fund in 1978,
the UK Ministry of Overseas Development (MoD) strongly considered and eventually
funded large scale works meant not only to solve the issues stemming from the lack of
maintenance but also to increase the region’s economic productivity71. Their justification
for taking on this project over others was simple: “the vast majority of the beneficiaries
of the scheme will be of Indian race. The present Government in Guyana has tended to
favour the Afro-Guyanese rather than the Indian element, and this could be held to
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constitute an argument for supporting the Tapakuma scheme72” (see also Khemraj 2016).
Frustrated by Burnham’s focus on growing the military and on his apparently
unconditional support for African communities at the perceived expense of East Indian
ones, the MoD sought to counter his power by providing services to the base of his main
political opposition. In a letter to R.G. Taylor of the engineering firm Sir William
Halcrow and Partners, who were at the time seeking aid funding to repair the failing
Tapakuma scheme, a representative of the Ministry of State stated that “while it is true
that the Guyanese are short of money and that sea water has breached the sea defences in
several places, much of this problem stems from the fact that the Guyanese themselves
are not according the work sufficient priority. While they are finding money for other
things such as military expenditure, they have failed to provide the relevant Government
Department with an adequate budget for a sea defences program.”73 In this way, the
financing of flood control systems was again used to affect the governance structures of
the country, this time as a challenge to Burnham’s hegemony at a time when he was
actively legislating for the pre-eminence of the party over the state and displaying
increasingly authoritarian tendencies (Hintzen 2004).
British interference appears to have worked. In his 1964 book Capital, Saving,
and Credit in Peasant Societies (306), Raymond Smith described the situation thusly:
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“Speaking very generally, one can say that the majority of the Negroes believe that the
majority of the East Indians […] are grasping, miserly, cunning, ambitious and ruthless
and that they are well on their way to the ownership of the bulk of important economic
assets as well as to the monopolization of prestigious positions in the civil service, the
professions, and commerce. […] The Indians tend to look down on the Negroes as being
improvident, and more interested in dancing and drinking than in hard work, but on the
other hand they accuse them of trying to hold on to a privileged position by
discriminating against Indians for appointment to the civil service, teaching and even in
the distribution of casual employment on public works department projects.”

Likewise, during field work in the Tapakuma region in 2017, an Indo-Guyanese man
described coastal flooding as “a black issue,” saying it was a concern for Georgetown and
the African villages but not along the Essequibo coast. An Afro-Guyanese man in the
village of Den Amstel in the West Coast Demerara region expressed similar thoughts,
saying that he felt the area was well taken care of during the Burnham period and that
flooding was more of an issue for the cities and black villages rather than the larger
coastal plain. Another Afro-Guyanese man also from Den Amstel suggested that the
region had reaped the benefits of Burnham’s regime but that the tide was turning, noting
that the sea wall was increasingly broken and worn down due to neglect during the era of
Jagan and the PPP from 1992 to 2015 (see Chapter 4). According to a number of coastal
residents the current government – a multiracial coalition party led by the PNC – had
seemingly moved past the racial politics of flood control and was focusing equally on all
areas, perhaps to the extent of spreading themselves thin. One woman, an Afro-Guyanese
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teacher in the village of Uivlught near the Boeraserie scheme, expressed concern that this
was effectively colorblind, and ignored the long-standing inequalities and hardships faced
by both groups in favor a “feel good” policy (see Hardy, Milligan, and Heynen 2017).
Regardless of these specific positions and experiences, however, it remains clear that
flood control has continued to serve as a technology of government in the postcolonial
era.

Conclusion
These three schemes represent three of the major infrastructural engineering projects that
took place in British Guiana between the end of the indentureship period and
independence. As such, they offer a unique insight into the political economies of
empolderment in the small colonial country, highlighting especially the ways in which
political economic decision-making followed the contours of the broader racial politics at
play in the region. At the same time, they show how operations of state and capitalist
power flow through larger systems, beyond just the political and economic relationships
they produce and are produced by. Though understudied compared to more typical water
management projects, empolderment can amplify the inequalities present in other
schemes in terms of the scale at which it occurs. This is because, as shown above,
empolderment schemes carry with them not just politics of the infrastructure itself but
also enable new forms of agricultural production and land settlement that carry with them
their own material impacts and, potentially, inequalities. Important in this distinction are
the scales at which these projects are occurring. As noted at the beginning of the chapter,
a key difference between empolderment and other water and flood control schemes was
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the scalar coherence of empolderment projects compared to the relatively adhoc
construction and subsequent governance of other drainage and irrigation works. In other
words, administrating existing village and estate level systems varies significantly from
administrating projects that are bound up with land settlement. This means that the scale
of the projects, whether local, regional (i.e. county level), or colonial/national helps in
part to determine what sorts of politics can become embedded in them and how this
affects political economic considerations going forward. At the local level, empolderment
projects served a simple function of providing land for Indian settlers whom the British
could not fulfil their indenture contracts. But taken as a whole (i.e. at the scale of the
colony), the projects also served a purpose of creating new economic, social, and
geographical spaces for Guyana’s Indian population that would later have important
political impacts, as shown in the next chapter. This geographical distance has produced a
variety of means for control and for the continued social independence of large swaths of
Guyana’s Indian and African populations. These divisions, in as far as they work to
undermine the social solidarity necessary for actual socioecological resilience,
continuously produce new forms of precarity even as they were created to avoid what
would otherwise be a precarious situation for the colonial enterprise as a whole.
Since scale is an important part of understanding the ways in which people and
environments interact in socio-ecological systems (Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 2004) and
because understanding politics within these systems is an important part of understanding
both the production and dissolution of resilience this also means that the scalar coherence
of empolderment projects and the establishment of the rice industry had potentially
different long-term outcomes for the resilience of Indian populations than African ones,
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even if the more general end result has been a continued vulnerability to flooding along
economic lines. In this way, the genealogy of flood control projects begins to unfold in
new directions, highlighting the broadly social aspects of flooding. However, it raises the
question of how things might have been different if sugar was, from the beginning, as
coherent or if the infrastructure for rice production had been created in a manner as adhoc
as that which supports for the sugar industry.
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CHAPTER 4 - COLONIAL PERSISTENCE: RACE, CLASS, AND FLOOD
CONTROL SINCE 1966

Introduction
The linkages between race, class, and flood control infrastructure during the
colonial period are clear. Thus far, the genealogical approach utilized in this dissertation
to understand flood control projects during the colonial period shows how they were
often just as much about governing colonized populations through the infrastructure they
experienced in their daily life as they were about building viable solutions to flooding.
They were enwrapped by other colonial matters relating to racial relations; changes in
local, regional, and global political economies; and became a key site in which colonial
politics could be performed in as far as they could simultaneously address several of
these issues in a single project. In Chapter 2, I showed how this governance affected
African village populations during times of economic depression by keeping villagers
tied to the sugar economy, thus bolstering it. In Chapter 3, I showed how land settlement
schemes related to rice production created new social and economic geographies centered
around race and racial stereotypes. But, how have these colonial-era projects affected the
ways in which flooding was managed in the postcolonial period? How does flooding
continue to manifest itself as a social or political problem with technological solutions
and how are other projects of governance tied to these solutions? In this chapter, I answer
these questions through an examination of the legacies colonial political-flood histories
and the power they carried into the postcolonial period.
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Despite the criticisms made by scholars of neo- and postcolonialism that argue
that the break between the colonial and postcolonial period is not as significant as it
appears on the surface, in Guyana this does serve as a valuable point from which new
analysis can be undertaken, particularly when thinking about the modes and forms of
governance existing in the country around that time. In this regard, the break is not
necessarily between the colonial and postcolonial state (which were similarly
authoritarian in nature) but through the ways in which governance functioned and to what
end. During the colonial period — as demonstrated above — governmental decisionmaking was largely oriented around the continuation of the colonial project as a whole
and in particular the political and economic systems that made colonialism a worthwhile
venture. With the end of colonialism and the start in earnest of the Burnham regime,
things changed and the major focus on governance became on regime survival (see
Hintzen 1989). While protecting the colonial system could be seen as a form of regime
survival (in as far as colonialism itself is a regime), the postcolonial period made it about
particular political parties and by extension about the people within those parties, a
process that occurred along racial lines.
I begin by outlining the relationship between racial politics and colonial and
postcolonial economic development, including a brief overview of the establishment of
Guyana’s racially-bifurcated two-party system and the movement for “non-capitalist”
development through industrial nationalization in the establishment of Guyanese
socialism, with a particular focus on the sugar industry. Though not directly related to
flood management infrastructure, this provides important context for current flooding
problems and government responses to them, especially as they are shaped by the
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continued reliance on the sugar industry to provide the bulk of the country’s GDP and,
significantly, coastal jobs. Next, I draw on public statements from the country’s two
major political parties and fieldwork conducted in Georgetown and Den Amstel in the
fall of 2017 to understand the ways in which flooding continues to manifest itself as a
political project. Finally, I examine these problems in relation to sea level rise and the
new era of environmental engineering and management taking place along the coast. I
argue that despite a shift from governance centered around political-economic
development to one around political parties and their charismatic leaders, flood control
has continued to play a major role in the governance of the country, affecting the ways in
which people continue to experience precarity and thus resilience well into the
postcolonial period.

The Racial Politics of Development
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, foreign interest in drainage, irrigation, and the
racial politics associated with them shifted from the colonial office to development
agencies, who used drainage and irrigation projects as a means for influencing the
political situation in the country. This is in line with work in critical development studies
that notes the political – and even colonial and imperialistic – influence of development
projects in the postcolonial period (e.g. Browne 2006; Hayter 1971; Mahoney 2010;
Smith 2008). Hayter (1971) and later Browne (2006), for example, argue that
development projects always contain within a desire to provide external political
influence on a population. For Hayter, this influence is imperialistic in nature,
highlighting the uneven relationship between donor countries and aid recipients. For
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Browne, the relationship is more benign, with donors using their economic influence to
ensure liberal, western ideals74. For many Guyanese, aid relationships were seen as
largely parasitic and holding the country back. In the 1970s, the Guyanese political
cartoonist H. Harris highlighted this sentiment with a comic showing Uncle Sam
providing life support to a dying body while simultaneously draining its blood (see
Figure 5). And as shown in the previous chapter, USAID and UKAID used development
money aimed at flood control to undermine Guyana’s newly independent government.
Mahoney (2010) has likewise argued that postcolonial development is in itself an
extension of the political economies developed during the colonial period along with the
broader political and economic goals of the colonizing regime. With the extractive nature
of Guyana’s colonial period, it should then be no surprise that postcolonial development
took on an equally extractive position. However, development in Guyana took another
form that was intimately linked not only to desires for political and economic autonomy,
but also to what would become a highly racialized struggle for competing socialisms.
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Figure 5 - The Real Meaning of Imperialist Aid - by H. Harris for The Mirror,
Georgetown, Guyana

At the same time that the IRDB was developing a systematic plan for Guyana’s
economy focused on the increased expansion and protection of the country’s colonial-era
sugar industry (see Chapter 3 - Rice, Race, and Empolderment), an anticolonial
movement was beginning fomenting among the ranks of the country’s two largest unions:
The British Guiana Labour Union (BGLU) and the Guyana Industrial Workers Union
(GIWU), representing Guyana’s dockworkers and sugar workers, respectively. This
union emerged in part out of the Ruimveldt Riots mentioned in the previous chapter but
was fomented by more radical actors in Guyana’s union movement. Utilizing the
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multiracial sentiment of workers strikes and riots as a means for decolonization, the
Guyanese dentist Cheddi Jagan, along with others, formed the Political Affairs
Committee (PAC) with the goal of educating Guianese workers to the political and
economic basis of colonialism (Premdas 1974). Using a Marxist-Leninist analysis, the
PAC placed the blame for the poor conditions of working people in British Guiana in a
colonial politics of disenfranchisement and property relations (Premdas 1974). In the
PAC’s analysis, the colonial state was used rhetorically as a common enemy of all
Guyanese working people, existing primarily as a tool of class oppression at the hands of
the colonizers (Premdas 1974; Hintzen 1989). This analysis, combined with relentless
propaganda from the PAC, led to Jagan’s election to parliament in the 1947 general
election. It was during his tenure that a strike broke out among sugar workers at the
Enmore plantation in 1948 leading to the shooting of some of the striking sugar workers
by colonial police forces (see Venn, Sudell, and Smallman 1949). During this time, Jagan
worked closely with the day-to-day operations of the strike, acting as a political voice for
the striking sugar workers and their emergent – though not officially recognized – union,
the GIWU (Premdas 1974). Meanwhile, other members of the PAC were infiltrating
other unions, including the BGLU.
Having captured leadership positions in Guyana’s growing union movement, the
PAC transformed themselves into a new labor-backed, multi-racial, and anti-colonial
political party, the People’s Progressive Party. Though working among unions with
different racial characteristics, Jagan’s popularity rested primarily with Indo-Guyanese
who saw in him one of their own (Premdas 1974). To unite the Afro-Guyanese and IndoGuyanese working classes under a single party, Jagan sought out a charismatic Afro-
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Guyanese counterpart in Forbes Burnham, a London-educated lawyer and expert orator
(Premdas 1974). The goal of the PPP was to establish a party which would prevent voting
along sectoral or racial lines. For example, if dockworkers and sugar workers voted for
separate parties, the working classes would remain divided in the colonial system and
never be able to take full control of the government, leaving elected governments to take
a conservative and undeniably capitalist form.
It was under this united banner that the PPP would advocate for self-government
and universal adult suffrage, succeeding in the latter and bringing about a new general
election in Guyana in 1953, which they won. Despite the victory of the PPP in the
country’s first mass election, the party was deposed by British armed forces after only six
months, reverting the political system to an autarchic form of colonial governance
(Premdas 1974; Hintzen 1989). During this time, British Guiana’s new constitution was
suspended, Jagan was jailed, and Burnham was placed under house arrest after agreeing
to cease any political activity (Hintzen 1989). Now separated, the two leaders of the PPP
began to espouse different tactics and goals for the party going forward leading to their
eventual split and the creation of a two-party, racially bifurcated political system that
would persist for decades (see Hintzen 1989).
The PPP split into two factions in 1955 based on differences in goals for the
country, with the Burnham-backed faction supporting federalization with the rest of the
British West Indies and the Jagan-backed section vehemently opposing confederation and
developing a more explicitly nationalist agenda. Though Burnham was originally brought
in to garner the support of the black proletariat, the split and his initial support were not
obviously racially motivated (Hintzen 1989). Within a year, however, both parties had
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moved from a class-based mobilization to one rooted in racial politics resulting in the
resignation of the remaining black leadership in Jagan’s PPP (Hintzen 1989). In the 1957
election, Burnham’s new party did not receive widespread support, however, with
Guyana’s black middle class supporting the more moderate United Democratic Party
(UDP). To overcome this, Burnham proposed his PPP faction merge with the UDP to
create Guyana’s first black political party, the People’s National Congress.
After the formation of the PNC, US and UK intelligence agencies pushed for
proportional representation. It was felt at the time that this would help insure against a
government controlled purely by Jagan, who was later described as showing “the
incompetence and bad judgement which is part of his character” and whose “half-baked
attempt to apply communist doctrine threatened unrest and a complete breakdown of the
administration.”75 Despite electoral support from the colonial and imperial powers,
however, the PNC did not easily take control of the country’s political situation. In the
1964 election, the first to decide who would be the postcolonial leader, neither the PPP
nor the PNC received the required 50 percent of the vote to form a government and, at the
urging of the US, the PNC created a coalition with the conservative and United Front,
with Burnham taking the role of the Premier and, upon independence, Prime Minister
while UF members filled out ministry positions related to the economy (Rabe 2005).
The United Force was a relative newcomer to Guyanese politics, contesting their
first election in 1961. However, they were filling a considerable void in the country.
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Though themselves a predominantly single race party with party members being almost
exclusively of Portuguese descent, they eschewed the racial narratives being put forth by
the other parties and instead offered a class-based perspective on Guyana’s situation. At
the same time, they also explicitly opposed themselves to the economic policies of both
Jagan and Burnham and offering an economic vision that relied heavily on private sector
growth. These two factors combined won them the support of Amerindian groups, white
ranchers in the deep hinterland savannahs, and Portuguese residents who had otherwise
been left out of the country’s political processes entirely (Sanders 1972).
For the US and UK, a coalition between the PNC and UF was a win-win. Jagan’s
party, though still holding a bulk of the parliamentary seats, would not be able to enact
legislation on its own or continue to build official political and economic relationships
with Cuba and the Soviet Union. However, with their simple majority, they would remain
vested in the parliamentary process. On the other hand, Burnham, though himself a
socialist, would be tempered by a conservative and pro-capitalist party who would work
to keep government spending in check, allowing for economic development to occur
through investment from the foreign private sector as it had in other recently decolonized
countries. Likewise, the coalition guaranteed that the PNC would need to rely on UF
votes on parliamentary measures, ensuring that Burnham’s more radical positions would
not become official.
The relationship between the PNC and the UF was contentious from the
beginning, with their problems arising primarily – and perhaps predictably – from
differences over how government funds should be spent in support of the new country’s
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development program.76 By 1966 the threads were beginning to show. With Jagan
beginning to campaign against the lack of development in the first two years of the PNC
government, Burnham was anxious to spend development money and put forth largescale
projects which would help his public image and bolster his chances for re-election in
1968. The Treasury, staffed primarily with ministers selected from the UF wanted to keep
government spending low and create favorable conditions for foreign investment.77 The
frustration led to the resignation of one of the ministers in lieu of being removed from his
position and Burnham taking direct ministerial control over economic development.78
D’Aguiar and the UF, however, stayed committed primarily to a focus on the “Puerto
Rican Model” of development advocated for by Sir Arthur Lewis, which relied on
attracting foreign capital in the private sector to stimulate the economy and provide a
source of funds for other development ventures (Pierce 1984).
Despite the growing differences between the two parties, foreign governments
remained committed to a Burnham-led coalition for the 1968 elections, if only because it
appeared better than the alternative: a Jagan-controlled government in which it would be
the USSR, not them, asserting political influence in the region. In reviewing Burnham’s
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first years in office, the British High Commission in Georgetown credited Burnham with
reducing racial tensions in the country, reducing the unemployment rate, and working
toward a coherent development plan (even if it was at the expense of the coalition with
the UF).79 Burnham’s government may not have been where they intended it to be, but it
was at least moving in a direction they deemed to be worthwhile. Based on this, and with
the help of the CIA and AFL-CIO, the PNC-UF coalition government was able to remain
in power after the 1968 elections (see Rabe 2005).
By 1970, political conditions in Guyana took a dramatic turn. Through continued
maneuvering of cabinet positions and a complete disregard for D’Aguilar’s economic
policy recommendations, Burnham had successfully shed the capitalist weight of the UF
and began working on his plan to develop the country on his own terms, including a
sharp turn to the left even from his previous Fabianist tendencies (Pierce 1984).
Increasingly he began adopting socialist rhetoric, building alliances with other socialist
states, and seeking industrial nationalization as a means for economic development that
did not rely on or replicate the conditions of colonial capitalism into the postcolonial era
(Pierce 1984). On the 14th of December 1974, Burnham delivered the now-infamous
Declaration of Sophia in which he stated, “the Party should assume unapologetically its
paramountcy over the Government which is merely one of its executive arms” and
declared “That ours is a Socialist Party, committed to practising Co-operative Socialism”
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(Burnham 1974). With this change in platform, Burnham moved forward on plans to
nationalize the sugar industry.
Burnham had hinted at nationalizing sugar before. It had been an official part of
PNC policy since 1964 and, at an April 1970 meeting of the Commonwealth Caribbean
Heads of Government, Burnham re-iterated his commitment and shortly thereafter began
the process of nationalizing the Demerara Bauxite Company80 (Shahabuddeen 1983).
Perhaps feeling increased pressure, Bookers – the largest sugar producing firm in the
Caribbean – agreed to transfer all sugar lands not currently under production to the
Government of Guyana in 1973 (Shahabuddeen 1983). This, for Burnham, had two
effects: first, the sugar firms were finally out of practice of housing, ostensibly giving a
role to the government to address housing issues for the last time. Second, it showed that,
if pressed, Bookers would bend. As Shahabuddeen (1983, 265) notes, Burnham’s initial
move with this change in land ownership was to tie future sale and government
acquisition of sugar lands to national policy. By 1975, the government had used its new
policy to nationalize Jessel (the smaller of the two remaining sugar firms), stating that “in
the circumstances [the] PNC Government has decided that the continued operation of that
company here is contrary to and inconsistent with the national interest” (quoted in
Shahabuddeen 1984, 267). Bookers was nationalized the following year after negotiation
with the government.
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Walter Rodney, then considered one of the leaders of Guyana’s third socialist
party – the multi-racial Working People’s Alliance (WPA) –criticized Burnham’s
socialism and its nationalistic tendencies as a means for establishing “dictatorship in
which the state control over the economy was the main weapon used to keep people in
line” (Rodney 1981c, 68). Likewise, despite supporting socialist policies in general and
nationalization of the country’s major industries in particular, the PPP did not feel that
the PNC was working in the best interest of the people and describing the state-owned
sugar industry as “already in a state of permanent debilitating crisis” by the mid-1980s
(Collymore 1984, 1). Nationalization also had a secondary effect that is often overlooked
but is important to this dissertation: it placed control of the bulk of the drainage,
irrigation, and other flood control schemes firmly in government hands, meaning failures
could no longer be passed off without drawing at least some criticism. As noted in the
previous chapter, this provided a space for foreign governments to enter into the country
and influence the situation through development assistance, a position that was not
widely supported. But perhaps even more significantly, it created a situation in which
flooding became a site of argument between the PNC and PPP regimes.

Understanding Modern Drainage and Irrigation Problems
From the mid-1970s to the late 1990s there is little in the way primary or
secondary source information on specific flood events in Guyana. While flooding
remained an object of inquiry in the Guyanese scientific community (see e.g. de Beer and
Bacchus 1992; Pelling 1997; 1998; Shaw 1987; Singhroy 1998) they weren’t particularly
politicized nor, apparently, were they newsworthy. Several people I spoke to in
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Georgetown and the surrounding areas during my fieldwork in 2018 acknowledged that
there was flooding during these periods but had no specific comments about particular
flood events or even their general characteristics. The Walter Rodney National Archives
also had little to offer in terms of materials related to flooding during this period. Outside
of a handful of PPP propaganda pamphlets that mentioned failing infrastructure in vague
ways, there is little available. This isn’t to say that the floods that did occur were not
significant for some, but that the general sentiment was that floods during that time were
overshadowed by what was to come.
Today, however, the drainage and irrigation system in Guyana is closely watched.
Following major floods in 2005, 2006, and 2015, engineers and policymakers have
become acutely aware of the need to balance demands for coastal drainage while also
maintaining the water levels in the various conservancies to prevent both overtopping and
drying out of conservancy dams. Especially when, as the local economy shifts from one
based on sugar to a multitude of other goods, less water is used to draw down local
conservancies. This is what happened in January 2005 when heavy rains caused water to
spill freely over conservancy walls, flooding southern Georgetown and villages
throughout the East Coast Demerara region. During the floods, as much as six feet of
water covered the village of Plaisance while residents of South Ruimveldt on the opposite
end of the capital city saw water enter their homes and businesses. Water stood on the
streets for several days, impacting the ability of children to go to school and adults to go
to work. These conditions were repeated the following year, although to a lesser extent,
when winter monsoon rains once again caused the conservancy to overtop and flood
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waters to fill Georgetown’s streets81. These large flood events have created a situation
where now more than ever drainage and irrigation are understood as a system where
weakness in one area could have devastating impacts in other areas. This has not,
however, made the racial components of flooding and flood vulnerability less visible.
As Sarah Vaughn (2012) has argued, the 2005 floods were used to maintain social
divisions through the deployment of state-sponsored environmental expertise. Slow
information cycles and inadequate response from government agencies meant that many
Guyanese were left to handle and recover from floods with little assistance until the PPP
began responding. Even then, environmental expertise was mobilized and circulated in
ways that were counter to those of flood victims. From this technical incompetence,
Vaughn (2012, 3080) argues that “accusations of racism, chauvinism, and subjugation
between the state and international aid organizations and across different racial
populations in Guyana” flourished. This created entry points for the PNC to undermine
state-sanctioned disaster narratives and produce counter-narratives of their own which
could then be used to mobilize their racial-political party supporters.
While the PNC felt the PPP handled the 2005 floods poorly, and argued that they
could have done more, it was only when they began actively campaigning for the 2006
election that such rhetoric began to take a position of importance in their policies. When
flooding broke out again in the early days of 2006, they were quick to attack the PPP and
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argue that this is reflective of PPP leadership. The earliest of such attacks took place on
January 6, 2006, when the PNC (now called the PNC-Reform, or PNCR) called for a
permanent disaster task force and criticized then-president Bharrat Jagdeo for
micromanaging the situation in an attempt to “gain political mileage” and noted how
Jagdeo and the PPP administration were quick to blame the flooding on the regional
administration in the affected areas when it became clear they could not handle the
situation adequately82. In the weeks to come, the PNCR would continue its attacks,
arguing that the government was made aware of the situation facing these regions a
month prior and that they had adequate time to address many of the infrastructural issues
causing flooding, particularly given the fact that many of these areas were also affected in
the 2005 floods83. On January 19, 2006, the PNCR released a scathing press statement
accusing the PPP of failing to live up to its promises of improved flood management, tied
this failure to other failures experienced in the previous two decades of PPP rule, and
noted the advancement of flood defense during the PNC governments of the 1960s, 70s,
and 80s. By the time of this release, floods were being fully utilized as a way for the
PNCR to position itself as the responsible alternative to the standing government during
an election year.
Up to this point, the PNCR position with regards to the flooding had largely
ignored racial division between the two parties, instead focusing primarily on the relative
inability of the government to adequately address the country’s needs and the historic
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precedence of the PNC sufficiently handling issues of flooding. However, in a January 26
press release, the PNCR accused Jagdeo and the PPP of “subliminal racial politics” in
their characterization of flood related protests in several predominantly Afro-Guyanese
communities, going so far as to tie Jagdeo’s statements on the protestors to the colonial
rhetoric used to divide the Afro- and Indo-Guyanese historically84. They likewise argued
that the PPP administration was engaged in practices of discrimination with regards to the
management of flood relief monies in the aftermath of the flood85. The racial divisions at
play in this context serve to naturalize and legitimize the social hierarchy in the country
in which a party with historical support from one of the major ethnic groups can place
itself in a superior position compared to members of another (Brahinsky, Sasser, and
Minkoff-Zern 2014).
By the second week of February 2006, much of the discourses surrounding the
floods specifically had died down with the PNC focusing on other differences between
themselves and the PPP government, particularly their political and economic policy.
However, the floods would remain a key point of contention during the PNC’s 2006
electoral campaign and would remain a key motivator for years to come. In June of that
year, the floods emerged again as a crucial point in the PNC electoral campaign, with the
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party again noting the failure of the government to respond adequately to the previous
year’s floods:

“We expected that the Government would have learnt the lessons so clearly taught by the
disastrous 2005 floods which ruined so many lives and set back our national economy
and that they would have put the necessary systems in place to enable affected citizens to
cope with such events. […] Many of the reports which assessed the 2005 floods made
comments and recommendations which should have been taken seriously by a
Government which had the interest of the people at heart.”86

Despite this rapidly escalating political discourse surrounding flooding in Guyana,
neither the PNCR nor the PPP directly acknowledged the role of the country’s political
economy of the long history of flood control projects (and their failures) in affecting not
only the perceived severity of the flooding but also its role in perpetuating the risk of
flooding (cf. Pelling 1999). Despite the connection among the drainage and irrigation
system, the country’s political economy, and colonialism, political economic changes that
move away from those used to bolster the colonial economy are never offered as a means
for mitigating the risk of experiencing flooding as a disaster. Political economy was a key
focus for both parties electoral campaigning and, for the PNCR, was included in several
press statements and releases that spoke directly to the country’s continuous experience
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Press Statement by the PNCR, June 15, 2006
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with flooding, but the two were never connected. The focus on the PNCR in this section
is not meant to dismiss and relieve the role of the PPP in politicizing flooding. However,
as the opposition party in a country where much of the media is owned and controlled by
the state, the PNC made all their positions clear in statements and releases to the press
where the PPP, largely, did not. Many public statements by the PPP have not yet been
made publicly available and are missing from the digital archives of the state newspaper,
the Guyana Chronicle. However, PPP actions can be understood through the context of
the above analysis of the PNC. It was not just the PNC who tied flood response to the
country’s racial politics, for example, but also the PPP by commenting only on protests
occurring in black areas and referring to the protestors as “thugs.” Likewise, blaming the
rainfall for the disaster rather than focusing on the political economic causes or the
failures of infrastructure served to do little more than work as excuses for the regime,
reframing the discussion away from the failures of the state even as those failures are
being made explicit by the opposition (see Olson 2000).
After losing the 2006 election, the PNC used the 2006 flood as a point of
reference for several years to come. In 2008, when the PPP attacked the character of the
PNCR and its members, the PNCR referenced explicitly the 2006 flooding in its
response, asking “Who was it that exposed the gross mismanagement, discrimination and
corruption within the Government Flood Relief program? The PNCR did not only
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criticize and expose, but vigorously organized its own National Relief efforts and
provided support to all communities regardless of race or politics.”87.
After losing the 2011 elections, the PNCR formed a coalition with other local
opposition parties called A Partnership for National Unity (APNU). Like the previous
coalition formed to defeat the PPP in the 1960s, the APNU is a multi-ethnic group with
membership from a number of differing political ideologies. Despite this, the 2006 flood
and the PNCR response has remained a key point for their platform, particularly in the
run up to the 2015 general election, which they would win. In 2014, after a series of
floods across the coast, under their new coalition name of A Party for National Unity
(APNU), they argued that “the PPP/C Administration seems to be unwilling to learn from
past experience, unable to conduct a comprehensive investigation to determine the causes
of recurrent flooding and unprepared to implement measures to notify the populace and
to mitigate the impact of this hazard. APNU asserts that, notwithstanding the
extraordinary rainfall, much of the human discomfort was caused by mismanagement and
neglect.” 88. Thus, the 2006 floods and the racially divided political maneuvering that
followed them remain an important waypoint in Guyana’s recent political history.
Despite the PNC’s arguments that flood responses were racially motivated, most
of the people I spoke to in Guyana were not as convinced. Between September and
November of 2017, I spoke to 52 people of various ages, classes, political affiliations,
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and racial/ethnic identities about flooding in Guyana and the government response to
them. Of these, 10 allowed me to record our conversations89. Regardless of recordings,
interviews lasted between 30 minutes and an hour and a half, although I met several times
with some of those who wouldn’t allow me to record them and those interviews,
combined, lasted for several hours. The object of my interviews was not to develop a
general consensus of the government response to floods, but to instead understand the
ways in which floods impacted individuals from different backgrounds. Six of those who
allowed me to record our conversation were men and four were women with ages ranging
from 25-70. Five lived in the greater Georgetown area and had directly experienced the
2005 and 2006 floods, four lived in Den Amstel – an Afro-Guyanese village in the West
Coast Demerara area, and one was a minibus driver who lived near Tuschen, on the east
bank of the Essequibo, but whose route took him from Georgetown to the Essequibo port
town of Parika.
In general, people I spoke to felt that the fact that flooding disproportionately
impacted the Afro-Guyanese community was an unfortunate consequence of the
country’s colonial-era cultural geography and that the racialization of them was little
more than politicking. Michael, an Indo-Guyanese chemical engineer, and Rachael, an
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There was a significant pushback when it came to recording conversations that was not
expected when planning for this research. In conversation with a number of Guyanese
academics about this, most felt as though it was the result of a general distrust of white
researchers while others said it was likely related to the proliferation of online news
outlets that has occurred recently. Out of a fear of alienating people who would not let me
record our conversations, I never pushed the issue and instead took notes either during
our interviews or immediately after. In future research, it may be worthwhile to offer a
survey mechanism in addition to semi-structured interviews.
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Afro-Guyanese government employee speaking to me in a non-official capacity were
both effected by the 2005 and 2006 floods as residents of South Ruimveldt but both felt
that the PNC missed the mark in their criticisms. For Michael, the fact that some
neighborhoods flooded and others didn’t was simple geography. Kitty – an IndoGuyanese community adjacent to the seawall on the northern edge of the city – for
example, did not flood as badly as nearby Ogle and Plaisance because they had a longexisting and well-functioning drainage pump and sluice gate. Newly incorporated parts of
the city, like South Ruimsveldt and Ogle did not; neither did the village of Plaisance
which still shared primary drainage facilities with Beterverwagting. Michael’s frustration
with this situation was, however, clear as he told me he felt that the relatively high taxes
in the country could be going to addressing these issues. Earl, a retired civil engineer and
lifelong resident of the Cummingsburg neighborhood in central Georgetown echoed this
sentiment, saying that the government was wasting rates by focusing on pumping when
they should have been addressing flow and evaporative characteristics of the canals.
For the past decade, Earl has documented every flood event in Georgetown in
order to find a natural pattern, one which he claims has not yet shown itself. Instead,
flooding seems to occur when water cannot be evacuated quickly enough and when it
does not have time or space to soak into the ground, a common occurrence. After the
2006 floods, he noted that a new large pump was installed in South Ruimsveldt to
alleviate flooding in the area but that the pump was so large it could never maintain
adequate head pressure and could thus only be run for a couple of minutes at a time.
Despite this shortcoming, the government declared it a success. At the same time,
residents throughout the city had continued the process of concreting their yards in order
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to mitigate the social and economic impacts of the floods despite knowledge that this
actually increased their likelihood. For Rachael, this was the case for her family property
which was concreted so that she would not have to miss school and her mother would not
have to miss work as they dealt with accumulating mud. Earl himself “empoldered” his
yard, concreting and grading it to fill a small ditch which he pumped himself into the city
drainage system. Adequate government response and actual maintenance of the existing
system, they felt, would have prevented the need for both bigger pumps and household
level mitigation strategies. They all agreed that the racial arguments put forth by the
political parties were simply ways to mask these inadequacies and appeal to the rural
populations who had much less (and significantly different) experiences with floods.
There was also a clear indication that people felt that the current governing
coalition – APNU – were taking flooding seriously, even if the country still faced
challenges. As Mary, a 25-year old woman from Den Amstel explained, the current
government is bringing in a lot of outside help in order to address local issues of
flooding. While not opposed to this, however, she was concerned with the motivations of
western actors, especially in a time when Guyana was receiving global recognition for its
newly discovered offshore oil and gas reserves. She was also concerned that this outside
help might replay some of the uneven exchanges of the colonial system but in innovative
ways and at the expense of local knowledge about flooding, stating that “People want the
Dutch to come back to stop the floods. The Dutch didn’t build the canals. Slaves did.”90
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Interview on October 14, 2017, Georgetown, Guyana
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When I asked her to expand on this powerful statement she said she felt as though
Guyanese have enough experience with floods and enough experience dealing with them
that they don’t need the Dutch – or any other Western power – to intervene. Although the
Dutch have been advertising themselves as global experts on coastal flooding due to their
historical and geographical position, Guyana has a history of its own and should have the
knowledge and capacity to do it on their own, even if it means eschewing current political
divisions and economic commitments. Thus, attempts by the government to bring in
foreign help for floods does nothing to empower Guyanese to handle these issues and
leaves them instead in the hands of wealthy, Western powers who will design systems
that continue to ignore local cultural politics and landscape knowledges. Mary was also
concerned that APNU’s focus on solving everyone’s problems equally and with the same
policies let deep-seated racial scars fester in the name of superficial equality without a
focus on producing environmental justice. By ignoring the past twenty-five years of PPP
rule — which she felt often benefited Indo-Guyanese communities — the inequalities
developed during those times (some of which have much longer histories) meant that
Afro-Guyanese would continue to suffer greater consequences relative to their IndoGuyanese compatriots.
Mary’s comments illuminate two clear parts of current issues to local flooding.
First, it highlights the continued violence of the colonial experience. Though Mary is not
old enough to have ever experienced colonialism first hand, she felt as though what she
was seeing was in line with what she had learned about the country’s colonial past.
Second, she highlighted the importance of a focus on the racism inherent in “color-blind”
approaches to coastal flood management (see Hartman and Squires 2010; Harden,
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Milligan, and Heynen 2017). Although most of the people I spoke with, including Mary,
had faith in the government to overcome these barriers and find more equitable solutions,
one man did not.
BD, the minibus driver from Tuschen, told me that in his age and the decades he
has spent driving Guyana’s coast, he doesn’t have any faith left in the government to
adequately address flood issues (or really any issues facing the country). A supporter of
the WPA in the 1970s, BD now feels as though the government has little to offer the
“small man” and that Guyanese should instead focus on solving flood problems (among a
multitude of others) themselves. He acknowledged the racial components of flooding,
highlighting the ways in which Afro-Guyanese communities benefitted from PNC works
while nearby Indo-Guyanese villages became the sites of pilot projects cooked up by the
PPP government in the 1990s, but didn’t feel that this was because of racial prejudice by
the politicians. Rather, he – like others – said that these were a way of appealing to the
voting bases of the parties and that this would be the case so long as the parties remained
divided along racial lines. When asked if he thinks the current government – which is
multi-racial in character – is doing things differently he explained his position succinctly,
“I don’t vote and I would never vote because I believe in people.”91 He suggested to me
that if everyone stopped worrying about the government doing things or getting
government approval before acting and just started addressing issues as they occurred in
a collective and communal way, Guyanese society as a whole would be better for it.
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Interview on November 18, 2017. Conducted as I rode with BD along his bus route.
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BD recalled that both the PPP and the PNC before them had called on the Dutch
to solve flooding issues in West Coast Demerara and while their solutions worked for
some or in the short-term, they left other people vulnerable. As we drove along the public
road, picking up and dropping off passengers along his route, BD pointed out the many
places where the sea wall was degraded and where Dutch designs meant to redirect ocean
tides had failed to account for the tremendous wave action and sedimentation of the
Guyana current. He also identified areas that were once dense with mangroves planted by
the PPP, but which were now exposed to the sea. His commentary proved prescient. On
March 2, 2018, unusually strong spring tides caused ocean water to overtop the sea walls
causing considerable damage in the West Coast villages that BD said would be a problem
(see Plate 9). Effecting some three hundred residents of the coast, the flood damaged
homes and businesses in the pre-dominantly Afro-Guyanese region. Minster of Public
Infrastructure David Peterson said that the overtopping had caused severe damage to the
tops of the sea walls, but as BD had noted nearly four months prior, the broken parts of
the walls were already in poor condition (Chabrol 2018), owing according to some locals
to decades of neglect by the Indo-Guyanese government in favor of mangrove planting
which had little long-term effect in the area. While long-term government response to
these issues remain to be seen, it highlights the ways in which certain groups continue to
experience floods as part of their everyday realities to life on the coast.
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Plate 9 - Ocean swells overtopping the sea wall, West Coast Demerara, March 2, 2018.
Photo courtesy of KeNo George Photography

Though the extent of the overtopping and inability of the existing infrastructure to
handle it was shocking to some along the coast, BD told me months prior that it was only
a matter of time before something so severe occurred. When talking to other WCD
residents, including those who would not allow me to record our conversations, several
expressed that floods were not an issue. The regular overflowing of canals did not in
themselves constitute flooding for these residents because floods meant a rupture in
everyday life which cannot happen when something is a regular occurrence — you have
to live through them. The overtopping this time represented a major rupture in everyday
life, displacing people from their homes and closing schools and businesses as the heavily
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silted water made its way through village streets. The everyday experiences with floods,
even minor “non-floods,” was not necessarily always the case, however.
Marvin, a long-time resident of the West Coast and staunch PNC supporter told
me how, as a child, he used to be able to walk for several hundred yards beyond the sea
wall at low tide, an area that he claims is now never exposed. He was unsure if this was
caused by erosion or some other process, but he did note that the frequency of floods
seemed to have increased with this change. The original sea wall constructed when his
village was still a sugar plantation, he claimed, could be found further north and land that
once was used for sugar and cattle by planters and villagers alike is now part of the sea,
the current sea wall being built as a replacement by the Dutch in the 1970s when
overtopping became too frequent92. Though generally critical of foreign intervention, in
sharp contrast to Mary and BD’s sentiments that Guyanese have the knowledge and
ability to solve problems of coastal flooding, Marvin felt as though the British and the
Dutch owed a responsibility to Guyana to help them address their experiences with
flooding as they were ultimately responsible for designing, building, and making
necessary the infrastructure in place today.
With an international shift away from sea walls toward “green infrastructure” and
particularly with recent Dutch projects means to “design with nature,” what might this
intervention look like? As BD and others noted, mangroves had already been a part of the
solution to Guyana’s flood problems but had little to no real effect in the WCD region.
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I have been unable to independently verify this, but I have no reason to think that this
is not the case.
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Tamsin, a forestry student at the University of Guyana was convinced that proper
mangrove management was the future and the government seems to agree, focusing its
sea level rise mitigation efforts on the Guyana Mangrove Restoration Project, which has
seen significant success in reducing the incidences of floods along the East Coast
Demerara region, from Beterverwagting to Mahaica, where mangrove stands are well
established.

Conclusion: River and Sea Defense in an Era of Sea Level Rise
While there are indications that the threat of coastal flooding has decreased with
recent flood control measures, less clear is how the government plans to mitigate the
impacts of sea level rise. Though a frequent topic of conversation, sea level rise largely
appears as a nebulous entity in Guyana, both an existing threat to the country’s safety and
sovereignty but something altogether foreign and distant enough that other concerns take
precedence. As a country that has, in its entire modern history, existed below sea level,
what impacts will rising seas actually have? The majority of the inhabited coast is already
defended by sea walls in various states of repair with sections from Kitty and stretching
out along the East Coast Demerara region already extended to prevent overtopping from
increasingly rough high tides. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Guiana Current batters the
coast with processes of rapid accretion and erosion that undermines the wall’s support
system and constantly threatens collapse. This same current and the geophysical
processes with it, however, created and supported dense mangrove forests that were
removed to expedite colonial development, leaving much of the coast vulnerable. To
address these shortcomings, since the late-1990s, the Guyanese government has been
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working on planting and restoring mangrove stands along the coast, solidifying these
efforts with the creation of the Guyana Mangrove Restoration Project in 2010, but with
mixed success in terms of their longevity. During a public presentation in November
2017 I was asked my opinion on mangroves as a way of protecting the coast and the
flooding in March 2018 certainly sparked interest in the topic amongst some Guyanese
on Facebook, but does the government’s current focus on mangroves provide meaningful
solutions to the problem of coastal vulnerability? What can an investigation of Guyana’s
mangroves tell us about the relationship between humans and non-humans on the coast
and in particular how non-humans become actors in the construction of racial
geographies and processes of capital accumulation that have dominated the history of the
coast?
As biological entities, mangroves have a proclivity for reproduction. They move
and spread, taking over new lands while ceding others to the erosive actions of the
brackish and salt water that they call home. They create dense networks of impenetrable
roots, create habitats for a vast array of living things, and cement in place the muds and
silts that form the basis of shorelines. These processes are referred to collectively as
“colonialism,” a name obviously borrowed from the human actions that similarly create
and cement networks of relations. In the coastal zones in which they are most prominent,
mangrove forests are also entangled in networks of human relations and structures of
power, their ability to move shaped and limited by borders of sea walls, groynes, and
subsurface structures meant to slow or outright prevent their freedom to flourish (cf.
Ogden 2011). They constitute an important part of coastal landscapes that “are
assemblages constituted by humans and nonhumans, material and semiotic processes,
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histories both real and partially remembered” and in which “a broader politics of nature
works to constrain the entanglement’s [of mangrove’s roots and human and non-human
actors] freedom of movement and connectivity” (Ogden 2011, 35). In Guyana,
engineered structures and the racial geographies established under colonialism and
enforced by postcolonial politics are equally important components of these landscapes.
Thus, if mangroves are meant to protect the coast, the ways in which they do so are codetermined by the existence of this multitude of historical and contemporary actors.
Billboards along the public road that lines Guyana’s coast vaguely ask Guyanese
to “protect” mangroves (see Plate 10), but not to let them live and flourish for their own
sake. This is part of what Sarah Vaughn (2017) has argued are the “epistemic politics of
mangrove restoration,” where GMRP scientists and the local community negotiate the
relationship between climate change adaptation strategies, technoscientific knowledge on
coastal engineering, and the economic needs and desires of local communities. But in
these instances, to “protect” mangroves is to render and maintain them as useful objects
for human and particularly capitalist endeavors. Mangrove protection seeks to preserve
not just the plants, but also – and primarily – the coastal world behind the plants without
challenging the basic assumptions about what in that world might need to change in order
to actually address individual vulnerabilities. In as far as mangroves are denied a right to
exist without the protection of the state and human populations, we might ask why such
protections are necessary. Mangroves once dominated Guyana’s coast. Their decomposed
remains mixed with the mud and silt that they had accumulated to produce the pegasse
soils that supported colonial efforts, but their broken limbs battered coastlines and
accelerated coastal erosion, turning them into new extensions for the sea. In their
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freedom, mangroves created and destroyed land, but under colonial and postcolonial
control they are denied that right – either through their outright removal or through the
strict discourses of protection that seek to limit their growth and spread to that which is
useful. Their existence is relegated to the protection of capitalist interests. Without their
engineered enclosures, they often don’t seem interested in developing into the dense
forests necessary for such interests any longer. They would rather wither away. In this
way, we might see mangrove death as resistance to capitalism. The stiff structures, the
accounting, and the limited possibilities for free movement that are required to maintain
Guyana’s capitalist system are antithetical to the very being of mangroves, so they die.

Plate 10 – Billboard by the Guyana Forestry Commission advocating for mangrove
protection.
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While mangroves would undoubtedly work to reduce the actual flood events, they do
nothing to address the things that make people vulnerable to them. As residents of Den
Amstel told me, it’s not the floods themselves that pose a threat but their ability to disrupt
life. It is this disruption that produces precarity and leads to a lack of socioecological
resilience. The inability of people to get by — much less flourish — with the everexisting threat of flooding has been the most frequent problem for Guyanese regardless of
race. This was likewise the case in 2005 and 2006 which saw people concreting their
yards in order to avoid missing work and school, functions which are required to feed and
house themselves even in Guyana’s mixed economy. The structuring factors of everyday
life in Guyana, a life in which the majority of the population relies precariously on daily
wage labor to meet their basic needs, remain in place even if mangroves succeed in
stopping the water from penetrating the neighborhoods.
This should not be read as a criticism of the efforts of the Guyana Mangrove
Restoration Project. To the contrary, the fact that they have successfully overcome
ecological barriers to mangrove growth should be applauded, but at the same time,
ignoring the ways in which mangroves interact with social and economic processes
means that their effects in reducing flood vulnerability will be limited. Flooding may still
occur from the river swells or from overflowing or conservancy collapse. Mangroves
may likewise present a false sense of security along the coast. During my first visit to the
GMRP offices in 2015, I was given a tour of a particularly vibrant mangrove stand in
Beterverwagting. Although most of the village sea walls are backed by a ditch to catch
any overtopped water and drain it to a nearby koker, the success of the mangrove project
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has encouraged residents to fill in that ditch and build houses adjacent to the sea wall.
Meanwhile, the mangroves themselves have become dumping grounds for those same
residents who rely on them for coastal protection.
The legal frameworks for flood control, the colonial racial geographies of the
coast, and the emergence of a racially bifurcated political system shape flood
vulnerability in complex ways. They rely on operations of power that extend beyond just
the words of the party leaders but which exist in the infrastructural logic that remains an
important part of coastal life. There is likewise a broader system at player in which the
diffuse power of the country’s political economy and continued reliance on coastal
agricultural production solidify colonial presence (see Stoler 2016). Building
socioecological resilience requires removing the systems which produce precarity for the
coastal population. A system in which the day-to-day activities or people’s basic ability
to survive are not threatened by minor coastal flooding is an apparent necessity as this
would provide an opportunity for the dynamism socioecological resilience requires (see
Angeler et al. 2016). Thus, if there is going to be a solution to coastal flooding in the
postcolonial period, it should not repeat the mistakes of the colonial, ignoring the
country’s racial geographies and political economic precarity of substantial portions of
the population and instead address the conditions that make people vulnerable in the first
place. This is reflected in the final, concluding chapter.
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CONCLUSION - COLONIAL RUINS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF FLOOD
VULNERABILITY: LESSONS FROM AND FOR GUYANA

“The only way to understand something in the past is to understand that it too used to be
a now. It’s to feel the faint breath of the air in which the human beings of yesterday lived
their lives. […] The current disaster is like a monstrous accumulation of all the deferrals
of the past, to which are added those of each day and each moment, in a continuous time
slide. But life is always decided now, and now, and now.” – The Invisible Committee,
Now (2017, 7).

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it
under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and
transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare
on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing
themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such
epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their
service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present
this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language.” –
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852/1999, 5).
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The two quotes above highlight the general essence of flood control projects in
Guyana, both their past and their presents. To summarize briefly, the current situation –
i.e. a constant threat of inundation and the catastrophic prospect of sea level rise – would
not be possible without the displacement of indigenous lives and livelihoods and the
subsequent establishment of a new colonial order. They could not exist as they do
without the brutality of enslaved labor building evermore canals and – after the abolition
of slavery – without the use of floods themselves to reinvigorate and maintain the
economic structures of colonialism that made such an arrangement worthwhile for the
Europeans who profited so heavily from it. The needs of capitalistic expansion beyond
sugar and into the empty spaces of the colonial landscape likewise set forth new
conditions in which people’s lives would and continue to face the threat of inundation
while at the same time dividing the population along racial lines, reducing social
cohesion and creating new means through which vulnerabilities to flooding can be
enacted (cf. Pelling 1999). The response has been, to a greater or lesser extent, more
walls, more pumps, more canals, more infrastructure – a solution both embedded within
the logic of the past and cognizant of the infrastructural realities of the present. Even
ecological restoration in the form of mangrove regrowth is done primarily for the
protection of humans and the capitalist world in which they inhabit and not for the sake
of the mangroves or their right to flourish as an equal inhabitant of the coast, but the
problems facing the coastal plain remain. An extracted headline from the January 24th,
1935 edition of The Daily Argosy claiming “Stagnation After a Century, Colony Either
Flooded or Burnt Out […] Irrigation and Drainage the Road to Prosperity […] Governor
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Says Development Should Be Seriously Considered” (see Figure 6) could easily be read
in one of the major newspapers of the country today.

Figure 6 - Extract from the January 24th, 1935 The Daily Argosy. Source: CO
111/727/1, The National Archives, UK

The past thus acts as a source for cumulative, intergenerational trauma in coastal
areas around the world, but particularly in Guyana and other postcolonial states where
flooding and flood vulnerability become intertwined with the racial legacies of the
colonial encounter. It not only structures the lives of individuals in the present by limiting
the range of human ideas and actions (imagining Guyana without a coast, however real a
threat, is not something most people are comfortable with), but it also continues to
inscribe on the coast the only forms of action which are seen to be legitimate: those that
rely on and recreate colonial engineering practices. Solutions to problems structured by
the past are contingent. They draw on a significant amount of information but, like the
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French armies of Marx’s time, solutions to present environmental crises offer nothing
really new, instead putting on the uniforms of the past in an attempt to address the
problems of the present. In this way a continued focus on infrastructure and likewise on
maintaining the political economic status quo without considering other possibilities for
life continues to produce conditions of precarity.

Figure 7 – The Mon Repos Coast, 2002. Source: Google Earth
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Figure 8 – The Mon Repos Coast, 2017. New housing highlighted. Source: Google Earth.

In Guyana, this is most obvious in the East Coast Demerara communities of Mon
Repos and Beterverwagting, where the success of the Guyana Mangrove Restoration
Project has encouraged new settlement in what were once lands designated as important
parts of flood control infrastructure. Figure 7 and Figure 8 highlight this development in
the case of Mon Repos. Figure 7 shows a section of the coast in 2002. With limited
mangrove protection, the area to the east of the koker was reserved for water control in
the event of overtopping. Water coming over the sea wall would fall safely into a canal
where it could be stored until tides returned to a low enough level that the koker could be
opened and the water drained back out to sea. The addition or re-establishment of
mangroves in the area changes the coastal dynamics. Mangroves break the waves far
ahead of the shore, rapidly reducing large ocean swells to little more than a ripple. In the
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process, sediment carried in those swells is deposited at the rear of the mangrove stand,
creating a new natural levee and eventually extending the coastline out to the sea
(Chapter 1; see also Othman 1991). With mangroves reducing the wave action on the
coast and thus also eliminating experiences of overtopping, people have begun to build
houses93 between the sea wall and the canal (Figure 8), creating a new proximal exposure
to sea water in the event that the mangrove forests die or otherwise give way to the sea.
This reflects a situation in which decisions about flooding are still being made in a
way that only considers the “now” but without thinking about the potential futures being
created in the process. While the material conditions will differ significantly, the general
problem of structuring future vulnerabilities through the creation of presents which don’t
consider those futures remain. Solutions for “now” must therefore also have a variety of
potential futures in mind. The financial and legislative mechanisms over flood control
enacted by colonial and postcolonial regimes served as a central means by which the
government could regulate the lives and livelihoods of Guyana’s population. These
projects corresponded to the political, economic, and racial dynamics of the country
through authoritarianisms rooted in both the hegemony of the plantocracy in the colonial
period and in the racially-driven dictatorship of Forbes Burnham and the PNC. Beyond
strict electoral control (through the refusal of adult suffrage under colonialism and blatant
election rigging under Burnham), these regimes were able to use flood control and its
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I was not able to find out who owns these or other similarly built houses. One of my
informants told me that they belong mostly to American-based Guyanese from the
villages who want a more modern house to stay in when they visit Guyana, but I could
not verify this.
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related infrastructural commitments to maintain and grow their economic and political
power. Equally important to these projects were the tax burdens imposed on AfroGuyanese populations during colonial rule and the willful neglect of flood control
infrastructure in both the colonial and postcolonial era as a means of increasing the
vulnerability of populations to ensure they could not actively resist the authoritarian state.
Additionally, in the former case, it could be argued that taxation itself served as a
separate act of governance separate from its role in funding the colony by making
colonized populations governable (Bush and Maltby 2004). During the colonial period,
new means of legislating and funding flood control infrastructure insured that alternatives
would not develop and that the laboring population would remain reliant on the
plantation system for its survival (see also Young 1958). In the postcolonial period,
infrastructural neglect was used to economically disenfranchise opposition groups who
would otherwise have threatened Burnham’s authoritarian regime. In all cases, the
concern was the maintenance of the current regime and its multitude of forms.
In plain terms, creating infrastructures for flooding “now” is going to continue to
have long-lasting impacts on both people and the environment. This is because, as I have
argued here and has been argued by others, infrastructure serves a mediating role in
everyday life. It “has become a medium of information. The information resides in
invisible, powerful activities that determine how objects and content are organized and
circulated” (Easterling 2014, 13). In Guyana, infrastructure created to deal only with
immediate problems – of colonial expansion (Chapter 1), of colonial protection (Chapter
2 and Chapter 3), and of regime survival (Chapter 4, cf. Hintzen 1989) – has worked to
produce and reinforce a racial geography in which three different colonized populations
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(Amerindian/indigenous, Afro-Guyanese, and Indo-Guyanese) occupy discrete positions
in the country geographically, economically, and politically. Likewise, it is not
necessarily possible to know what properties of a particular infrastructural response will
take. They alter and become a part of complex socionatural systems and only gain
meaning through their use (and abuse.) Thus, rather than a teleological history in which
the manipulation of flood control infrastructures for various ends is inevitable, the history
of flood control is one in which various individuals and groups wield power to respond to
a variety of spatially and temporally specific concerns stemming from and occurring
within a broader political, economic, social, geophysical, and ecological system which
they can never fully understand.
Beyond this, however, current flood control regimes and the ideologies which
conjure them have produced a long-lasting and systematic precarity with which the
average Guyanese person must contend on a daily basis. Isabell Lorey (2015, 13) has
brilliantly explained how experiences with precarity can lend themselves to unique forms
of governance, arguing that “[u]nderstanding precarization as governmental makes it
possible to problematize the complex interactions between an instrument of governing
and the conditions of economic exploitation and modes of subjectivation.” Lorey situates
her argument within neoliberalism and suggests that government by and through
precarity is unique to modern, neoliberal forms of governmentality. However, through a
genealogy of flood control I have shown in this dissertation how the continued
environmental threat of flooding and the proposed solutions in Guyana have created a
situation in which flood control infrastructure becomes itself an “instrument of
governing” with its own internal logic and structure (i.e. its own mentalité) that can be
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understood as working on the basic threat and reality of precarity. Rather than a means
for protecting the coastal region from the threat of floods, flood control projects have
been designed in such a way to protect the political, economic, and social stability of the
coast including its agricultural industries and its racial hierarchies not just from natural
hazards, but also from the ever-present threat posed by the potential resistance of the
country’s exploited classes. It does this specifically through the creation and enabling of
particular environmental forms that produce precarity and then offering infrastructural
solutions to them, producing new racial and cultural geographies in the process. This
suggests that the history of such modes of governing extend much further into history
than Lorey imagines. Lorey, in a way, falls into a trap noted by the architect Keller
Easterling (2014, 22) when she states “[w]ell-rehearsed theories like those related to
Capital or neoliberalism continue to send us to the same places to search for dangers
while other concentrations of authoritarian power escape scrutiny.” The historical
experience of coastal flooding in Guyana thus shows that many of the logics of coastal
engineering are not only embedded within but are also extensions of the colonial project
itself. They act as extensions of colonialism into the present and provide an easy-to-use
framework for deciding how to deal with problems with which a postcolonial country has
a long history. But might there be alternatives?
The idea that floods are only floods when they disrupt daily life is worth
considering. In my conversations with the people who expressed these ideas I was
initially taken aback. One man I spoke to, Marcus, went as far as to say he hadn’t
experienced a flood in recent memory despite the fact that his neighbor, who did not wish
to be recorded, complained about a flood that happened a year prior. Was the three inches
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of standing water in the alley leading to my apartment not a flood? For, Earl, the civil
engineer I spoke to who empoldered his own yard it would have been. He shared with me
several pictures showing what some would consider to be lesser events, but which caused
serious problems for him and his neighbors despite living within the normally welldrained capital city of Georgetown (see Plate 11). His response, to literally extend the
logic of colonial engineering onto his personal property, is certainly not scalable. The
average Guyanese person has neither the time nor the means to maintain such a
complicated system. But if we take seriously the idea that solutions for flooding may
already exist in the form of the everyday actions of individuals there might be some
valuable lessons to be learned when it comes to understanding both contributions to
precarity and the building of resilient coastal regions.
During my fieldwork I befriended a number of individuals of the homeless and
squatter population living in the Tiger Bay area of Georgetown. One of these men, James,
an older man originally from Bartica, told me how he and a few others in the area don’t
trust the government to maintain even the basic aspects of flood control infrastructure. He
and other squatters living in Tiger Bay collect trash from the drains and attempt to keep
water flowing so that they will not flood. James felt that if he and a few others from the
country’s most vulnerable population could have an effect on local flooding, then the
population as a whole could have a large impact if they just took better care of the places
they lived and worked. For him and the others it was a practical matter: if the area was
flooded no one would go to the shops and restaurants and there would be no one to give
them money. James was skeptical as to whether or not the shop owners or government
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would be willing to do the work but felt that if he could carry the burden of making his
neighborhood a more inhabitable space so could others who were better off.

Plate 11 - Flooding on Quamina Street, Georgetown. November 27, 2013. Photo
Courtesy of “Earl"

For James and a few of the others, cleaning drains was a collective action. It was
something done in order to improve the conditions not just for themselves but also for
others in the area. This sort of attitude has precedence among squatter communities with
Pelling (1999) noting that it was the collective action of squatters that largely prevented
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their communities from flooding in the 1990s94. I want to suggest that this sort of
collective responsibility might form one part of a solution to coastal flood threats. While
the government does have a responsibility to act on the behalf of people and prevent
flooding, too often those actions are either not enough on their own or are done in a way
that is meant to make it seem like they are doing more than they really are (as was the
case in the examples in Chapter 4).
A second component of this is the decolonization of the coast. This raises
uncomfortable questions about land and property rights, about the role of the diaspora,
and about who is responsible for colonization in the first place that I am not qualified to
answer (because the answers must come from Guyanese themselves.) But, the continued
reliance on colonial structures and systems of decision-making work to reproduce the
disconnected and at times abstract nature of colonial governance. Experimenting with
indigenous forms of coastal life (drawing from Amerindian, African, and Indian
experiences) may offer new ways to address these questions but requires that erasure of
Amerindian communities from the coast no longer be part of Guyana’s story. Based on
conversations I had with parents and school teachers, Guyanese children are still taught
that the coast was a terra nulius ready for settlement. Recognizing that colonial
settlement was not done by the colonizers but that it was done by other colonized groups
who were given control of the postcolonial state in some ways works to challenge the
legitimacy of that state.

94

These areas have since be formalized and I was told both that those types of collective
actions no longer happen and that they happen but not on the same scale.
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More generally, this disrupts what has often been seen as a clean binary between
the colonizers and the colonized. As Walter Rodney (1972) and others argued in the case
of Tanzania, decolonization can take a number of forms but when it is only legislative in
nature it does not necessarily constitute decolonization. This does not mean that all those
on the land must leave, that African and Indian Guyanese people must relinquish all
rights they can claim to the land, but that those rights might not be as exclusive as they
appear and that this might be a good thing. By beginning to undo the structures (and
infrastructures) of colonialism new possibilities for coastal life may emerge, not only in
Guyana but elsewhere. The roots of this thinking are showing in the form of Mary, BD,
and James, but can be quickly cut down by what can only be described as colonial
nostalgia95 – the idea that times were better during the colonial period and thus they
should be emulated rather than rejected. Alternatively, there is an emergent desire for
renewed colonial resistance. Mary is a vocal advocate for this, but it’s taking more
institutionalized forms as well.
In March of 2016 the villages of Beterverwagting and Triumph voted against both
major parties, electing a community group called the ‘8th of May Movement,’ so-named
because on May 8, 1839, emancipated slaves loaded 52,000 Dutch Guilders into a wheel
barrow to purchase the land that would become the villages (see Young 1955). Their goal
was to return to the forms of self-government imagined by their village founders. Leyland

95

Colonial nostalgia is typically used to refer to metropolitan tourists visiting the
colonies, but in this case I’m using it to refer to Guyanese themselves who express a
desire for a return (at least partially) to some aspects of colonial governance specifically
because they were colonial.
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Harcourt, leader of the movement, told the Guyana Chronicle “We decided to go this as a
village movement, because if we had belonged to a party we might have been asked to
toe the party line, even if it is not in the best interest of the community. […] And so we
believed that, as a community group, we are in a better position to call the shots for the
development of our community” (“Local gov’t elections…” 2016). Whether they follow
in the footsteps of their forbearers and develop alternatives has yet to be seen, but the
idea that it is communities themselves who are best situated to determine their futures is
vital to building coastal community resilience. Beyond more or better engineered systems
there is a dire need to address the social causes of vulnerability, that which makes it
possible for floods to disrupt daily life and not be simple annoyances. No one knows
better than those affected by them what the actual causes of disruption were and likewise
what they need to better handle and respond to future events, allowing them to address
the now and the future without continuing to replay the engineering logic of the past.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A – LIST OF ARCHIVAL SOURCES
Note: Directly citable items such as books, pamphlets, and newspaper articles obtained
through the archives are listed in the references.
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APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW INFORMATION

Interview Questions and Probes
Q1. Tell me about some experiences you’ve had with flooding in your
neighborhood/village/community.
-

When did the flood(s) occur?

-

For how long did it/they last?

-

What was/were the cause(s) of the flood(s)?

-

Why do you think this area was impacted?

-

Was this area impacted more than others? Why/why not?

-

Did you do anything to lessen the impacts you felt? What did you do/why not?

Q2. Do you feel that your race/ethnicity was a factor in how you experienced the flood?
How so/why not?
Q3. Do you think there are any historical factors that lead to the flooding or that shaped
your experience of it? What are they?
-

Do you think other governments/parties would have handled it differently?
How so/why not?

Q4. What do you think should be done to reduce flooding in the future?
-

Do you think this can be done? Why/why not?

-

Are there any specific programs or agencies that might help?
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